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Nowadays, deep neural networks based software have been widely applied in many areas
including safety-critical areas such as traffic control, medical diagnosis and malware detection,
etc. However, the software engineering techniques, which are supposed to guarantee the
functionality, safety as well as fairness, are not well studied. For example, some serious crashes
of DNN based autonomous cars have been reported. These crashes could have been avoided if
these DNN based software were well tested. Traditional software testing, debugging or repairing
techniques do not work well on DNN based software because there is no control flow, data flow or
AST(Abstract Syntax Tree) in deep neural networks. Proposing software engineering techniques
targeted on DNN based software are imperative. In this thesis, we first introduced the
development of SE(Software Engineering) for AI(Artificial Intelligence) area and how our works
have influenced the advancement of this new area. Then we summarized related works and some
important concepts in SE for AI area. Finally, we discussed four important works of ours.
Our first project DeepTest is one of the first few papers proposing systematic software
testing techniques for DNN based software. We proposed neuron coverage guided image
synthesis techniques for DNN based autonomous cars and leveraged domain specific
metamorphic relation to generate oracle for new generated test cases to automatically test DNN
based software. We applied DeepTest to testing three top performing self-driving car models in
Udacity self-driving car challenge and our tool has identified thousands of erroneous behaviors
that may lead to potential fatal crash.
In DeepTest project, we found that the natural variation such as spatial transformations or
rain/fog effects have led to problematic corner cases for DNN based self-driving cars. In the
follow-up project DeepRobust, we studied per-point robustness of deep neural network under
natural variation. We found that for a DNN model, some specific weak points are more likely to
cause erroneous outputs than others under natural variation. We proposed a white-box approach
and a black-box approach to identify these weak data points. We implemented and evaluated our
approaches on 9 DNN based image classifiers and 3 DNN based self-driving car models. Our
approaches can successfully detect weak points with good precision and recall for both DNN
based image classifiers and self-driving cars.
Most of existing works in SE for AI area including our DeepTest and DeepRobust focus on
instance-wise errors, which are single inputs that result in a DNN model’s erroneous outputs.
Different from instance-wise errors, group-level errors reflect a DNN model’s weak performance
on differentiating among certain classes or inconsistent performance across classes. This type of
errors is very concerning since it has been found to be related to many real-world notorious errors
without malicious attackers. In our third project DeepInspect, we first introduced the group-level
errors for DNN based software and categorized them into confusion errors and bias errors based
on real-world reports. Then we proposed neuron coverage based distance metric to detect
group-level errors for DNN based software without requiring labels. We applied DeepInspect to
testing 8 pretrained DNN models trained in 6 popular image classification datasets, including
three adversarial trained models. We showed that DeepInspect can successfully detect group-level
violations for both single-label and multi-label classification models with high precision.
As a follow-up and more challenging research project, we proposed five WR(weighted
regularization) techniques to repair group-level errors for DNN based software. These five
different weighted regularization techniques function at different stages of retraining or inference
of DNNs including input phase, layer phase, loss phase and output phase. We compared and
evaluated these five different WR techniques in both single-label and multi-label classifications
including five combinations of four DNN architectures on four datasets. We showed that WR can
effectively fix confusion and bias errors and these methods all have their pros, cons and applicable
scenario.
All our four projects discussed in this thesis have solved important problems in ensuring the
functionality, safety as well as fairness for DNN based software and had significant influence in
the advancement of SE for AI area.
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Introduction
In recent years, deep neural networks have been developed and adopted in many areas
including computer vision, natural language processing, program synthesis, recommending
systems, etc. and even in some safety-critical areas, such as self-driving cars, medical diagnosis,
malware detection, etc. However, these DNN based software have not been adequately tested and
thus the functionality, safety as well as fairness are not guaranteed. This is because existing
software testing techniques for DNN based software are very limited and most of deep learning
researchers and developers only focus on improving the accuracy in test data[1, 2, 3, 4] and
neglect other software quality measurement. Most of traditional software testing techniques do
not work for DNN based software. The DNN based software, unlike traditional software where
program logic is manually written by software developers, learn its logic automatically from the
training data. The learned weights as well as model structures (neurons and layers) are much
harder to interpret and thus challenging for debugging. The code coverage such as statement
coverage, branch coverage, MC/DC coverage[5, 6, 7], etc., which are used for measuring how
well traditional software are tested, do not work for DNNs at all. The test generation techniques,
such as MHS(metaheuristic search)[8] based test generation[9, 10, 11, 12] and the symbolic
execution based test generation[13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18], etc. do not work for DNNs because the
complex input type such as image or video and there is no control flow or data flow in DNNs.
There are some software testing techniques for machine learning based software, which can be
adapted to DNN based software, such as applying metamorphic testing to machine learning
applications without test oracles[19, 20, 21, 22]. However, these software testing techniques do
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not leverage information specifically in DNNs such as neurons, gradients, weights, loss functions
and etc. and thus have limited effect and performance. Similarly, existing automatic program
repairing techniques are also only targeted to traditional software.[23]. These techniques include
random or guided mutation of AST(Abstract Syntax Tree)[24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31], static
program analysis or symbolic execution/concrete execution[32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37] and most
recently, language models training and program synthesis[38, 39]. All these techniques for
repairing traditional programs such as C, C++ or Java, cannot work on DNN based software
because there is no control flow, data flow or AST in deep neural networks.
However, just like traditional software, DNN-based software suffer from unexpected corner
cases that can lead to dangerous consequences like a fatal collision in self-driving cars. Several
such real-world cases have already been reported (see Table 1). For example, the fatal Tesla crash
resulted from a failure to detect a white truck against the bright sky. Such severe crashes could be
avoided if the DNN based autonomous cars are well tested. The existing possible approaches to
detect such bugs depend heavily on manual collection of labeled test data and techniques to
measure how well the DNN based software is tested are not available. The systematic testing
tools for DNN based software are far away from being ready, not mentioning the repairing
techniques for repairing DNN based software. Therefore, proposing software engineering
techniques for DNN based software are imperative and in urgent need.
Table 1: Examples of real-world accidents involving autonomous cars
Reported Date Cause Outcome Comments
Hyundai Competition [40] December, 2014 Rain fall Crashed while
testing
"The sensors failed to pick up street signs, lane markings, and
even pedestrians due to the angle of the car shifting in rain and
the direction of the sun" [40]
Tesla autopilot mode [41] July, 2016 Image contrast Killed the driver "The camera failed to recognize the white truck against a bright
sky" [42]
Google self-driving car [43] February, 2016 Failed to estimate speed Hit a bus while
shifting lane
"The car assumed that the bus would yield when it attempted
to merge back into traffic" [43]
Initially, DNNs are mostly developed by machine learning researchers, who are interested
in improving the performance with respect to test accuracy. In this thesis, we argue the necessity
of more software engineering measurement and software engineering techniques that can work
for DNN based software. It is significantly important to design, implement and evaluate new
2




(d) -9°, dog (e) 0°, bird (f) +6°, bird (g) +24°,
bird
(h) -9°, bird
Figure 1: (a)-(d) A well-trained ResNet model [47] misclassifies the rotated variations of a bird image
into three different classes though the original un-rotated image is classified correctly. (e)-(h) The
same model successfully classifies all the rotated variants of another bird image from the same test
set. The sub-captions consist of rotation degrees and the predicted classes.
systematic testing tools that can work for DNN based software to assure the functionality, safety
as well as fairness. One of our work DeepTest to be discussed in Chapter 3 is one of the first few
paper applying software engineering techniques on DNN based software. We proposed neuron
coverage guided image synthesis techniques to generate test cases for DNN based software and at
the same time maximize the coverage of new neurons. Different from DeepXplore[44], which
requires multiple implementations required by differential testing, ours is able to test single
implementation by leveraging metamorphic testing to generate labels for those new generated test
cases as the test oracle to automatically test DNN based software. We apply DeepTest to testing
top-rank DNN based self-driving car models in Udacity self-driving car challenge and our tool
discovers thousands of erroneous behaviours that may lead to potential fatal crash. We also retrain
these self-driving car models with our new generated test inputs and show that those bugs can be
fixed after retraining.
Deep neural networks are extremely vulnerable to natural variation such as spatial
transformations or rain/fog effects. The natural variants are especially concerning as they can
occur naturally in the field without any active adversary and may lead to serious
consequences [45, 46]. In our second project DeepRobust, we tried to understand per-point
robustness of deep neural network under natural variation. We found that not all the inputs under
natural variation will result in erroneous outputs for a DNN. There are specific "weak" data
points, which are more likely to fail a deep neural network than other data points. For example,
consider Figure 1, although the original bird image (a) is predicted correctly by a DNN, its rotated
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variations in images (b)-(d) are mispredicted to three different classes. This makes the original
image (a) very weak as far as robustness is concerned. In contrast, the bird image (e) and all its
rotated versions (generated by the same degrees of rotation) in Figure 1:(f)-(h) are correctly
classified. Thus, the original image (e) is quite robust. It is important to distinguish between such
robust vs. non-robust images, as the non-robust ones can induce errors with slight natural
variations.
Existing works in DNN robustness mainly focuses on evaluating the overall robustness of
DNNs across all the test data [47, 48, 49]. This is analogous to estimating how buggy a software
is without actually localizing the bugs in traditional software. We argued that DNN is a
combination of data and architecture. DeepRobust(Chapter 4) focuses on localizing the
non-robust points in the input space that pose significant threats to a DNN model’s robustness.
Different from traditional software where bug localization is performed in program space, we
identify the non-robust inputs in the data space. To address this problem, we proposed a white-box
approach(DEEPROBUST-W) and a black-box approach(DEEPROBUST-B) to identify these weak
data points for DNN based software. We applied our approaches to testing 9 DNN based image
classifiers and 3 DNN based self-driving car models. Our results show that DEEPROBUST-W and
DEEPROBUST-B are able to achieve an F1 score of up to 91.4% and 99.1%, respectively in
testing DNN based image classifiers. DEEPROBUST-W is effective in identifying weak data
points with F1 score up to 78.9% in testing DNN based self-driving car models.
More and more papers have been published in SE for AI area, as the software engineering
techniques are urgently demanded for machine learning based software. Similar to code coverage
in traditional software, different coverage for DNNs such as neuron coverage[44], k-multisection
coverage and boundary coverage[50], SS(sign-sign coverage) coverage[51], etc. have been
proposed and evaluated for DNNs. Similar to test generations in traditional software, norm based
perturbation[52, 44] , natural transformations[53, 47] based and GAN(Generative Adversarial
Networks)[46] based test generation have been proposed to generate corner cases input for testing
DNNs. Metamorphic testing[53, 46], fuzzing testing[52, 54, 55], mutation testing[56], differential
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testing[44] and concolic testing[57, 58], etc. have been proposed for DNN based software.
Abstract interpreter[59] has been proposed to verify DNN based software. Image
transformations[47, 60] or data augmentation techniques[61, 55] are proposed to evaluate the
robustness of DNN based software.
Besides of the new testing techniques for DNN based software, the repairing techniques for
DNN based software have been studied too[62]. Different data augmentation and fine-tuning
techniques have been proposed for repairing DNN models in improving overall accuracy[63, 64,
65]. There are also works in improving robustness of DNN models against adversarial
instances[55, 60, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75].
However, existing studies including our DeepTest and DeepRobust in detecting and
repairing errors only focus on instance-wise errors, while group-level errors are mostly ignored.
An instance-wise error happens when a DNN model outputs inconsistent prediction given a
specific input[44, 45, 76, 72]. These inputs include adversarial examples from norm-bounded
perturbation[72], realistic transformation[47] of an existing input, or physical attack[77], etc.. To
repair these instance-wise errors, techniques such as adversarial training, data augmentation, etc.
are widely leveraged [72, 47]. In contrast, group-level error is about the DNN model’s weak
performance on differentiating among certain classes or has inconsistent performance across
classes[78]. This type of bugs is very concerning since it has been found to relate to many
real-world notorious errors without malicious attackers[78] as shown in Table 2. For example,
Google faced backlash in 2015 due to a notorious error in its photo-tagging app, which tagged
pictures of dark-skinned people as “gorillas” [79]. Analogous to traditional software bugs, the
Software Engineering (SE) literature denotes these classification errors as model bugs [65], which
can arise due to either imperfect model structure or inadequate training data.
In one of our works, DeepInspect, to be discussed in Chapter 5, we investigated some
public reports describing the class-level violations listed in Table 2, and categorized them into two
group-level errors: (i) Confusion Errors: The model cannot differentiate one class from another.
For example, Google Photos confuses skier and mountain [81]. (ii) Bias Errors: The model
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Table 2: Examples of real-world bugs reported in neural image classifiers
Bug Type Name Report Date Outcome
Gorilla Tag [79] Jul 1, 2015 Black people were tagged as gorillas by Google photo app.
Confusion Elephant is detected Aug 9, 2018 Image Transplantation (replacing a sub-region of an image by
in a room [80] another image containing a trained object) leads to mis-classification.
Google Photo [81] Dec 10, 2018 Google Photo confuses skier and mountain.
Nikon Camera [82] Jan 22, 2010 Camera shows bias toward Caucasian faces when detecting people’s blinks.
Men Like Shopping [83] July 29, 2017 Multi-label object classification models show bias towards women on
Bias activities like shopping, cooking, washing, etc.
Gender Shades[84] 2018 Open-source face recognition services provided by IBM, Microsoft, and Face++
have higher error rates on darker-skin females for gender classification.
shows disparate outcomes between two related groups. For example, Zhao et al. in their paper
“Men also like shopping” [83], find classification bias in favor of women on activities like
shopping, cooking, washing, etc. We further notice that in the case of confusion errors, the
classification error-rate between the objects of two classes, say, cat and dog, can be significantly
higher than the overall classification error rate of the model trained in CIFAR-10 dataset. In the
bias scenario reported by Zhao et al., a DNN model, while classifying the gender of a person,
may mistakenly associate gender with a given specific activity, object or environment such as
shopping, sports or kitchen. Different from instance-wise errors, this is a class level property
affecting all the shopping, sports or kitchen images with men or women. Any violation of such a
property by definition affects the whole class although not necessarily every image in that class,
e.g., a man is more prone to be predicted as a woman when he is shopping, in the kitchen or hold
a baby, even though some individual images of a man may still be predicted correctly.
In DeepInspect, we also proposed a novel neuron-coverage metric to automatically detect
group-level violations (confusion and bias errors) in DNN-based models for image classification.
Our tool DeepInspect found many errors in widely-used DNN models with precision up to 100%
(avg. 72.6%) for confusion errors and up to 84.3% (avg. 66.8%) for bias errors. DeepInspect
shows that these group-level errors occur in all popular models trained in popular classification
dataset including single-label image classification where each image is labeled with one object
and multi-label image classification where each image is associated with a set of labels. The
following lists some examples of group-level errors DeepInspect identified in DNN models
trained in popular image classification datasets. Figure 2, 3, 4 and 5 presents examples of
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confusion errors respectively from COCO, ImageNet, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. Figure 6, 7
presents examples of bias errors respectively from COCO gender and ImSitu dataset.
(a) laptop -> laptop,mouse (b) bus -> bus,traffic lights (c) skis -> snowboard
Figure 2: Examples of confusion errors found in COCO dataset
(a) cello -> violin (b) violin -> cello (c) wok -> pan
Figure 3: Examples of confusion errors found in ImageNet dataset
(a) bird -> deer (b) bird -> deer (c) cat -> dog (d) cat -> dog
Figure 4: Examples of confusion errors found in CIFAR10
A much harder and reasonable follow-up problem to solve is how to repair these errors.
One of the root causes is that certain classes are harder to be differentiated from each other. For
example, in CIFAR-10, dog and cat tend to confuse even a state-of-the-art DNN model since they
7
(a) boy -> girl (b) boy -> girl (c) oak -> maple (d) oak -> maple
Figure 5: Examples of confusion errors found in CIFAR100
(a) given surfboard, woman -> man (b) given frisbee, woman -> man
Figure 6: Examples of bias errors found in COCO gender dataset
(a) given outside, woman -> man (b) given room, man -> woman
Figure 7: Examples of bias errors found in ImSitu dataset
share many common semantic features. For multi-label classification, one of the root causes is
that two classes may appear together frequently. For example, in COCO dataset, mouse and laptop
appear in the same image frequently, which make it hard for DNN model to distinguish between
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them. The confusing pair of classes tend to be very close with each other in the representation
space and the decision boundary between them might not be "fine-grained" enough for correct
classification on these confusing pairs. We denote the error-inducing classes as target classes. To
fix the errors of the target classes, the model needs to take more effort to learn from them.
In the last work(Chapter 6) to be discussed in this thesis, We propose a generic method
called weighted regularization (WR) to repair group level errors in DNN based software. WR
consists of five weighted regularization methods including weighted augmentation (w-aug),
weighted batch normalization (w-bn), weighted output smoothing (w-os), weighted loss (w-loss),
and weighted distance-based regularization (w-dbr). These methods function at different stage of
a given DNN’s training or inference as shown in Figure 8. Specifically, if retraining is allowed
and training data are accessible, w-aug assigns more weights to the target classes during the
retraining; w-bn re-scales the distribution of the activation values induced by the input at every
batchnorm layer to shift the decision boundary toward target classes(assuming the model has
batchnorm layers); w-loss modifies the loss function by assigning more weights to the
mis-classification occurring between target classes while w-dbr updates the loss function by
regularizing the class centroids in the representation space. Such regularization strategies enable
the model to emphasize more on the instances of the target classes and thus reduce the errors
between the target classes. If fine-tuning is not possible or training data are not accessible, w-os
multiplies the model’s prediction on target classes by a small user-specified constant to make the
model predict less the target class such that those unsure data points located in decision
boundary(mis-classification between target classes ) can be avoided.
Figure 9 illustrates how these different approaches function using an example consists of
three classes (square, circle and diamond). The colors represent the model’s prediction while the
dashed lines denote the model’s decision boundary. Figure 9(a) shows that the original model
tends to confuse between square and circle. The ideal fix of decision boundary is shown in
Figure 9(d). w-os solves the confusion error by contracting the decision boundary of the target
classes as illustrated in Figure 9(c). w-aug, w-loss, and w-dbr try to reduce confusion by shifting
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Figure 8: Overview of Weighted Regularization for Target Fixing
(a)Original (b)Shifted (c)Contracted (d)Ideal
Figure 9: Illustration of different potential decision boundary before and after applying WR.
the decision boundary. They may be able to achieve Figure 9(d) but it may also be possible to
sacrifice the decision boundary for other classes and get the decision boundary in Figure 9(b)
instead. w-bn comes in between: on the one hand, it tends to contract the decision boundary as
w-os; on the other hand, it tends to shift the decision boundary through fine-tuning. We evaluate
different regularization methods and compare their effectiveness on four widely-used datasets and
architectures and show that WR can effectively fix confusion and bias errors and these approaches
all have their pros, cons and applicable scenario. The detail results will be discussed in Chapter 6.
In summary, this thesis incorporates four major projects in SE for AI area.
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• Chapter 3: DeepTest(Automated Testing of DNN based Autonomous Cars), published in
ICSE’ 18[45]
• Chapter 4: DeepRobust(Understanding Local Robustness of Deep Neural Networks under
Natural Variations), published in FASE’ 21[76]
• Chapter 5: DeepInspect(Automated Testing Group Level Errors for DNN based Image
Classifiers), published in ICSE’ 20[78]
• Chapter 6: WR (Repair Group Level Errors for DNN based Image Classifiers Using
Weighted Regularization), one short paper published in FSE’ 20[85], another 12-page paper
in submission.
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Chapter 1: Problem Statement
1.1 Problem Statement
Our studies focus on proposing new software engineering techniques to ensure the functional-
ity, safety as well as fairness for DNN based software.
In recent years, more and more papers have been published in this SE for AI area from coverage
metric for DNNs to automatic testing, repairing and verification for DNN based software. Here we
discuss existing works’ limitation, specify the problems our projects try to solve and summarize
our contributions.
• Before our DeepTest project, there is very few paper in SE for AI area. Most of works were
trying to improve DNNs’ generalization with respect to natural accuracy in deep learning
studies[1, 2, 3, 4] or robust accuracy in adversarial examples studies[61, 86]. Pei et al. in
DeepXplore proposed neuron coverage to measure how well a DNN based software is tested,
leveraged gradient based perturbation to generate test inputs to test image classifiers[44]. Our
project DeepTest(Chapter 3) presents an neuron coverage based grey-box approach to guide
our generation of test inputs. In contrast to gradient based perturbation by DeepXplore we
are using nature image transformations including rain or fog weather to simulate the camera
shake, different weather conditions, etc. Our generated test inputs are more natural since the
image transformations can very well simulate the real-world driving conditions.
• Pei et al. in DeepXplore applied differential testing from software engineering in testing dif-
ferent DNN models. However, differential testing requires multiple DNN models. We pro-
posed domain specific metamorphic relation to generate oracles for all the synthesized im-
ages, which enables the testing of single DNN model in DeepTest(Chapter 3). DeepTest ap-
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plies metamorphic testing from software engineering to testing the DNN driven autonomous
cars as one of the first few paper in SE for AI area.
• As a follow-up project of DeepTest(Chapter 3), we conducted an empirical study on per-
point robustness under natural variation to dig further into DNNs’ vulnerability against nat-
ural transformations in DeepRobust(Chapter 4). Existing works in DNN robustness, focuses
on evaluating the overall robustness of DNNs across all the test data [47, 48, 49]. This is
analogous to estimating how buggy a software is without actually localizing the bugs in tra-
ditional software. DeepRobust(Chapter 4) tries to localize the non-robust points in the input
space that pose significant threats to a DNN model’s robustness. However, unlike traditional
software where bug localization is performed in program space, we identify the non-robust
inputs in the data space. We proposed white-box and black-box solutions in identifying non-
robust points for both DNN based image classifiers and DNN based self-driving car models.
• In recent years, more and more papers have been published in DNN testing, repairing as
well as verification. However, all of these works focus on instance-wise errors, while group-
level errors are completely ignored. An instance-wise error is a classification mistake a
DNN model makes, given a specific input. This input could be an original test case or
an adversarial test case from norm-bounded perturbation[72], natural transformation[47],
or physical attack[77] etc. In contrast, group-wise error is about the DNN model’s weak
performance on differentiating among certain classes or has inconsistent performance across
classes. Our paper DeepInspect(Chapter 5) categorizes group-level errors into confusion
errors and bias errors and proposes neuron coverage based metric to detect confusion errors
and bias errors in DNN based single-label and multi-label classifiers.
• A reasonable follow-up and more challenging problem is to repair group level errors for
DNN based software. Our last project(Chapter 6) proposed five different weighted regular-
ization techniques to address this problem. These five different techniques are leveraged in
different stages of DNN retraining or inference including input phase, layer phase, output
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phase and loss phase. We compare and evaluate these five different WR techniques in both
single-label and multi-label DNN-based classifications including five combinations of four
DNN architectures for four datasets. The results show that WR can effectively fix confusion
and bias errors and these methods all have their pros, cons and applicable scenario.
1.2 Thesis Overview
Following this chapter, we include a detail literature review in the SE for AI areas where our
works focus on and necessary background knowledge in computer vision, machine learning and
software engineering to prepare readers for following chapters’ discussion. In Chapter 3, we pre-
sented our project DeepTest, which, to our knowledge, is the first systematic testing tool for DNN
based autonomous cars. We will discuss our neuron coverage guided inputs synthesize algorithm
and how we apply metamorphic testing in DNNs as well as the implementation and evaluation of
our tool DeepTest on top performing models in Udacity self-driving car challenge. In Chapter 4,
we presented our project DeepRobust in understanding the local robustness of deep neural net-
works under natural variation. We showed our finding that only specific weak points would result
in errors under natural variation. We proposed a white-box approach and black-box approach to
identify these weak points for DNN based image classifiers and DNN based self-driving cars. In
Chapter 5, we presented our project DeepInspect, which introduces the concepts of group-level
errors in DNNs and categorizes them into confusion errors and bias errors. We will discuss the
difference between group-level errors and instance-wise errors. We will also discuss the method-
ology and evaluation of DeepInspect, a systematic tool to identify group-level errors for DNN
based image classifiers. In Chapter 6, we presented our project "Repairing group-level errors using
weighted regularization". In this chapter, we discuss the five weighted regularization approaches,
which works on different stages of retraining and inference and thus can be applied in different
scenarios to effectively repair group-level errors. We conclude this thesis with a summary of con-
tribution, discussion of existing works’ limitation, potential future works.
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Chapter 2: Background and Related Work
Our works discussed in this thesis explored and proposed new software engineering techniques
for DNN based software to ensure the functionality, security as well as fairness. First in Sec-
tion 2.1, we briefly summarized traditional software engineering techniques, explained the differ-
ence between traditional software and DNN based software and showed why traditional software
techniques cannot work on DNN based software. In Section 2.2, we introduced the popular DNN
architectures and two DNN based software, DNN based autonomous cars and DNN based image
classifiers. DNN based autonomous car is one of most popular safety critical DNN applications in
recent years and its safety issues are very concerning. We introduced DNN based autonomous cars
to prepare readers for our first project in proposing systematic testing techniques for DNN based
autonomous cars. Image classification is one of the most popular DNN applications. We intro-
duced two types of image classification tasks, single-label/multi-class classification and multi-label
classification to prepare readers for our third and fourth project in detecting and repairing errors in
DNN based image classifiers. Both DNN based autonomous cars and DNN based image classifiers
are useful for understanding the second project because the second project proposed approaches in
localizing non-robust points for both DNN based applications. Then in Section 2.3, we discussed
related works in DNN testing and repairing techniques. There are generally two categories of er-
rors in DNN testing and repairing, instance-wise errors and group level errors. We showed that
most of existing works in SE for AI focus on instance-wise errors and motivated readers about the
importance of group level errors to prepare readers for our third and fourth project in proposing
techniques in testing DNN based software with respect to group level errors. Lastly in Section 2.4,
we discussed the related works in DNN bias/fairness to prepare readers for our third and fourth
project in detecting bias errors and repairing bias triples for DNN based software.
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2.1 Software Testing and Repair
2.1.1 Test Generation and Test Criteria
Software testing for traditional software usually involves test generation, amplification and
leveraging different test criteria to measure the quality of a test set or how well the software has
been tested. There is a large body of work on test case generation and amplification techniques
for traditional software that automatically generate test cases from some seed inputs and increase
code coverage. Instead of summarizing them individually here, we refer the interested readers to
the surveys by Anand et al. [87], McMinn et al. [9], and Pasareanu et al. [88]. There are also
well-established test criteria for traditional software including statement coverage, branch cover-
age, MC/DC coverage[5, 6, 7], etc.. However, these test generation and amplification techniques
as well as test criteria for traditional software cannot work for DNN based software because there
is no control flow or data flow in DNNs and the input type for DNN based software is usually much
more complex such as image or video. Inspired from test amplification for traditional software,
one of the contributions in our work DeepTest(Chapter 3) is to automatically generate test inputs
for DNN based autonomous cars and at the same time maximize the neuron coverage. In our sec-
ond project DeepInspect(Chapter 5), we propose neuron coverage based metric to test DNN based
image classifiers for group-level errors/bugs. The approaches we propose can be generalized for
other DNN based software as well, although the evaluation is targeted to a specific type of software
application.
2.1.2 Software Repair
For the automatic program repair techniques that target traditional software, we refer interested
readers to this review[23]. In summary, automatic program repairing techniques include random
or guided mutation of AST(Abstract Syntax Tree)[24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31], static program
analysis or symbolic execution/concrete execution[32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37] and most recently, lan-
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guage models training and program synthesis[38, 39]. All these techniques for repairing traditional
programs such as C, C++ or Java, cannot work on DNN based software because there is no control
flow, data flow or AST in deep neural networks. In our third major project(Chapter 6), we pro-
pose weighted regularization techniques, which can automatically repair DNN based software for
group-level errors.
2.2 DNN based Software
2.2.1 DNN Architectures
Most popular DNNs used in DNN based software can be categorized into two types: (1) Con-
volutional Neural Network (CNN), and (2) Recurrent neural network (RNN). We provide a brief
description of each architecture below and refer the interested readers to [89] for more detailed
descriptions.
CNN architecture. The most significant signature to distinguish a CNN from a fully connected
neural network is the convolution layers. The neurons in a convolution layer are connected only to a
subset of the neurons in the next layer and multiple connections share the same weight. The sets of
connections sharing the same weights are essentially a convolution kernel [90] that applies the same
convolution operation on the outputs of a set of neurons in the previous layer. Figure 2.1a illustrates
a simplified CNN based self-driving car architecture with three convolution layers, which is similar
to the models used in practice [91].
CNNs have much fewer trainable parameters than fully connected neural networks by allowing
sharing of weights among multiple connections and thus the training process of CNNs is much
faster. CNNs perform especially well for image or video input as their architecture resembles the
human visual system which extracts a layer-wise representation of visual input [90, 92].
RNN architecture. In RNNs[93], the output of each layer is not only fed to the following layer but
also flow back to the previous layer. Such arrangement allows the prediction output for previous
inputs (e.g.,, previous frames in a video sequence or previous words in a sentence) to be also
considered in predicting current input.
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(a) A simplified CNN architecture
(b) A simplified RNN architecture
Figure 2.1: (Upper row) A simplified CNN architecture with a convolution kernel shown on the top-left
part of the input image. (Lower row) A simplified RNN architecture with loops in its hidden layers.
Figure 2.1b illustrates a simplified version of the RNN based self-driving car architecture.
Similar to other DNNs, RNNs also leverage gradient descent to update weights during back
propagation for training. However, it is well known that the gradient, when propagated through
multiple loops in an RNNs, may vanish to zero or explode to an extremely large value [94] and
therefore may lead to an inaccurate model. Long short-term memory (LSTM) [95], a popular
subgroup of RNNs, is designed to solve this vanishing/exploding gradient problem. We encourage
interested readers to refer to [95] for more details.
2.2.2 DNN based Autonomous Cars
Our first major project DeepTest(Chapter 3) proposed techniques for automatically testing
DNN based autonomous cars. Here we briefly introduce DNN based autonomous cars. The key
component of an autonomous vehicle is the perception module controlled by the underlying Deep
Neural Network (DNN) [96, 97]. The DNN takes input from different sensors like camera, light
sensors and LiDAR sensors, and so on, which can measure the environment, and outputs the steer-
ing angle, braking, acceleration, etc. to maneuver the car safely in road as shown in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: A simple autonomous car DNN that takes inputs from camera, light sensors and LiDAR sensors,
and etc., and outputs steering angle, braking, and acceleration control. The DNN models the function
f() (2) · f() (1) · x)) where )s represent the weights of the edges and f is the activation function. The
details of the computations performed inside a single neuron are shown on the right.
DNNs(including CNNs and RNNs) are composed of multiple layers stacked together to extract
different level of representations of the input [98]. Each layer of the DNN increasingly abstracts
the input, e.g.,, from raw pixels to semantic concepts. For example, the first few layers of an
autonomous car DNN extract low-level features such as edges and directions, while the deeper
layers identify objects like stop signs and other cars, and the final layer outputs the steering decision
(e.g.,, turning left or right by some degree).
Each layer of a DNN consists of multiple computing units called neurons. The neurons between
adjacent layers are connected through edges, which has a corresponding weight ()s as shown in
Figure 2.2). Each neuron applies a nonlinear activation function on its inputs and sends the output
to the subsequent neurons as shown in Figure 2.2. Popular activation functions include ReLU (Rec-
tified Linear Unit) [99], Sigmoid [100], etc. The weights of a DNN is learned by backpropagation
during the training process. Gradient descent is usually adapted in backpropagation [101]. After
training, an inference of DNN with learned weights can be used for predictions. For example, an
autonomous car DNN can predict the steering angle based on input images.
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2.2.3 DNN based Image Classifier
Our second major project(Chapter 5) and third major project(Chapter 6) focus on testing and
repairing DNN based image classifiers respectively. Image classification is one of the most popular
applications of deep neural networks. There are generally two type of image classification tasks.
(i) Single-label Classification. In single-label classification problem, each datum is associated
with a single label l from a set of disjoint labels ! where |! | > 1. If |! | = 2, the classification
problem is called a binary classification problem; if |! | > 2, it is a multi-class classification
problem [102]. Among some popular image classification datasets, MNIST, CIFAR-10/CIFAR-
100 [103] and ImageNet [104] are all single-label, where each image can be categorized into only
one class or outside that class.
(ii) Multi-label Classification. In a multi-label classification problem, each datum is associated
with a set of labels Y where . ⊆ !. COCO[105] and imSitu[106] are popular datasets for multi-
label classification. For example, an image from the COCO dataset can be labeled as bus, person,
traffic light. A multi-label classification model is supposed to predict all of bus, person, traffic light
from a single image that shows all of these kinds of objects.
Given any single- or multi-label classification task, DNN based classifier is supposed to learn
the decision boundary between different classes—all members of a class, say 8, should be cate-
gorized identically irrespective of their individual features, and members of another class, say  9 ,
should not be categorized to 8 [107]. The DNN represents the input image in an embedded space
with the feature vector at a certain intermediate layer and uses the subsequent layers as a classifier
to classify these representations. The class separation between two classes estimates how well the
DNN has learned to separate each class from the other. If the distance in an embedded feature
space between two classes is too small compared to other classes, or lower than some pre-defined
threshold, the DNN can hardly separate them from each other.
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2.3 DNN Testing and Repairing
2.3.1 Against Instance-wise Errors
Most of existing works in DNN testing focus on identifying instance-wise errors. An instance-
wise error happens when a DNN model outputs inconsistent prediction across different semantic-
preserving transformations of a given input [44, 45, 76, 72]. Testing of DNN based software for
instance-wise errors usually involves generating test cases using norm-bounded perturbation[72],
natural transformation[47], generative adversarial network[46] or physical attack[77], etc.. Sim-
ilar to coverage metric in traditional software, coverage metrics such as neuron coverage[44], k-
multisection coverage[50], neuron boundary coverage[50] and sign-sign coverage[108] have been
proposed for DNN based software to evaluate how well these software are tested. Different white-
box and black-box testing approaches based on these new metrics have been proposed to identify
instance-wise errors for DNN based software [44, 53, 46, 57, 52].
Adversarial deep learning studies also target instance wise errors. DNNs are known to be
vulnerable to well-crafted inputs called adversarial examples, where the discrepancies are imper-
ceptible to a human but can easily fool deep neural network models [109, 110, 111, 112, 77,
113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121]. These adversarial examples can be used to test
DNN based software. However, they are manually crafted and may not exist in reality. Our work
DeepTest(Chapter 3) leveraged image transformations to simulate camera shake, weather condi-
tion, etc.. Our generated test cases are more realistic and at the same time maximize neuron cover-
age. Our follow-up project DeepRobust(chapter 4) studied per-point robustness of neural network
under natural transformations and proposed both white-box and black-box solutions to identify
non-robust data points for DNN based image classifiers and self-driving cars.
There are also studies in repairing DNN based software against instance-wise errors or defend-
ing against adversarial attacks by using adversarial training or data augmentation [122, 123, 124,
125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 75, 72, 47]. Our work DeepTest(Chapter 3) also
shows that retraining with our generated test cases can repair the DNN based software.
21
2.3.2 Against Group-level Errors
Group-level errors are about the DNN model’s weak performance on differentiating among
certain classes or has inconsistent performance across classes[78]. For example, Google faced
backlash in 2015 due to a notorious error in its photo-tagging app, which tagged pictures of dark-
skinned people as “gorillas” [79]. Our third project(Chapter 5) investigates some public reports
describing the class-level violations listed in Table 2, and categorize them into two group-level
errors: (i) Confusion Errors: The model cannot differentiate one class from another. For example,
Google Photos confuses skier and mountain [81]. (ii) Bias Errors: The model shows disparate
outcomes between two related groups. For example, a DNN model should not have different error
rates while classifying the gender of a person, given a specific activity, object or environment such
as shopping, sports or kitchen. Unlike individual image properties, this is a class property affecting
all the shopping, sports or kitchen images with men or women. Any violation of such a property
by definition affects the whole class although not necessarily every image in that class. Our third
project(Chapter 5) is the first paper to propose techniques in testing DNN based software against
group level errors. Our fourth project(Chapter 6) proposed weighted regularization approaches to
repair DNN based software against target confusion errors or bias errors.
2.4 Bias/Fairness Related Work
Evaluating Models’ Bias/Fairness. Evaluating the bias and fairness of a system is important both
from a theoretical and a practical perspective [134, 135, 136, 137]. Related studies first define a
fairness criteria and then try to optimize the original objective while satisfying the fairness criteria
[138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143]. These properties are defined either at individual [138, 144, 145] or
group levels [146, 139, 147].
Galhotra et al. [148] first applied the notion of software testing to evaluating software fairness.
They mutate the sensitive features of the inputs and check whether the output changes. One major
problem with their proposed method, Themis, is that it assumes the model takes into account
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sensitive attribute(s) during training and inference. This assumption is not realistic since most
existing fairness-aware models drop input-sensitive feature(s). Besides, Themis will not work on
image classification, where the sensitive attribute (e.g.,, gender, race) is a visual concept that cannot
be flipped easily.
Our third project(Chapter 5) proposed a white-box approach to measure the bias learned by the
model during training. Our testing method does not require the model to take into account any
sensitive feature(s). We propose a new fairness notion for the setting of multi-object classification,
average confusion disparity, and a proxy, average bias, to measure for any deep learning model
even when only unlabeled testing data is provided. In addition, our method tries to provide an
explanation behind the discrimination. Our last project(Chapter 6) proposed weighted regulariza-
tion methods, which can be applied in different stage of retraining or inference based on different
scenarios and usage, to reduce bias among the target bias triple.
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Chapter 3: DeepTest: Automated Testing of DNN based Autonomous Cars
In this chapter, we introduce our first project DeepTest, which is one of the first few papers
in proposing software testing techniques for DNN based software and promoting the birth of SE
for AI area. In this project, we proposed systematic test generation and automatic software test-
ing techniques for DNN based software such as autonomous cars. We leveraged realistic image
transformations to simulate different driving conditions such as camera shake, lightning condition,
weather condition, etc. for generating corner cases and proposed neuron coverage guided test gen-
eration to synthesize corner cases and maximize the neuron coverage at the same time. We also
leveraged metamorphic testing to generate oracle for these new generated test inputs to automati-
cally test DNN based software. Finally, we implemented our proposed techniques in DeepTest and
applied our tool in testing three top performing models in Udacity self-driving car challenge. Our
tool identified thousands of erroneous behaviors that may lead to potential fatal crash. We also
show that our generated test inputs can be used to repair those errors after retraining.
We publicly release the source code1. All images, figures, tables, equations, and text included
in this chapter is based on a published collaborative work [53].
3.1 Motivation
Significant progress in Machine Learning (ML) techniques like Deep Neural Networks (DNNs)
over the last decade has enabled the development of safety-critical ML systems like autonomous
cars. Several major car manufacturers including Tesla, GM, Ford, BMW, and Waymo/Google are
building and actively testing these cars. Recent results show that autonomous cars have become
very efficient in practice and already driven millions of miles without any human intervention [149,
150]. Twenty US states including California, Texas, and New York have recently passed legislation
1https://github.com/ARiSE-Lab/deepTest
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to enable testing and deployment of autonomous vehicles [151].
However, despite the tremendous progress, just like traditional software, DNN-based software,
including the ones used for autonomous driving, often demonstrate incorrect/unexpected corner-
case behaviors that can lead to dangerous consequences like a fatal collision. Several such real-
world cases have already been reported (see Table 3.1). As Table 3.1 clearly shows, such crashes
often happen under rare previously unseen corner cases. For example, the fatal Tesla crash re-
sulted from a failure to detect a white truck against the bright sky. The existing mechanisms for
detecting such erroneous behaviors depend heavily on manual collection of labeled test data or ad
hoc, unguided simulation [152, 153] and therefore miss numerous corner cases. Since these cars
adapt behavior based on their environment as measured by different sensors (e.g., camera, Infrared
obstacle detector, etc.), the space of possible inputs is extremely large. Thus, unguided simulations
are highly unlikely to find many erroneous behaviors.
Table 3.1: Examples of real-world accidents involving autonomous cars
Reported Date Cause Outcome Comments
Hyundai Competition [40] December, 2014 Rain fall Crashed while
testing
"The sensors failed to pick up street signs, lane markings, and
even pedestrians due to the angle of the car shifting in rain and
the direction of the sun" [40]
Tesla autopilot mode [41] July, 2016 Image contrast Killed the driver "The camera failed to recognize the white truck against a bright
sky" [42]
Google self-driving car [43] February, 2016 Failed to estimate speed Hit a bus while
shifting lane
"The car assumed that the bus would yield when it attempted
to merge back into traffic" [43]
At a conceptual level, these erroneous corner-case behaviors in DNN-based software are anal-
ogous to logic bugs in traditional software. Similar to the bug detection and patching cycle in
traditional software development, the erroneous behaviors of DNNs, once detected, can be fixed
by adding the error-inducing inputs to the training data set and also by possibly changing the model
structure/parameters. However, this is a challenging problem, as noted by large software compa-
nies like Google and Tesla that have already deployed machine learning techniques in several
production-scale systems including self-driving car, speech recognition, image search, etc. [154,
155].
Our experience with traditional software has shown that it is hard to build robust safety-critical
systems only using manual test cases. Moreover, the internals of traditional software and new
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DNN-based software are fundamentally different. For example, unlike traditional software where
the program logic is manually written by the software developers, DNN-based software automat-
ically learns its logic from a large amount of data with minimal human guidance. In addition,
the logic of a traditional program is expressed in terms of control flow statements while DNNs
use weights for edges between different neurons and nonlinear activation functions for similar
purposes. These differences make automated testing of DNN-based software challenging by pre-
senting several interesting and novel research problems.
First, traditional software testing techniques for systematically exploring different parts of the
program logic by maximizing branch/code coverage is not very useful for DNN-based software as
the logic is not encoded using control flow [44]. Next, DNNs are fundamentally different from the
models (e.g., finite state machines) used for modeling and testing traditional programs. Unlike the
traditional models, finding inputs that will result in high model coverage in a DNN is significantly
more challenging due to the non-linearity of the functions modeled by DNNs. Moreover, the
Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solvers that have been quite successful at generating high-
coverage test inputs for traditional software are known to have trouble with formulas involving
floating-point arithmetic and highly nonlinear constraints, which are commonly used in DNNs. In
fact, several research projects have already attempted to build custom tools for formally verifying
safety properties of DNNs. Unfortunately, none of them scale well to real-world-sized DNNs [67,
156, 157]. Finally, manually creating specifications for complex DNN systems like autonomous
cars is infeasible as the logic is too complex to manually encode as it involves mimicking the logic
of a human driver.
In this paper, we address these issues and design a systematic testing methodology for automat-
ically detecting erroneous behaviors of DNN-based software of self-driving cars. First, we leverage
the notion of neuron coverage (i.e., the number of neurons activated by a set of test inputs) to sys-
tematically explore different parts of the DNN logic. We empirically demonstrate that changes in
neuron coverage are statistically correlated with changes in the actions of self-driving cars (e.g.,
steering angle). Therefore, neuron coverage can be used as a guidance mechanism for systemically
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exploring different types of car behaviors and identify erroneous behaviors. Next, we demonstrate
that different image transformations that mimic real-world differences in driving conditions like
changing contrast/brightness, rotation of the camera result in activation of different sets of neurons
in the self-driving car DNNs. We show that by combining these image transformations, the neuron
coverage can be increased by 100% on average compared to the coverage achieved by manual test
inputs. Finally, we use transformation-specific metamorphic relations between multiple executions
of the tested DNN (e.g., a car should behave similarly under different lighting conditions) to au-
tomatically detect erroneous corner case behaviors. We found thousands of erroneous behaviors
across the three top performing DNNs in the Udacity self-driving car challenge [158].
The key contributions of this paper are:
• We present a systematic technique to automatically synthesize test cases that maximizes
neuron coverage in safety-critical DNN-based systems like autonomous cars. We empirically
demonstrate that changes in neuron coverage correlate with changes in an autonomous car’s
behavior.
• We demonstrate that different realistic image transformations like changes in contrast, pres-
ence of fog, etc. can be used to generate synthetic tests that increase neuron coverage. We
leverage transformation-specific metamorphic relations to automatically detect erroneous be-
haviors. Our experiments also show that the synthetic images can be used for retraining and
making DNNs more robust to different corner cases.
• We implement the proposed techniques in DeepTest, to the best of our knowledge, the
first systematic and automated testing tool for DNN-driven autonomous vehicles. We use
DeepTest to systematically test three top performing DNN models from the Udacity driv-
ing challenge. DeepTest found thousands of erroneous behaviors in these systems many of
which can lead to potentially fatal collisions as shown in Figure 3.1.
• We have made the erroneous behaviors detected by DeepTest available at
https://deeplearningtest.github.io/deepTest/. We also plan to release
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the generated test images and the source of DeepTest for public use.
(a) original (b) with added rain
Figure 3.1: A sample dangerous erroneous behavior found by DeepTest in the Chauffeur DNN.
3.2 Methodology
To develop an automated testing methodology for DNN-driven autonomous cars we must an-
swer the following questions. (i) How do we systematically explore the input-output spaces of an
autonomous car DNN? (ii) How can we synthesize realistic inputs to automate such exploration?
(iii) How can we optimize the exploration process? (iv) How do we automatically create a test ora-
cle that can detect erroneous behaviors without detailed manual specifications? We briefly describe
how DeepTest addresses each of these questions below.
3.2.1 Systematic Testing with Neuron Coverage
The input-output space (i.e., all possible combinations of inputs and outputs) of a complex
system like an autonomous vehicle is too large for exhaustive exploration. Therefore, we must
devise a systematic way of partitioning the space into different equivalence classes and try to cover
all equivalence classes by picking one sample from each of them. In this paper, we leverage
neuron coverage [44] as a mechanism for partitioning the input space based on the assumption that
all inputs that have similar neuron coverage are part of the same equivalence class (i.e., the target
DNN behaves similarly for these inputs).
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Neuron coverage was originally proposed by Pei et al. for guided differential testing of multiple
similar DNNs [44]. It is defined as the ratio of unique neurons that get activated for given input(s)
and the total number of neurons in a DNN:
#4DA>= >E4A064 =
|2C8E0C43 #4DA>=B |
|)>C0; #4DA>=B | (3.1)
An individual neuron is considered activated if the neuron’s output (scaled by the overall layer’s
outputs) is larger than a DNN-wide threshold. In this paper, we use 0.2 as the neuron activation
threshold for all our experiments.
Similar to the code-coverage-guided testing tools for traditional software, DeepTest tries to
generate inputs that maximize neuron coverage of the test DNN. As each neuron’s output affects
the final output of a DNN, maximizing neuron coverage also increases output diversity. We empir-
ically demonstrate this effect in Section 3.4.
Pei et al. defined neuron coverage only for CNNs [44]. We further generalize the definition to
include RNNs. Neurons, depending on the type of the corresponding layer, may produce different
types of output values (i.e. single value and multiple values organized in a multidimensional array).
We describe how we handle such cases in detail below.
For all neurons in fully-connected layers, we can directly compare their outputs against the
neuron activation threshold as these neurons output a single scalar value. By contrast, neurons
in convolutional layers output multidimensional feature maps as each neuron outputs the result
of applying a convolutional kernel across the input space [159]. For example, the first layer in
Figure 2.1.1 illustrates the application of one convolutional kernel (of size 3×3) to the entire image
(5×5) that produces a feature map of size 3×3 in the succeeding layer. In such cases, we compute
the average of the output feature map to convert the multidimensional output of a neuron into a
scalar and compare it to the neuron activation threshold.
For RNN/LSTM with loops, the intermediate neurons are unrolled to produce a sequence of
outputs (Figure 2.1.2). We treat each neuron in the unrolled layers as a separate individual neuron
for the purpose of neuron coverage computation.
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3.2.2 Increasing Coverage with Synthetic Images
Generating arbitrary inputs that maximize neuron coverage may not be very useful if the in-
puts are not likely to appear in the real-world even if these inputs potentially demonstrate buggy
behaviors. Therefore, DeepTest focuses on generating realistic synthetic images by applying im-
age transformations on seed images and mimic different real-world phenomena like camera lens
distortions, object movements, different weather conditions, etc. To this end, we investigate nine
different realistic image transformations (changing brightness, changing contrast, translation, scal-
ing, horizontal shearing, rotation, blurring, fog effect, and rain effect). These transformations
can be classified into three groups: linear, affine, and convolutional. Our experimental results, as
described in Section 3.4, demonstrate that all of these transformations increase neuron coverage
significantly for all of the tested DNNs. Below, we describe the details of the transformations.
Adjusting brightness and contrast are both linear transformations. The brightness of an image
depends on how large the pixel values are for that image. An image’s brightness can be adjusted
by adding/subtracting a constant parameter V to each pixel’s current value. Contrast represents the
difference in brightness between different pixels in an image. One can adjust an image’s contrast
by multiplying each pixel’s value by a constant parameter U.
Table 3.2: Different affine transformation matrices






CG : displacement along x axis






BG : scale factor along x axis






BG : shear factor along x axis
BH : shear factor along y axis
Rotation
[
cos @ − sin @ 0
sin @ cos @ 0
]
@: the angle of rotation
Translation, scaling, horizontal shearing, and rotation are all different types of affine transfor-
mations. An affine transformation is a linear mapping between two images that preserves points,
straight lines, and planes [160]. Affine transforms are often used in image processing to fix distor-
tions resulting from camera angle variations. In this paper, we leverage affine transformations for
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the inverse case, i.e., to simulate different real-world camera perspectives or movements of objects
and check how robust the self-driving DNNs are to those changes.
An affine transformation is usually represented by a 2× 3 transformation matrix " [161]. One
can apply an affine transformation to a 2D image matrix  by simply computing the dot product
of  and " , the corresponding transformation matrix. We list the transformation matrices for the
four types of affine transformations (translation, scale, shear, and rotation) used in this paper in
Table 3.2.
Blurring and adding fog/rain effects are all convolutional transformations, i.e., they perform the
convolution operation on the input pixels with different transform-specific kernels. A convolution
operation adds (weighted by the kernel) each pixel of the input image to its local neighbors. We
use four different types of blurring filters: averaging, Gaussian, median, and bilateral [162]. We
compose multiple filters provided by Adobe Photoshop on the input images to simulate realistic
fog and rain effects [163, 164].
3.2.3 Combining Transformations to Increase Coverage
As the individual image transformations increase neuron coverage, one obvious question is
whether they can be combined to further increase the neuron coverage. Our results demonstrate
that different image transformations tend to activate different neurons, i.e., they can be stacked
together to further increase neuron coverage. However, the state space of all possible combinations
of different transformations is too large to explore exhaustively. We provide a neuron-coverage-
guided greedy search technique for efficiently finding combinations of image transformations that
result in higher coverage (see Algorithm 1).
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Algorithm 1: Greedy search for combining image transfor-
mations to increase neuron coverage
Input : Transformations T, Seed images I
Output : Synthetically generated test images
Variable: S: stack for storing newly generated images
Tqueue: transformation queue
1
2 Push all seed imgs ∈ I to Stack S
3 genTests = q
4 while ( is not empty do
5 img = S.pop()
6 Tqueue = q
7 numFailedTries = 0
8 while numFailedTries ≤ maxFailedTries do
9 if Tqueue is not empty then
10 T1 = Tqueue.dequeue()
11 else
12 Randomly pick transformation T1 from T
13 end
14 Randomly pick parameter P1 for T1
15 Randomly pick transformation T2 from T
16 Randomly pick parameter P2 for T2
17 newImage = ApplyTransforms(image, T1, P1, T2, P2)




22 genTest = genTests ∪ newimage S.push(newImage)
23 else





The algorithm takes a set of seed images , a list of transformations T and their corresponding
parameters as input. The key idea behind the algorithm is to keep track of the transformations
that successfully increase neuron coverage for a given image and prioritize them while generating
more synthetic images from the given image. This process is repeated in a depth-first manner to
all images.
3.2.4 Creating a Test Oracle with Metamorphic Relations
One of the major challenges in testing a complex DNN-based system like an autonomous ve-
hicle is creating the system’s specifications manually, against which the system’s behavior can
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be checked. It is challenging to create detailed specifications for such a system as it essentially
involves recreating the logic of a human driver. To avoid this issue, we leverage metamorphic rela-
tions [165] between the car behaviors across different synthetic images. The key insight is that even
though it is hard to specify the correct behavior of a self-driving car for every transformed image,
one can define relationships between the car’s behaviors across certain types of transformations.
For example, the autonomous car’s steering angle should not change significantly for the same
image under any lighting/weather conditions, blurring, or any affine transformations with small
parameter values. Thus, if a DNN model infers a steering angle \> for an input seed image > and
a steering angle \C for a new synthetic image C , which is generated by applying the transformation
C on >, one may define a simple metamorphic relation where \> and \C are identical.
However, there is usually no single correct steering angle for a given image, i.e., a car can
safely tolerate small variations. Therefore, there is a trade-off between defining the metamorphic
relations very tightly, like the one described above (may result in a large number of false positives)
and making the relations more permissive (may lead to many false negatives). In this paper, we
strike a balance between these two extremes by using the metamorphic relations defined below.
To minimize false positives, we relax our metamorphic relations and allow variations within the
error ranges of the original input images. We observe that the set of outputs predicted by a DNN
model for the original images, say {\>1, \>2, ...., \>=}, in practice, result in a small but non-trivial
number of errors w.r.t. their respective manual labels ({\̂1, \̂2, ...., \̂=}). Such errors are usually
measured using Mean Squared Error (MSE), where "(>A86 = 1=
∑=
8=1(\̂8 − \>8)2. Leveraging this
property, we redefine a new metamorphic relation as:
(\̂8 − \C8)2 ≤ _ "(>A86 (3.2)
The above equation assumes that the errors produced by a model for the transformed images as
input should be within a range of _ times the MSE produced by the original image set. Here, _




Autonomous driving DNNs. We evaluate our techniques on three DNN models that won top
positions in the Udacity self-driving challenge [158]: Rambo [166] (2=3 rank), Chauffeur [167]
(3A3 rank), and Epoch [168] (6Cℎ rank). We choose these three models as their implementations are
based on the Keras framework [169] that our current prototype of DeepTest supports. The details
of the DNN models and dataset are summarized in Table 3.3.
As shown in the right figure of Table 3.3, the steering angle is defined as the rotation degree
between the heading direction of the vehicle (the vertical line) and the heading directions of the
steering wheel axles (i.e., usually front wheels). The negative steering angle indicates turning left
while the positive values indicate turning left. The maximum steering angle of a car varies based
on the hardware of different cars. The Udacity self-driving challenge dataset used in this paper has
a maximum steering angle of +/- 25 degree [158]. The steering angle is then scaled by 1/25 so that
the prediction should fall between -1 and 1.
No. of Reported Our
Model Sub-Model Neurons MSE MSE





Epoch CNN 2500 0.08 0.10
†
dataset HMB_3.bag [170]
Table 3.3: (Left) Details of DNNs used to evaluate DeepTest.†(Right) The outputs of the DNNs are the
steering angles for a self-driving car heading forward. The Udacity self-driving car has a maximum steering
angle of +/- 25 degree.
Rambo model consists of three CNNs whose outputs are merged using a final layer [166].
Two of the CNNs are inspired by NVIDIA’s self-driving car architecture [91], and the third CNN
is based on comma.ai’s steering model [171]. As opposed to other models that take individual
images as input, Rambo takes the differences among three consecutive images as input. The model
uses Keras [169] and Theano [172] frameworks.
34
Chauffeur model includes one CNN model for extracting features from the image and one
LSTM model for predicting steering angle [167]. The input of the CNN model is an image while
the input of the LSTM model is the concatenation of 100 features extracted by the CNN model from
previous 100 consecutive images. Chauffeur uses Keras [169] and Tensorflow [173] frameworks.
Epoch model uses a single CNN. As the pre-trained model for Epoch is not publicly available,
we train the model using the instructions provided by the authors [168]. We used the CH2_002
dataset [170] from the Udacity self-driving Challenge for training the epoch model. Epoch , similar
to Chauffeur, uses Keras and Tensorflow frameworks.
Image transformations. In the experiments for RQ2 and RQ3, we leverage seven different types
of simple image transformations: translation, scaling, horizontal shearing, rotation, contrast ad-
justment, brightness adjustment, and blurring. We use OpenCV to implement these transforma-
tions [174]. For RQ2 and RQ3 described in Section 3.4, we use 10 parameters for each transfor-
mation as shown in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Transformations and parameters used by DeepTest for generating synthetic images.
Transformations Parameters Parameter ranges
Translation (CG , CH)
(10, 10) to (100, 100)
step (10, 10)
Scale (BG , BH)
(1.5, 1.5) to (6, 6)
step (0.5, 0.5)
Shear (BG , BH)
(−1.0, 0) to (−0.1, 0)
step (0.1, 0)
Rotation @ (degree) 3 to 30 with step 3
Contrast U (gain) 1.2 to 3.0 with step 0.2
Brightness V (bias) 10 to 100 with step 10
Averaging kernel size 3 × 3, 4 × 4, 5 × 5, 6 × 6
Gaussian kernel size 3 × 3, 5 × 5, 7 × 7 , 3 × 3
Blur Median aperture linear size 3, 5
Bilateral Filter diameter, sigmaColor, sigmaSpace 9, 75, 75
3.4 Results
As DNN-based models are fundamentally different than traditional software, first, we check
whether neuron coverage is a good metric to capture functional diversity of DNNs. In particular, we
investigate whether neuron coverage changes with different input-output pairs of an autonomous
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car. An individual neuron’s output goes through a sequence of linear and nonlinear operations
before contributing to the final outputs of a DNN. Therefore, it is not very clear how much (if at
all) individual neuron’s activation will change the final output. We address this in our first research
question.
Table 3.5: Relation between neuron coverage and test output
Steering Steering
Model Sub-Model Angle Direction
Spearman Wilcoxon Effect size
Correlation Test (Cohen’s d)
Chauffeur Overall -0.10 (***) left (+ve) > right (-ve) (***) negligible
CNN 0.28 (***) left (+ve) < right (-ve) (***) negligible
LSTM -0.10 (***) left (+ve) > right (-ve) (***) negligible
Rambo Overall -0.11 (***) left (+ve) < right (-ve) (***) negligible
S1 -0.19 (***) left (+ve) < right (-ve) (***) large
S2 0.10 (***) not significant negligible
S3 -0.11 (***) not significant negligible
Epoch N/A 0.78 (***) left (+ve) < right (-ve) (***) small
*** indicates statistical significance with p-value < 2.2 ∗ 10−16
RQ1. Do different input-output pairs result in different neuron coverage?
For each input image we measure the neuron coverage (see Equation 3.1 in Section 3.2.1) of
the underlying models and the corresponding output. As discussed in Section 3.3, corresponding
to an input image, each model outputs a steering direction (left (+ve) / right (-ve)) and a steering
angle as shown in Table 3.3 (right). We analyze the neuron coverage for both of these outputs
separately.
Steering angle. As steering angle is a continuous variable, we check Spearman rank corre-
lation [175] between neuron coverage and steering angle. This is a non-parametric measure to
compute monotonic association between the two variables [176]. Correlation with positive statis-
tical significance suggests that the steering angle increases with increasing neuron coverage and
vice versa. Table 3.5 shows that Spearman correlations for all the models are statistically signif-
icant—while Chauffeur and Rambo models show an overall negative association, Epoch model
shows a strong positive correlation. This result indicates that the neuron coverage changes with
the changes in output steering angles, i.e. different neurons get activated for different outputs.
Thus, in this setting, neuron coverage can be a good approximation for estimating the diversity
of input-output pairs. Moreover, our finding that monotonic correlations between neuron coverage
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and steering angle also corroborate Goodfellow et al.’s hypothesis that, in practice, DNNs are often
highly linear [113].
Steering direction. To measure the association between neuron coverage and steering direc-
tion, we check whether the coverage varies between right and left steering direction. We use the
Wilcoxon nonparametric test as the steering direction can only have two values (left and right).
Our results confirm that neuron coverage varies with steering direction with statistical significance
(p < 2.2 ∗ 10−16) for all the three overall models. Interestingly, for Rambo , only the Rambo-
S1 sub-model shows statistically significant correlation but not Rambo-S2 and Rambo-S3. These
results suggest that, unlike steering angle, some sub-models are more responsible than other for
changing steering direction.
Overall, these results show that neuron coverage altogether varies significantly for different
input-output pairs. Thus, a neuron-coverage-directed (NDG) testing strategy can help in finding
corner cases.
Result 1: Neuron coverage is correlated with input-output diversity and can be used to
systematic test generation.
4.1 Difference in neuron coverage caused by different image transformations 4.2 Average cumulative neuron coverage per input image
Figure 3.2: Different image transformations activate significantly different neurons. In the top figure
the median Jaccard distances for Chauffeur-CNN, Chauffeur-LSTM, Epoch, Rambo-S1, Rambo-S2, and
Rambo-S3 models are 0.53, 0.002, 0.67, 0.12, 0.17, 0.30, and 0.65.
Next, we investigate whether synthetic images generated by applying different realistic image
transformations (as described in Table 3.2) on existing input images can activate different neurons.
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Thus, we check:
RQ2. Do different realistic image transformations activate different neurons?
We randomly pick 1,000 input images from the test set and transform each of them by using
seven different transformations: blur, brightness, contrast, rotation, scale, shear, and translation.
We also vary the parameters of each transformation and generate a total of 70,000 new synthetic
images. We run all models with these synthetic images as input and record the neurons activated
by each input.
We then compare the neurons activated by different synthetic images generated from the same
image. Let us assume that two transformations )1 and )2, when applied to an original image ,
activate two sets of neurons #1 and #1 respectively. We measure the dissimilarities between #1
and #2 by measuring their Jaccard distance: 1 − |#1∩#2 ||#1∪#2 | .
Figure 3.2.1 shows the result for all possible pair of transformations (e.g., blur vs. rotation,
rotation vs. transformation, etc.) for different models. These results indicate that for all models,
except Chauffeur-LSTM , different transformations activate different neurons. As discussed in
Section 2.2.2, LSTM is a particular type of RNN architecture that keeps states from previous
inputs and hence increasing the neuron coverage of LSTM models with single transformations is
much harder than other models. In this paper, we do not explore this problem any further and leave
it as an interesting future work.
We further check how much a single transformation contributes in increasing the neuron cover-
age w.r.t. all other transformations for a given seed image. Thus, if an original image  undergoes




)8. Figure 3.2.2 shows the cumulative effect of all the transformations on average
neuron coverage per seed image. We see that the cumulative coverage increases with increasing
number of transformations for all the models. In other words, all the transformations are contribut-
ing towards the overall neuron coverage.
We also compute the percentage change in neuron coverage per image transformation (#) )
38
w.r.t. to the corresponding seed image (#$) as: (#) -#$)/#$ . Figure 3.3 shows the result. For all
the studied models, the transformed images increase the neuron coverage significantly—Wilcoxon
nonparametric test confirms the statistical significance. These results also show that different image
transformations increase neuron coverage at different rates.
Result 2: Different image transformations tend to activate different sets of neurons.
Next, we mutate the seed images with different combinations of transformations (see Sec-
tion 3.2). Since different image transformations activate different set of neurons, here we try to
increase the neuron coverage by these transformed image inputs. To this end, we question:
RQ3. Can neuron coverage be further increased by combining different image transforma-
tions?
We perform this experiment by measuring neuron coverage in two different settings: (i) apply-
ing a set of transformations and (ii) combining transformations using coverage-guided search.
i) Cumulative Transformations. Since different seed images activate a different set of neu-
rons (see RQ1), multiple seed images collectively achieve higher neuron coverage than a sin-
gle one. Hence, we check whether the transformed images can still increase the neuron cover-
age collectively w.r.t. the cumulative baseline coverage of a set of seed images. In particular,
we generate a total of 7,000 images from 100 seed images by applying 7 transformations and
varying 10 parameters on 100 seed images. This results in a total of 7,000 test images. We
then compare the cumulative neuron coverage of these synthetic images w.r.t. the baseline, which
use the same 100 seed images for fair comparison. Table 3.6 shows the result. Across all the
models (except Rambo-S3), the cumulative coverage increased significantly. Since the Rambo-
S3 baseline already achieved 97% coverage, the transformed images only increase the coverage by
(13, 080 − 13, 008)/13, 008 = 0.55%.
ii) Guided Transformations. Finally, we check whether we can further increase the cumula-
tive neuron coverage by using the coverage-guided search technique described in Algorithm 1.
We generate 254, 221, and 864 images from 100 seed images for Chauffeur-CNN , Epoch , and
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Median Increase in Neuron Coverage
Transformation Chauffeur Epoch Rambo
(CNN,LSTM) (S1,S2,S3)
Scale (1.0,0.0) 39.0** (2.0*,5.0*,32.0)
(0.67%,0%) 93% (0.41%,1%,4%)
Brightness (100.0**,1.0) 113.0** (67.0**,104.0**,585.0*)
(67%,0.2%) 269% (14%,24%,66%)
Contrast (120.0**,1.0*) 75.0** (47.0**,100.0**,159.0)
(80%,0.2%) 179% (10%,23%,18%)
Blur (41.0**,0.0) 9.0* (18.0**,23.0**,269.5*)
(28%,0%) 21% (4%,5%,31%)
Rotation (199.0**,2.0*) 81.0** (70.0**,13.0**,786.5*)
(134%,0.39%) 193% (14%,3%,89%)
Translation (147.0**,1.0*) 65.0** (143.0**,167.0**,2315.5**)
(99%,0.2%) 155% (29%,38%,263%)
Shear (168.0**,1.0*) 167.0** (48.0**,132.0**,1472.0**)
(113%,0.2%) 398% (10%,30%,167%)
All numbers are statistically significant;
Numbers with * and ** have small and large Cohen’s D effect.
Figure 3.3: Neuron coverage per seed image for individual image transformations w.r.t. baseline.
Table 3.6: Neuron coverage achieved by cumulative and guided transformations applied to 100 seed images.
Cumulative Guided % increase of guided w.r.t.
Model Baseline Transformation Generation Baseline Cumulative
Chauffeur-CNN 658 (46%) 1,065 (75%) 1,250 (88%) 90% 17%
Epoch 621 (25%) 1034 (41%) 1,266 (51%) 104% 22%
Rambo-S1 710 (44%) 929 (57%) 1,043 (64%) 47% 12%
Rambo-S2 1,146 (30%) 2,210 (58%) 2,676 (70%) 134% 21%
Rambo-S3 13,008 (97%) 13,080 (97%) 13,150 (98%) 1.1% 0.5%
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Rambo models respectively and measure their collective neuron coverage. As shown in Table 3.6,
the guided transformations collectively achieve 88%, 51%, 64%, 70%, and 98% of total neurons
for models Chauffeur-CNN , Epoch , Rambo-S1 , Rambo-S2 , and Rambo-S3 respectively, thus
increasing the coverage up to 17% 22%, 12%, 21%, and 0.5% w.r.t. the unguided approach. This
method also significantly achieves higher neuron coverage w.r.t. baseline cumulative coverage.
Result 3: By systematically combining different image transformations, neuron coverage
can be improved by around 100% w.r.t. the coverage achieved by the original seed images.
Next we check whether the synthetic images can trigger any erroneous behavior in the au-
tonomous car DNNs and if we can detect those behaviors using metamorphic relations as described
in Section 3.2.4. This leads to the following research question:
RQ4. Can we automatically detect erroneous behaviors using metamorphic relations?
Figure 3.4: Deviations from the human labels for images that violate the metamorphic relation (see
Equation 3.2) is higher compared to the deviations for original images. Thus, these synthetic images
have a high chance to show erroneous behaviors.
Here we focus on the transformed images whose outputs violate the metamorphic relation
defined in Equation 3.2. We call these images 4AA and their corresponding original images as >A6.
We compare the deviation between the outputs of 4AA and >A6 w.r.t. the corresponding human
labels, as shown in Figure 3.4. The deviations produced for 4AA are much larger than >A6 (also
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confirmed by Wilcoxon test for statistical significance). In fact, mean squared error (MSE) for
4AA is 0.41, while the MSE of the corresponding >A6 is 0.035. Such differences also exist for
other synthetic images that are generated by composite transformations including rain, fog, and
those generated during the coverage-guided search. Thus, overall 4AA has a higher potential to
show buggy behavior.
original fog original rain original translation(40,40) original scale(2.5x)
original shear(0.1) original rotation(6 degree) original contrast(1.8) original brightness(50)
Figure 3.5: Sample images showing erroneous behaviors detected by DeepTest using synthetic images. For
original images the arrows are marked in blue, while for the synthetic images they are marked in red. More
such samples can be viewed at https://deeplearningtest.github.io/deepTest/.
However, for certain transformations (e.g., rotation), not all violations of the metamorphic
relations can be considered buggy as the correct steering angle can vary widely based on the con-
tents of the transformed image. For example, when an image is rotated by a large amount, say
30 degrees, it is nontrivial to automatically define its correct output behavior without knowing its
contents. To reduce such false positives, we only report bugs for the transformations (e.g., small
rotations, rain, fog, etc.) where the correct output should not deviate much from the labels of the
corresponding seed images. Thus, we further use a filtration criteria as defined in Equation 3.3 to
identify such transformations by checking whether the MSE of the synthetic images is close to that
of the original images.
| "((CA0=B,?0A0<) − "(>A6 | ≤ n (3.3)
Thus, we only choose the transformations that obey Equation 3.3 for counting erroneous be-
haviors. Table 3.7 shows the number of such erroneous cases by varying two thresholds: n and
42
_—a higher value of _ and lower value of n makes the system report fewer bugs and vice versa.
For example, with a _ of 5 and n of 0.03, we report 330 violations for simple transformations. We
do not enforce the filtration criteria for composite transformations. Rain and fog effects should
produce same outputs as original images. Also, in guided search since multiple transformations
produce the synthesized images, it is not possible to filter out a single transformation. Thus, for
rain, fog, and guided search, we report 4448, 741, and 821 erroneous behavior respectively for _ =
5, across all three models.
Table 3.7: Number of erroneous behaviors reported by DeepTest across all tested models at different thresh-
olds
Simple Tranformation Composite Transformation
_ n (see Eqn. 3.3) Fog Rain Guided
(see Eqn. 3.2) 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 Search
1 15666 18520 23391 24952 29649 9018 6133 1148
2 4066 5033 6778 7362 9259 6503 2650 1026
3 1396 1741 2414 2627 3376 5452 1483 930
4 501 642 965 1064 4884 4884 997 872
5 95 171 330 382 641 4448 741 820
6 49 85 185 210 359 4063 516 764
7 13 24 89 105 189 3732 287 721
8 3 5 34 45 103 3391 174 668
9 0 1 12 19 56 3070 111 637
10 0 0 3 5 23 2801 63 597
Table 3.8: Number of unique erroneous behaviors reported by DeepTest for different models with _ = 5
(see Eqn. 3.2)
Transformation Chauffeur Epoch Rambo
Simple Transformation
Blur 3 27 11
Brightness 97 32 15
Contrast 31 12 -
Rotation - 13 -
Scale - 10 -
Shear - - 23
Translation 21 35 -
Composite Transformation
Rain 650 64 27
Fog 201 135 4112
Guided 89 65 666
Table 3.8 further elaborates the result for different models for _ = 5 and n = 0.03, as high-
lighted in Table 3.7. Interestingly, some models are more prone to erroneous behaviors for some
transformations than others. For example, Rambo produces 23 erroneous cases for shear, while
the other two models do not show any such cases. Similarly, DeepTest finds 650 instances of er-
roneous behavior in Chauffeur for rain but only 64 and 27 for Epoch and Rambo respectively. In
total, DeepTest detects 6339 erroneous behaviors across all three models. Figure 3.5 further shows
43
some of the erroneous behaviors that are detected by DeepTest under different transformations that
can lead to potentially fatal situations. We also manually checked the bugs reported in Table 3.8
and report the false positives in Figure 3.6. It also shows two synthetic images (the corresponding
original images) where DeepTest incorrectly reports erroneous behaviors while the model’s output
is indeed safe. Although such manual investigation is, by definition, subjective and approximate,
all the authors have reviewed the images and agreed on the false positives.
Simple
Model Transformation Guided Rain Fog Total
Epoch 14 0 0 0 14
Chauffeur 5 3 12 6 26
Rambo 8 43 11 28 90
Total 27 46 23 34 130
original translation(50,50), epoch original shear(0.4), rambo
Figure 3.6: Sample false positives produced by DeepTest for _ = 5, n = 0.03
Result 4: With neuron coverage guided synthesized images, DeepTest successfully detects
more than 1,000 erroneous behavior as predicted by the three models with low false positives.
RQ5. Can retraining DNNs with synthetic images improve accuracy?
Table 3.9: Improvement in MSE after retraining of Epoch model with synthetic tests generated by DeepTest
Test set Original MSE Retrained MSE
original images 0.10 0.09
with fog 0.18 0.10
with rain 0.13 0.07
Here we check whether retraining the DNNs with some of the synthetic images generated by
DeepTest helps in making the DNNs more robust.We used the images from HMB_3.bag [170] and
created their synthetic versions by adding the rain and fog effects. We retrained the Epoch model
with randomly sampled 66% of these synthetic inputs along with the original training data. We
evaluated both the original and the retrained model on the rest 34% of the synthetic images and
their original versions. In all cases, the accuracy of the retrained model improved significantly over
the original model as shown in Table 3.9.
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Result 5: Accuracy of a DNN can be improved up to 46% by retraining the DNN with
synthetic data generated by DeepTest.
3.5 Discussion & Threats to Validity
DeepTest generates realistic synthetic images by applying different image transformations on
the seed images. However, these transformations are not designed to be exhaustive and therefore
may not cover all realistic cases.
While our transformations like rain and fog effects are designed to be realistic, the generated
pictures may not be exactly reproducible in reality due to a large number of unpredictable factors,
e.g., the position of the sun, the angle and size of the rain drops. etc. However, as the image
processing techniques become more sophisticated, the generated pictures will get closer to reality.
A complete DNN model for driving an autonomous vehicle must also handle braking and
acceleration besides the steering angle. We restricted ourselves to only test the accuracy of the
steering angle as our tested models do not support braking and acceleration yet. However, our
techniques should be readily applicable to testing those outputs too assuming that the models
support them.
3.6 Related Work
Testing of driver assistance systems. Abdessalem et al. proposed a technique for testing Ad-
vanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) in autonomous cars that show warnings to the drivers
if it detects pedestrians in positions with low driver visibility [177]. They use multi-objective meta
heuristic search algorithms to generate tests that simultaneously focus on the most critical behav-
iors of the system and the environment as decided by the domain experts (e.g., moving pedestrians
in the dark).
The key differences between this work and ours are threefold: (i) We focus on testing the
image recognition and steering logic in the autonomous car DNNs while their technique tested
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ADAS system’s warning logic based on preprocessed sensor inputs; (ii) Their blackbox technique
depends on manually selected critical scenarios while our gray-box technique looks inside the
DNN model and systematically maximize neuron coverage. The trade-off is that their technique
can, in theory, work for arbitrary implementations while our technique is tailored for DNNs; and
(iii) We leverage metamorphic relations for creating a test oracle while they depend on manual
specifications for detecting faulty behavior.
Testing and verification of machine learning. Traditional practices in evaluating machine
learning systems primarily measure their accuracy on randomly drawn test inputs from manually
labeled datasets and ad hoc simulations [178, 153, 152]. However, without the knowledge of the
model’s internals, such blackbox testing paradigms are not able to find different corner-cases that
may induce unexpected behaviors [179, 44].
Pei et al. [44] proposed DeepXplore, a whitebox differential testing algorithm for systemat-
ically finding inputs that can trigger inconsistencies between multiple DNNs. They introduced
neuron coverage as a systematic metric for measuring how much of the internal logic of a DNNs
have been tested. By contrast, our graybox methods use neuron coverage for guided test genera-
tion in a single DNN and leverage metamorphic relations to identify erroneous behaviors without
requiring multiple DNNs.
Another recent line of work has explored the possibility of verifying DNNs against different
safety properties [157, 156, 67]. However, none of these techniques can verify a rich set of
properties for real-world-sized DNNs. By contrast, our techniques can systematically test state-of-
the-art DNNs for safety-critical erroneous behaviors but do not provide any theoretical guarantees.
Adversarial machine learning.
A large number of projects successfully attacked machine learning models at test time by forc-
ing it to make unexpected mistakes. More specifically, these attacks focus on finding inputs that,
when changed minimally from their original versions, get classified differently by the machine
learning classifiers. These types of attacks are known to affect a broad spectrum of tasks such as
image recognition [119, 113, 115, 116, 180, 118, 117, 114, 77], face detection/verification [181,
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182], malware detection [183, 184, 185, 186], and text analysis [187, 188]. Several prior works
have explored defenses against these attacks with different effectiveness [126, 130, 122, 132, 156,
123, 189, 190, 129, 131, 125, 191, 124, 127, 128].
In summary, this line of work tries to find a particular class of erroneous behaviors, i.e., forcing
incorrect prediction by adding a minimum amount of noise to a given input. By contrast, we
systematically test a given DNN by maximizing neuron coverage and find a diverse set of corner-
case behaviors. Moreover, we specifically focus on finding realistic conditions that can occur in
practice.
Test amplification. There is a large body of work on test case generation and amplification
techniques for traditional software that automatically generate test cases from some seed inputs
and increase code coverage. Instead of summarizing them individually here, we refer the interested
readers to the surveys by Anand et al. [87], McMinn et al. [9], and Pasareanu et al. [88]. Unlike
these approaches, DeepTest is designed to operate on DNNs.
Metamorphic testing. Metamorphic testing [165, 192] is a way of creating test oracles in
settings where manual specifications are not available. Metamorphic testing identifies buggy be-
havior by detecting violations of domain-specific metamorphic relations that are defined across
outputs from multiple executions of the test program with different inputs. For example, a sample
metamorphic property for program ? adding two inputs 0 and 1 can be ?(0, 1) = ?(0, 0) + ?(1, 0).
Metamorphic testing has been used in the past for testing both supervised and unsupervised ma-
chine learning classifiers [193, 20]. By contrast, we define new metamorphic relations in the do-
main of autonomous cars which, unlike the classifiers tested before, produce a continuous steering
angle, i.e., it is a regression task.
3.7 Summary
In this work, we proposed and evaluated DeepTest, a tool for automated testing of DNN-driven
autonomous cars. DeepTest maximizes the neuron coverage of a DNN using synthetic test im-
ages generated by applying different realistic transformations on a set of seed images. We use
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domain-specific metamorphic relations to find erroneous behaviors of the DNN without detailed
specification. DeepTest can be easily adapted to test other DNN-based systems by customizing the
transformations and metamorphic relations. We believe DeepTest is an important first step towards
building robust DNN-based systems.
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Chapter 4: Understanding Local Robustness of Deep Neural Networks
under Natural Variations
In Chapter 3, DeepTest has identified large numbers of erroneous behaviors resulted from cor-
ner cases generated by natural transformations. In this chapter, we presented a follow-up project
DeepRobust in studying the local robustness of deep neural networks under natural variations.
We first conducted an empirical study to understand per-point robustness of deep neural networks
under natural variation. We found that not all the inputs under natural variation will result in er-
roneous outputs for a DNN. There exists specific weak data points, which are more likely to fail a
deep neural network model than other data points. Then we designed and implemented a white-box
approach(DEEPROBUST-W) and a black-box approach(DEEPROBUST-B) to identify these weak
data points for DNN based image classifiers and DNN based self-driving cars. We evaluated our
approaches on 9 DNN based image classifiers and 3 DNN based self-driving car models. Our
results show that DEEPROBUST-W and DEEPROBUST-B are able to achieve an F1 score of up to
91.4% and 99.1%, respectively in testing DNN based image classifiers. DEEPROBUST-W is effec-
tive in identifying weak data points with F1 score up to 78.9% in testing DNN based self-driving
car models.
We publicly release the source code1. All images, figures, tables, equations, and text included
in this chapter is based on a published collaborative work [76].
4.1 Motivation
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have achieved an unprecedented level of performance over the
last decade in many sophisticated areas such as image recognition [92], self-driving cars [91] and
1https://github.com/deeprobust/DeepRobust
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(d) -9°, dog (e) 0°, bird (f) +6°, bird (g) +24°,
bird
(h) -9°, bird
Figure 4.1: (a)-(d) A well-trained Resnet model [47] misclassifies the rotated variations of a bird
image into three different classes though the original un-rotated image is classified correctly. (e)-(h)
The same model successfully classifies all the rotated variants of another bird image from the same
test set. The sub-captions consist of rotation degrees and the predicted classes.
playing complex games [194]. These advances have also motivated companies to adapt their soft-
ware development flows to incorporate AI components [195]. This trend has, in turn, spawned a
new area of research within software engineering addressing the quality assurance of DNN com-
ponents [44, 45, 46, 65, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 78, 55].
Notwithstanding the impressive capabilities of DNNs, recent research has shown that DNNs
can be easily fooled, i.e. made to mispredict, with a little variation of the input data [113, 47,
45]—either adding a norm-bound pixel-level perturbation into the original input [119, 113, 123],
or with natural variants of the inputs, e.g., rotating an image, changing the lighting conditions,
etc. [47, 44]. The natural variants are especially concerning as they can occur naturally in the field
without any active adversary and may lead to serious consequences [45, 46].
While norm-bound perturbation based DNN robustness is relatively well-studied, our knowl-
edge of DNN robustness under the natural variations is still limited—we do not know which images
are more robust than others, what their characteristics are, etc. For example, consider Figure 4.1:
although the original bird image (a) is predicted correctly by a DNN, its rotated variations in im-
ages (b)-(d) are mispredicted to three different classes. This makes the original image (a) very
weak as far as robustness is concerned. In contrast, the bird image (e) and all its rotated versions
(generated by the same degrees of rotation) in Figure 4.1:(f)-(h) are correctly classified. Thus, the
original image (e) is quite robust. It is important to distinguish between such robust vs. non-robust
images, as the non-robust ones can induce errors with slight natural variations.
Existing literature, however, focuses on estimating the overall robustness of DNNs across all
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the test data [47, 48, 49]. From a traditional software point of view, this is analogous to estimating
how buggy a software is without actually localizing the bugs. Our current work tries to bridge this
gap by localizing the non-robust points in the input space that pose significant threats to a DNN
model’s robustness. However, unlike traditional software where bug localization is performed in
program space, we identify the non-robust inputs in the data space. As a DNN is a combination
of data and architecture, and the architecture is largely uninterpretable, we restrict our study of
non-robustness to the input space. To this end, we first quantify the local (per input) robustness
property of a DNN. First, we treat all the natural variants of an input image as its neighbors. Then,
for each input data, we consider a population of its neighbors and measure the fraction of this pop-
ulation classified correctly by the DNN - a high fraction of correct classifications indicates good
robustness (Figure 4.1:e) and vice versa (Figure 4.1:a). We term this measure neighbor accuracy.
Using this metric, we study different local robustness properties of the DNNs and analyze how
the weak, a.k.a. non-robust, points differ characteristically from their robust counterparts. Given
that the number of natural neighbors of an image can be potentially infinite, first we performed a
more controlled analysis by keeping the natural variants limited to spatially transformed images
generated by rotation and translation, following the previous work [47, 48, 49]. Such controlled
experiments help us to explore different robustness properties while systematically varying trans-
formation parameters.
Our analysis with three well-known object recognition datasets across three popular DNN mod-
els, i.e. a total of nine DNN-dataset combinations, reveal several interesting properties of local
robustness of a DNN w.r.t. natural variants:
• The neighbors of a weaker point are not necessarily classified to one single incorrect class. In
fact, the weaker the point is its neighbors (mis)classifications become more diverse.
• The weak points are concentrated towards the class decision boundaries of the DNN in the feature
space.
Based on these findings, we further develop two techniques (a black-box and a white-box) that
can localize the points of poor robustness, thereby providing a means of, input-specific, real-time
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feedback about robustness to the end-user. Our white-box and black-box detectors can identify
weak, a.k.a. non-robust, points with f1 score up to 91.4% and 99.1%, respectively, at neighbor
accuracy cutoff 0.75. To further check the generalizability of our technique, we aim to detect weak
points w.r.t. a self-driving car application where we generated natural input variants by adding rain
and fog. Note that these are more complex image transformations, and also the model works in
a regression setting instead of classification. These models take an image as input, and output a
driving angle. Our white-box detector can identify weak points with f1 score up to 78.9%.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We conduct an empirical study to understand the local robustness properties of DNNs under
natural variations.
• We develop a white-box (DEEPROBUST-W) and a black-box (DEEPROBUST-B) method to au-
tomatically detect weak points.
• We present a detailed evaluation of our methods on three DNN models across three image clas-
sification datasets. To check the generalizability of our findings, we further evaluate DEEP-
ROBUST-W in a setting with non-spatial transformations (i.e. rain and fog), a different task (i.e.
regression), and a safety-critical application (i.e. self-driving car). We find that DEEPROBUST
can successfully detect weak points with reasonably good precision and recall.
• We made our code public at https://github.com/deeprobust/DeepRobust.
4.2 Methodology
4.2.1 Terminology
Original Data Point: An original data point represents an original un-modified data instance (im-
age in our case) in the studied dataset. The original data points can come from training, validation,
or testing dataset, depending on the experimental setting. In Figure 4.2, the triangle in the center
is an original data point.
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Figure 4.2: Illustrating our terminologies. The triangles are original points, and the small circles are
their neighbors generated by natural variations. The light-green region is robust with higher neighbor
accuracy, while the light-red region is vulnerable. The corresponding original points are robust and
non-robust accordingly.
Neighbors: Neighbors are images generated by the natural variations, e.g., spatial transformations
applied to an original image. Since the transformation parameters are continuous (e.g., degree of
rotations), there can be an infinite number of neighbors per image. In Figure 4.2, the small circles
around an original data point represent its neighbors.
Neighbor Accuracy: We define neighbor accuracy as the percentage of its neighbors, including
itself, that can be correctly classified by the DNN model. Figure 4.2 illustrates this; here, red small
circles indicate misclassified neighbors, while the green small circles are correctly classified ones.
The figure shows that there are only five neighbors per original data point. In the left-hand-side
diagram, four out of five neighbors are correctly classified by the given DNN model. If the original
data point is correctly classified as well, the neighbor accuracy of the original data is (5/6=) 83.3%.
Similarly, in Figure 4.2 (right), four out of the five neighbors have been misclassified by the model;
if the original data point is misclassified, the neighbor accuracy is (1/6=) 16.6%.
Robustness. An original data point is strong, a.k.a. robust, w.r.t. the DNN model under test if its
neighbor accuracy is higher than a pre-defined threshold. Conversely, a weak, a.k.a. non-robust,
point has the neighbor accuracy lower than a pre-defined threshold. For example, at 0.75 neighbor
accuracy threshold, the black triangle in Figure 4.2 is a strong point, and the grey triangle is a weak
point.
A region contains an original point and all of its neighbors. If the original point is strong
(weak), we call the corresponding region as a robust (weak) region. In Figure 4.2, the light green
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region is robust while the light red region is weak.
Neighbor Diversity: For multi-class classification task, different neighbors of an original point
can be mis-classified to different classes. Neighbor Diversity score measures how many diverse






where : is the total number of possible classes and ?8 is the probability of an image’s neighbors
being predicted to be class 8. Large Simpson Index means low diversity. Let’s consider we have
three possible classes A, B, and C. Assume an image has 4 neighbors. Including the original image,
there are 5 images in total. If two of the five images are classified as A, and rest are classified as B,
then _ = (2/5)2 + (3/5)2 + (0/5)2 = 0.52. In contrast, if two of them are classified as A, and two
are classified as B, and one is classified as C then _ = (2/5)2 + (2/5)2 + (1/5)2 = 0.36. Clearly,
the latter case is more diverse and thus, has a lower _ score.
Feature Representation: In a DNN, the neurons’ output in each layer capture different abstract
representation of the raw input, which are commonly known as features, extracted by the current
layer and all the preceding layers. Each layer’s output forms the corresponding feature space. For
a given input data point, we consider the output of the DNN’s second-to-last layer as its feature
representation or feature vector.
4.2.2 Data Collection
Neighbor Generation: For the image classification tasks, for each original image point, we gen-
erate its neighbors by combining two types of spatial transformations: rotation and translation. We
carefully choose these two types as representatives of non-linear and linear spatial transformations,
respectively, following Engstrom et al. [47]. In particular, following them, we generate a neighbor
by randomly rotating the original point by t (∈ [−30, 30]) degrees, shifting it by 3G (about 10%
of the original image’s width i.e. ∈ [−3, 3]) pixels horizontally, and shifting it by 3H (about 10%
of the original image’s height i.e. ∈ [−3, 3]) pixels vertically. It should be noted that for image
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classification it is standard in the literature [71, 47, 203] to assume that the transformed image has
the same label as the original one. As the transformation parameters are continuous, there can be
infinite neighbors of an original data point. Hence, we sample < neighbors for each original data
point. We explore the impact of < in RQ2.
For the self-driving-car task where the model predicts steering angle, for each original im-
age point, we generate 50% neighbors with rain effect and the rest 50% with fog effects. We
adopt a widely used self-driving car data augmentation package, Automold [204], for adding
these effects where we randomly vary the degrees of the added effect. For the rain effect, we
set “rain_type=heavy" and everything else as default. For the fog effect, we set everything as
default.
Estimating Neighbor Accuracy: To compute the neighbor accuracy of a data point for a given
DNN model, we first generate its neighbor samples by applying different transformations—spatial
for image classification and rain or fog for self-driving-car application. Then we feed these gen-
erated neighbors into the DNN model and compute the accuracy by comparing the DNN’s output
with the label of the original data point. For self-driving-car application, we follow the technique
described in DeepTest [45]. More specifically, if the predicted steering angle of the transformed
image is within a threshold to the original image, we consider it as correct. This ensures that
any small variations of steering angle are tolerated in the predicted results. We then compute
=486ℎ1>DA 022DA02H =
#2>AA42C ?A4382C8>=B
>A868=0; ?>8=C+#C>C0; =486ℎ1>DAB .
4.2.3 Classifying Robust vs. Weak Points
We propose two methods, DEEPROBUST-W and DEEPROBUST-B, to identify whether an un-
labeled input is strong or weak w.r.t. a DNN in real time. If a test image is identified as a weak
point, although it may be classified correctly by the pre-trained model, this image is in a vulnera-
































(b) workflow - testing
Figure 4.3: Workflow of DEEPROBUST-W
This is a binary classifier designed to classify an image (in particular, image feature vector) as
a strong or weak point. Here, we assume that we have white box access to the DNN under test to
extract the feature vectors of the input images from the DNN. These feature vectors are given as
inputs to DEEPROBUST-W. Figure 4.3 shows the workflow.
Training: During training of DEEPROBUST-W, we first feed all the original training images and
their neighbors to the DNN under test. From the DNN outputs, we compute the neighbor accuracy
for each data point in the training set and label each point strong/weak depending on whether its
neighbor accuracy is higher/lower than a predefined threshold. For each original data point, we
also extract the output of the DNN’s second-to-last layer as its feature vector. We use these vectors
as inputs to train DEEPROBUST-W and the outputs are the corresponding strong/weak labels.
Testing: Given a test input, we first extract its feature vector by feeding the test image to the DNN
under test and then feed the extracted feature vector into trained DEEPROBUST-W, which predicts
if the input image is a strong or weak point.
DEEPROBUST-B: Black-box Classifier
This is also a binary classifier that is intended to classify an image to strong/weak point. How-

















Figure 4.4: Workflow of DEEPROBUST-B
Given a test input, we first randomly generate some of its neighbors. We then query the DNN
under test with all these neighbors and compute the diversity score, as per Equation 4.1. If the
neighbor diversity score (inversely correlated with neighbor diversity) is greater than a given di-
versity score threshold, the given test input is classified as a strong point; otherwise, a weak point.
Notice that, in this method, we do not need a training step. We only need the diversity score
threshold, which can be empirically set using a ground-truth data set. In particular, we first cal-
culate the neighbor accuracy and diversity score of each pre-annotated point. Next, based on a
given neighbor accuracy threshold, we identify the weak points, as the ground truth. The highest
diversity score among these weak points is chosen as the diversity score threshold.
Usage Scenario
DEEPROBUST-W/B works in a real-world setting where a customer/user runs a pre-trained
DNN model in real-time which constantly receives inputs and wants to test if the prediction of the
DNN on a given input can be trusted. DEEPROBUST-W assumes that the user has white-box access
to DNN under test and all the training data used to train the DNN. DEEPROBUST-W leverages the
feature vector and neighbor accuracy of the training data to train the classifier, which can notify
the user if the current input is a strong point or weak point. If the input is classified as strong point,
the user can give more trust to the original DNN’s prediction. On the other hand, if the point is
classified as a weak point, the user may want to be more cautious about the DNN’s prediction and
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conduct additional inspections.
In the blackbox setting, DEEPROBUST-B assumes the user does not have white-box access to
DNN under test. DEEPROBUST-B comes with a small overhead of transforming the input multiple




Similar to many existing works [45, 46, 196, 50, 205, 78] on DNN testing, in this work, we use
image classification application of DNNs as the basis of our investigation. This is one of the most
popular computer vision tasks, where the model tries to classify the objects in an image or video.
Datasets: We conduct our experiments on three image classification datasets: F-MNIST [206],
CIFAR-100 [207], and SVHN [208].
• CIFAR-10: consists of 50,000 training and 10,000 testing 32x32 color images. Each image is
one of ten digit classes.
• F-MNIST: consists of 60,000 training images and 10,000 testing 28x28 grayscale images. Each
image is one of ten fashion product related classes.
• SVHN: consists of 73,257 training images and 26,032 testing images. Each image is a 32x32
color cropped image of house numbers collected from Google Street View images.
Architectures: The popular DNN-based image classifiers are variants of convolutional neural
networks (CNN) [209, 210, 92]. Here we study the following three architectures for all the three
datasets:
• ResN: Following Engstrom et al. [47], we use ResN model with 4 groups of residual layers with
filter sizes 16, 16, 32, and 64, and 5 residual units each.
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Table 4.1: Study Subjects (values are in percentage)
Dataset CIFAR-100 SVHN F-MNIST
Model VGG ResN WRN VGG ResN WRN VGG ResN WRN
nat acc’ 89.0 89.3 90.6 94.5 95.3 95.2 93.4 93.5 93.6
rob acc* 75.5 68.5 74.8 78.1 78.9 81. 61.1 63.0 64.2
’Natural accuracy. *Robust accuracy is estimated as the average neighbor accuracy for test data points.
• VGG: We use the same VGG architecture as proposed in [211].
• WRN: We use a structure with block type (3, 3) and depth 28 in [1] but replace the widening
factor 10 with 2 for less parameters and faster training.
We train all the models from scratch. When training models on CIFAR-100 , we pre-process
the input images with random augmentation (random translation with 3G, 3H ∈ [−2, 2] pixels
both horizontally and vertically) which is a widely used preprocessing step for this dataset. When
training models on the other two datasets, plain images are directly fed into the models. The natural
accuracies and robust accuracies of the models are shown in Table 4.1.
Steering Angle Prediction
We further evaluate DEEPROBUST-W in a self-driving car application to show that it can be
applied into a regression task. These models learn to steer (i.e. predict steering angle) by taking
in visual inputs from car-mounted cameras that record the driving scene, paired with the steering
angles from a human driver.
Datasets: We use the dataset by Stocco et al. [212], which is collected by the authors driving
on three tracks of different environments in the Udacity Simulator [213]. It consists of 37888
central camera training images and 9427 central camera evaluation images. Each image is of size
320x120.
Architectures: We evaluate our method on the three pre-trained DNN models used in [212]:
NVIDIA DAVE-2 [214], Epoch [168], and Chauffeur [167]. These models have been used by
many previous testing works on self-driving car [44, 45, 212].
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4.3.2 Evaluation
Evaluation Metric. We evaluate both DEEPROBUST-W and DEEPROBUST-B for detecting weak
points under twelve and nine different DNN-dataset combinations, respectively, in terms of preci-
sion, recall, and F1 score. Let us assume that  is the number of weak points detected by our tool
and  is the the number of true weak points in the ground truth set. Then the precision and recall
are |∩ || | and
|∩ |
|| , respectively. F1 score is a single accuracy measure that considers both preci-
sion and recall, and defined as 2×?A428B8>=×A420;;
?A428B8>=+A420;; . We perform each experiment for two thresholds
of neighbor accuracy that defines strong vs. weak points: 0.75 and 0.50.
Baselines. We compare DEEPROBUST-W and DEEPROBUST-B with two baselines. One naive
baseline (denoted random) is randomly selecting the same number of points as detected by our
proposed method to be weak points. Another baseline (denoted top1) is based on prediction confi-
dence score—if the confidence of a data point is higher than a pre-defined cutoff we call it a strong
point, weak otherwise. This baseline is based on the intuition that DNNs might not be confident
enough to predict the weak points.
4.4 Results
In this section, we elaborate on our results. In our preliminary experiments, we have two
findings regarding neighbor accuracy. First, the neighbor accuracy vary widely across data points
and there is a non-trivial number of points having relatively low neighbor accuracy. For example,
for all the models trained on CIFAR-100 dataset, 40% of training data and 42% of testing data
have neighbor accuracy <0.75, and 16% of training data and 20% of testing data have neighbor
accuracy <0.50. These points degrade the aggregated spatial robustness of the model. The same
finding holds for the other two datasets. Second, the distribution of neighbor accuracy for a dataset
is similar across different models. For CIFAR-100 , F-MNIST and SVHN, 60%, 76%, and 81%,
respectively, of data points have neighbor accuracy change < 0.2 across any two models on the
same dataset. This implies that a large portion of data points’ neighbor accuracy is independent of
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Figure 4.5: The t-SNE plots of data points from two randomly chosen classes across all three datasets
when using ResNet. Darker color indicates lower neighbor accuracy.
the model selected.
The first observation shows that neighbor accuracy is a distinguishable measure for local ro-
bustness for the datasets and models we study. The second observation implies that the properties
of points of low neighbor accuracy may be similar across models for each dataset. Following these
two observations, we dive deeper and explore the characteristics of data points with different neigh-
bor accuracy in RQ1. We then evaluate the performance of DEEPROBUST-W and DEEPROBUST-B
which are developed based on the observations from RQ1 in RQ2 and RQ3, respectively. Finally,
in RQ4, we evaluate the generalizability of our method by applying DEEPROBUST-W in a regres-
sion task for self-driving cars under more complex transformations.
RQ1. What are the characteristics of the weak points? Here we explore the characteristics of
robust vs. non-robust points in their feature space. In particular, we check the difference in feature
representations between: a) robust and non-robust points, and b) points with different degrees of
robustness.
RQ1a. Given a well trained model, do the feature representations of robust and non-robust points
vary? In this RQ, we first explore how robust (i.e. strong) and non-robust (i.e. weak) data points
are distributed in the feature space. We apply t-SNE[215], a widely used visualization method, to
visualize the distribution of points of different neighbor accuracy in the representation space for
all three datasets when using ResN as the classifier. Figure 4.5 shows the visualization of feature
vectors from two randomly picked classes with colors indicating the neighbor accuracy of each
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Table 4.2: Weak and strong points ratio, and cohen’s d effect size
Dataset CIFAR-100 SVHN F-MNIST
Model ResN WRN VGG ResN WRN VGG ResN WRN VGG
Neighbor Accuracy Cutoff=0.5
AF 0.915 0.955 1.004 1.046 1.103 0.997 0.746 0.734 0.976
AB 0.609 0.584 0.975 0.294 0.309 0.977 0.297 0.293 0.930
d* 1.368 1.736 1.163 2.077 2.428 1.420 1.426 1.312 1.332
Neighbor Accuracy Cutoff=0.75
AF 0.778 0.796 0.992 0.604 0.671 0.983 0.516 0.496 0.953
AB 0.588 0.558 0.973 0.260 0.274 0.977 0.253 0.257 0.918
d* 0.786 1.040 0.749 0.860 1.111 0.401 0.749 0.642 0.937
*Cohen’s d effect size of 0.20 = small, 0.50 = medium, 0.80 = large, 1.20 = very large, and 2.0 = huge [216, 217].
point. The darker a point’s color is, the lower its neighbor accuracy is. It is evident that most
points of low neighbor accuracy tend to be further away from the class center.
To numerically verify this observation, first, we define a class center 2: for each class : as the
median value of the feature vectors of all the points from class : . Thus, if 58 is the feature of a
point at iCℎ dimension and 5̂8: is the median of the iCℎ dimension features for all the points in class
: , 2: is defined to be ( ˆ51: , ..., ˆ5 9 : , ..., ˆ5=: ).
The reason we take median rather than mean is that it is a more statistically stable measure and
is less likely to be heavily influenced by outliers in the representation space. Then, for every point







, where 3 (?)
B0<4_2;0BB is the distance of the ?-th point’s
feature vector to its own class center and 3 (?)
=40A4BC_>Cℎ4A_2;0BB is the distance of the ?-th point’s
feature vector to the class center of its closest other class. A small A (?) means that the point ? is
close to its own class center while far from other classes, i.e. ? is far from the decision boundary.
In contrast, a larger A (?) indicates that the point ? is closer to some other classes, i.e. it is closer to
the decision boundary.
We then measure the average A (?) among the weak points (denoted as AF) and among strong
points (denoted as AB) for all three datasets across three models. Besides, we also calculate mann-
whitney wilocox test[218] and cohen’s d effect size [216] between the two ratios to test if the two
ratios indeed have statistically significant difference and how large the difference is.
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Table 4.3: Spearman Correlation between Neighbor Accuracy and Simpson Diversity Index. All
coefficients are reported with statistical significance (? < 0.05).
Dataset CIFAR-100 SVHN F-MNIST
Model ResN WRN VGG ResN WRN VGG ResN WRN VGG
corr.coeff. 0.853 0.909 0.946 0.970 0.984 0.983 0.923 0.962 0.8947
As shown in Table 4.2, for both the neighbor accuracy cutoff (0.5 and 0.75), except one setting,
the cohen’s d effect size for every setting is larger than 0.50, which implies a medium to very large
difference. Besides, for every setting, the mann-whitney wilocox test value (not shown in the table)
is smaller than 14−80, which implies the difference is indeed statistically significant.
The visualization and numerical results imply that most weak points are close to the decision
boundaries between classes. Note that similar observation was also observed by Kim et. al. [196] in
case of adversarial perturbation. In particular, they find that adversarial examples tend to be closer
to class decision boundaries. In contrast, we focus on spatial robustness and find that spatially
non-robust points are closer to decision boundaries.
RQ1b. Given a well trained model, do the feature representations of the data points vary by their
degree of robustness? By analyzing the classifications of the neighbors of weak vs. strong points,
we observe that the weaker a point is, its neighbors are more likely to be classified in different
classes. We quantify this observation by computing diversity of the outputs a point’s neighbor; We
adopt Simpson Diversity Index (_) [202] as defined in Equation (4.1).
Table 4.3 shows the Spearman correlation between neighbor accuracy and _ on the three
datasets and three models for each. Note that while calculating the correlation, we remove points
with neighbor accuracy 100% since there are many points having 100% neighbor accuracy and
tend to bias upward the Spearman Correlation; if we include points with neighbor accuracy 100%,
the correlations become even higher. We notice that for any setting, the Spearman Correlation is
never lower than 0.853. This indicates that neighbor accuracy and diversity are highly correlated
with each other. For example, the bird image in Fig.4.1a has neighbor accuracy 0.49 and diversity
0.36, while the bird image in Fig.4.1e has neighbor accuracy 1 and diversity 1. This shows, the
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classifier tends to be confused about weak points and mispredicts them into many different kinds
of classes.
Result 1: In the representation space, weak points tend to lie towards the class decision
boundary while the strong points lie towards the center. The weaker an image is, the model
tends to be more confused by it, and classify its neighbors into more diverse classes.
RQ2. Can we detect the weak points in a white-box setting?
We explore this RQ using DEEPROBUST-W, as discussed in Section 4.2.3. DEEPROBUST-
W takes the feature vector of a data point as input and classifies it to a strong/weak point. We
implement DEEPROBUST-W with a simple 4-layer, fully connected neural network architecture
with hidden layer dimensions 1500, 1000, and 500, respectively.
Table 4.4 shows the result. At 0.75 setting, DEEPROBUST-W has F1 up to 91.4%, with an
average of 76.9%. At 0.50 setting, DEEPROBUST-W detects weak points with average f1 of 61.1%,
while it can go as high as 79.1%. DEEPROBUST-W consistently performs significantly better than
the top1 baseline and random baseline.
The top1 has very good precision, since a mis-classified image with low confidence tends to
have very poor local robustness. However, there also exist many images that are correctly classified
with high confidence yet have poor local robustness. The miss of these points leads the top1 to
have very poor recall and thus even worse f1 compared with the random baseline. Our method
comes to aid by providing high recall at the same time of decent precision.
Notice that DEEPROBUST-W’s performance depends on the training data selection, mainly (a)
how many weak vs. strong points are used to train the model, and (b) how many neighbors are
generated per point to decide whether it is strong/weak. To investigate the previous one, we assign
a weight to each input point, indicating how likely it would be selected to train DEEPROBUST-W.
In particular, for an input 8, a weight F8 := 1+(1−=8)
<×100<
1+100< is computed, where = is its neighbor
accuracy, and < is a configurable parameter; with larger <, more weak points are sampled, and
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Table 4.4: Performance of DEEPROBUST-W and the baseline methods for predicting weak points.
dataset model method 0.75 neighbor acc. 0.50 neighbor acc.
f1 tp fp f1 tp fp
CIFAR-100 ResN ours 0.79 3844 764 0.581 1290 664
top1 0.376 1218 206 0.182 255 120
random 0.488 2372 2236 0.233 520 1445
WRN ours 0.747 2901 906 0.56 947 610
top1 0.35 889 222 0.183 189 90
random 0.395 1534 2273 0.154 261 1296
VGG ours 0.654 2222 938 0.493 747 543
top1 0.439 1070 153 0.266 278 106
random 0.332 1127 2033 0.132 200 1090
SVHN ResN ours 0.755 6814 2530 0.577 1414 674
top1 0.315 1665 142 0.267 452 122
random 0.343 3095 6249 0.086 210 1878
WRN ours 0.709 5062 2143 0.582 1404 1055
top1 0.292 1238 130 0.203 275 85
random 0.28 2000 5205 0.095 229 2230
VGG ours 0.595 5214 3367 0.498 1272 911
top1 0.172 840 67 0.139 221 52
random 0.341 2986 5595 0.094 240 1943
F-MNIST ResN ours 0.914 6034 873 0.791 2144 556
top1 0.124 428 11 0.039 57 7
random 0.657 4340 2567 0.263 712 1988
WRN ours 0.896 5743 652 0.76 2033 641
top1 0.144 490 14 0.045 63 8
random 0.638 4093 2302 0.281 752 1922
VGG ours 0.864 6348 1231 0.654 1895 1082
top1 0.104 392 5 0.028 39 5
random 0.734 5393 2186 0.295 854 2123
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vice versa. Thus, if < is larger, DEEPROBUST-W will be trained with more weak points and vice
versa.
Table 4.5A shows the performance: as < increases, the detector trades precision for recall.
In this way, choosing different values of <, the precision-recall trade-off of the detector can be
adjusted according to a user’s need. From a different perspective, this way of oversampling weak
points also addresses the potential problem of imbalanced data when the weak points are much
less than the strong points.
Table 4.5: DEEPROBUST-W performance using different sampling strategies for training
A: with varying number of strong/weak points
dataset m prec recall tp fp f1
CIFAR-100 0 0.660 0.518 1290 664 0.581
1 0.615 0.599 1490 932 0.607
2 0.544 0.699 1740 1460 0.612
SVHN 0 0.677 0.502 1414 674 0.577
1 0.575 0.653 1837 1357 0.612
2 0.332 0.767 2160 4356 0.463
F-MNIST 0 0.794 0.787 2144 556 0.791
1 0.746 0.839 2284 777 0.79
2 0.712 0.871 2372 962 0.783
B: with varying number of neigbours
dataset #neighbors prec recall tp fp f1
CIFAR-100 6 0.662 0.389 967 493 0.49
12 0.685 0.384 955 440 0.492
25 0.665 0.502 1250 629 0.572
50 0.660 0.518 1290 664 0.581
200 0.683 0.507 1261 585 0.582
SVHN 6 0.723 0.403 1136 436 0.518
12 0.672 0.527 1483 725 0.59
25 0.619 0.629 1771 1090 0.624
50 0.632 0.605 1703 993 0.618
200 0.667 0.550 1550 774 0.603
F-MNIST 6 0.817 0.727 1981 443 0.77
12 0.784 0.790 2153 592 0.787
25 0.773 0.787 2143 629 0.78
50 0.836 0.727 1981 390 0.778
200 0.778 0.812 2211 632 0.794
Next, we check how DEEPROBUST-W’s performance is dependent on the number of sampled
neighbors, because a data point can potentially have infinite neighbors. Table 4.5B shows that the
number of neighbors does not have much influence on the performance of the detector once it goes
beyond some value (F1 score does not change more than 3.5 percentage point between 25 and 200
samples) for all the three datasets. Thus, we choose 50 for all of our experiments
Result 2: DEEPROBUST-W can identify weak points with reasonably high F1 score: on
average 76.9%, at 0.75 neighbor accuracy cut-off.
RQ3. Can we identify the weak points in a black-box setting?
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Figure 4.6: The spearman correlation coeff. between diversity score (_) and neighbor accuracy, with
varying #neighbors (<).
We explore this RQ using DEEPROBUST-B, as discussed in Section 4.2.3. Here, we assume,
we only have access to unlabeled testing data and black-box access of the model under test. To
evaluate DEEPROBUST-B, we spatially transform each test input < times by randomly applying
3l ∈ [−30, +30] degrees rotation, 3G ∈ [−3, +3] pixels horizontal translation, and 3H ∈ [−3, +3]
pixels vertical translation. We then calculate the output diversity score (_) based on Equation (4.1)
and rank the test images based on _. Finally, we mark top : images as potential most non-robust
points. The parameter : is chosen according to users’ need.
With each test data, DEEPROBUST-B queries the model with < neighbors to compute _. Since
querying the classifier comes with an overhead, our goal is to achieve an optimal accuracy with
minimal queries (i.e. <). To determine an optimal < value, we explore the spearman correlation
between diversity score and neighbor accuracy, with varying <, when running ResN on all the
three datasets (see Figure 4.6). The correlation increases as < increases, as with more query _
becomes more accurate, and so the neighbor accuracy. We notice that at < = 15, the correlation
coefficients across all the experimental settings reach above 0.8, and the rate of increase begins to
slow down significantly. The results for the other two architectures are highly similar. Thus, we
set < = 15 as default for DEEPROBUST-B.
Next, we evaluate DEEPROBUST-B’s performance. We plot AUC-ROC by changing C>? − :
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Figure 4.7: AUC-ROC curve with neighbor accuracy cutoff at 0.75. The red vertical line indicates
when the diversity score threshold is chosen from training data.
at < = 15 and compare our method with the random baseline and the top1 baseline as before. As
shown in Figure 4.7, our method performs much better than the random baseline. In particular, our
proposed method achieves AUC higher than 0.87 for all settings when neighbor accuracy cutoff is
0.5 and 0.97 when neighbor accuracy cutoff is 0.75.
Instead of above ranking based scheme, DEEPROBUST-B can also be used as a classifier if a
diversity threshold is given (see Section 4.2.3). Here, we estimate the threshold using pre-annotated
training data.
We evaluate precision and recall of DEEPROBUST-B in the nine DNN-dataset combinations
under neighbor accuracy cutoffs 0.5 and 0.75. Table 4.6 shows the result. At 0.75 setting, DEEP-
ROBUST-B has f1 up to 99.1%, with an average of 96.5%. At 0.50 setting, DEEPROBUST-B
detects weak points with average f1 of 72.9%, while it can go as high as 85.7%. It consistently
produces much better estimation than the top1 baseline and the random baseline. This shows that
our black-box method can effectively identify weak points.
Note that, generating the spatial transformations and querying the model with it under black
box setting is fast. Previous black box methods for adversarial perturbation work in such fashion
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Table 4.6: Performance of DEEPROBUST-B and the random baseline method for predicting neighbor
accuracy under different settings.
dataset model method 75% 50%
f1 tp fp f1 tp fp
CIFAR-100 ResN ours 0.939 4714 257 0.622 1454 801
top1 0.376 1218 206 0.182 255 120
random 0.501 2516 2455 0.234 549 1706
WRN ours 0.938 3657 171 0.585 986 604
top1 0.35 889 222 0.183 189 90
random 0.383 1494 2334 0.182 307 1283
VGG ours 0.945 3397 148 0.682 1087 390
top1 0.439 1070 153 0.266 278 106
random 0.36 1296 2249 0.153 244 1233
SVHN ResN ours 0.956 8371 365 0.67 1845 858
top1 0.315 1665 142 0.267 452 122
random 0.336 2944 5792 0.102 280 2423
WRN ours 0.963 6827 227 0.718 1602 514
top1 0.292 1238 130 0.203 275 85
random 0.275 1950 5104 0.085 191 1925
VGG ours 0.976 8608 144 0.779 2138 454
top1 0.172 840 67 0.139 221 52
random 0.339 2997 5755 0.102 279 2313
F-MNIST ResN ours 0.987 6422 81 0.802 2316 546
top1 0.124 428 11 0.039 57 7
random 0.655 4265 2238 0.289 835 2027
WRN ours 0.989 6246 70 0.857 2297 360
top1 0.144 490 14 0.045 63 8
random 0.631 3987 2329 0.274 736 1921
VGG ours 0.991 7078 60 0.847 2393 418
top1 0.104 392 5 0.028 39 5
random 0.711 5084 2054 0.277 784 2027
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[219, 220]. For example, using CIFAR-100 , when we use a batch with size 100, the average
transformation+query time for one image is 0.031 ± 0.015 ms. For the other two datasets, the
overhead is similar. Thus, to for < = 15 queries, it takes only 0.465 ± 0.225 ms, which is a
negligible overhead for most real-world DNN based vision applications. This implies that our
black-box method can also be used in real time for many applications.
Result 3: Given only black-box access to the DNN classifier, DEEPROBUST-B can identify
weak points with f1 that are much better than those of using top1 method or random method.
RQ4. How generalizable are these findings?
The local robustness issues also exist in more critical applications like self-driving-car. Here
we explore more complex transformations, i.e. adding rain and fog to the driving scenes. As shown
in Figure 4.8, among those correctly classified data points, there is a non-trivial portion (45.8%) of
them (in the heatmap, more red signified weaker) suffer from low (<0.75) neighbor accuracy.
Note that, here, we test regression models, which take images of driving scenes as inputs and
output the corresponding steering angles.
Let the set of outputs predicted by a DNN be denoted by {\̂>1, \̂>2, ..., \̂>=}, and corresponding
ground truth labels for the original (unmodified) image points be {\1, \2, ..., \=}. If the difference
between predicted steering angle \̂>8 of a transformed image and the ground truth label of the
original image \8 is above a threshold, we consider it as incorrect. The threshold _"(>A86 is
defined following DeepTest’s [45], where "(>A86 = 1=
∑=
8=1(\8 − \̂>8)2 . "( is the Mean Square
Error between the outputs and the manual labels, and _ is a positive coefficient that is chosen
to reflect a user’s tolerance on the deviation. Note that there is no softmax layer (and thus no
confidence score) in these regression models so the top1 baseline method cannot be used here.
Table 4.7 shows the result when _ = 3. At 0.75 setting, DEEPROBUST-W has f1 score up to
78.9%, with an average of 58.2%. At 0.50 setting, DEEPROBUST-W detects weak points with
an average f1 of 47.9%, while it can go as high as 68.2%. It consistently produces much better
estimation than the random baseline under all the settings. It should be noted that our observation is
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Figure 4.8: The t-SNE plot of correctly classified data points from Self-Driving dataset by the epoch
model. data points are colored based on neighbor accuracy.
model method 0.75 neighbor acc. 0.50 neighbor acc.
f1 tp fp f1 tp fp
chauffeur ours 0.417 555 547 0.346 339 384
random 0.146 194 908 0.096 94 629
epoch ours 0.789 4354 1112 0.682 2641 1127
random 0.586 3234 2232 0.411 1592 2176
dave2 ours 0.541 979 471 0.409 475 246
random 0.193 350 1100 0.121 141 580
Table 4.7: Performance of DEEPROBUST-W for predicting weak points of Self-Driving dataset
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valid for all the _ used in [45] from _ equal to 1 to 5. This shows that our proposed method DEEP-
ROBUST-W can be applied to regression problems with more complex natural transformations.
It should also be noted that it is unrealistic to use DEEPROBUST-B for this task for two reasons:
It is impractical to try different variations of an image in real-time for a self-driving car, which is a
time-sensitive application. Further, DEEPROBUST-B requires the calculation of neighbor diversity
score. For a regression problem, the predicted values are continuous, so there is a very low proba-
bility for any two predictions being equal. Thus, the neighbor diversity score for every data point
will be the same and cannot be used for identifying the weak points.
Result 4: DEEPROBUST-W can detect weak points of a self-driving car dataset with f1
score up to 78.9%, with an average of 58.2%, at neighbor accuracy cutoff 0.75.
4.5 Discussion & Threats to Validity
We adopt rotation and translation as transformations for image classification tasks and rain and
fog effects for the self-driving car task. There are many more natural variations such as brightness,
snow effect etc. However, rotation and translation are representative of spatial transformation and
used by many paper in evaluating robustness of DNN models[47, 44]. Rain and fog effects are also
widely leveraged in many influential studies on testing self-driving cars [44, 45, 46].
Besides, for some of the experiments we did not show all the combinations under both neighbor
accuracy cutoffs (i.e. 0.5 and 0.75). However, we note that the observations are consistent and we
did not include them purely because of space limitation. Another limitation is that for both DEEP-
ROBUST-W and DEEPROBUST-B, we need to decide the number of neighbors to use for training
a classifier and estimating _, respectively. We mitigate it by selecting the neighbor numbers that
give stable performance in terms of precision and recall.
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4.6 Related Work
Adversarial examples. Many works focus on generating adversarial examples to fool the DNNs
and evaluate their robustness using pixel-based perturbation [113, 123, 124, 127, 221, 196, 70, 222,
66, 126, 130, 129, 223, 224]. Some other papers [203, 71, 47], like us, proposed more realistic
transformations to generate adversarial examples. In particular, Engstrom et al. [47] proposed that
a simple rotation and translation can fool a DNN based classifier, and spatial adversarial robustness
is orthogonal to ;?-bounded adversarial robustness. However, all these works estimate the overall
robustness of a DNN based on its aggregated behavior across many data points. In contrast, we
analyze the robustness of individual data points under natural variations and propose methods to
detect weak/strong points automatically.
DNN testing. Many researchers [44, 50, 57, 196, 78, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229] proposed techniques
to test DNN. For example, Pei et al. [44] proposed an image transformation based differential test-
ing framework, which can detect erroneous behavior by comparing the outputs of an input image
across multiple DNNs. Ferit et al. [229] used fault localization methods to identify suspicious
neurons and leveraged those to generate adversarial test cases.
In contrast, others [45, 46, 225, 228, 230, 231] used metamorphic testing where the assumption
is the outputs of an original and its transformed image will be the same under natural transforma-
tions. Among them, some use a uncertainty measure to quantify some types of non-robustness
of an input for prioritizing samples for testing / retraining [230] or generating test cases[231].
We follow a similar metamorphic property while estimating neighbor accuracy and our proposed
DEEPROBUST-B also leverages an uncertainty measure. The key differences are: First, we focus
on estimating model’s performance on general natural variants of an input rather than the input
itself or only spatial variants. Second, we focus on the task of weak points detection rather than
prioritizing / generating test cases. We also give detailed analyses of the properties of natural
variants and propose a feature vector based white-box detection method DEEPROBUST-W. Fur-
ther, we show that our method works across domains (both image classification and self-driving
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car controllers) and tasks (both classification and regression). Other uncertainty work comple-
ment ours in the sense that we can easily leverage weak points identified by DEEPROBUST-W and
DEEPROBUST-B to prioritize test cases or generate more adversarial cases of natural variants.
Another line of work [232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238] estimates the confidence of a DNN’s
output. For example, [233] leverages thrown away information from existing models to measure
confidence; [234] shows other NN properties like depth, width, weight decay, and batch normaliza-
tion are important factors influencing prediction confidence. Although such methods can provide
a confidence measure per input or its adversarial variants, they do not check its natural robustness
property, i.e., with natural variations how will they behave.
DNN verification. There also exist work on verifying properties for a DNN model [239, 70, 156,
240, 241]. Most of them focus on verifying properties on ;? norm bounded input space. Recently,
Balunovic et al.[49] provides the first verification technique for verifying a data point’s robustness
against spatial transformation. However, their technique suffers from scalability issues.
Robust training. Regular neural network training involves the optimization of the loss value for
each data point. Robust training of neural network works on minimizing the largest loss within
a specific bounded region usually using adversarial examples [66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73,
74]. While both robust training methods and our work generate variants of data points, instead
of training a model with these variants to improve robustness, we leverage them to estimate the
robustness of the unseen data points. The relation between robust retraining and us is thus similar
to bug fixing vs. bug detection in traditional software engineering literature.
4.7 Summary
In this work, we include the data characteristic into the robustness testing of a DNN model.
We adopt the concept of neighbor accuracy as a measure for local robustness of a data point on
a given model. We explore the properties of neighbor accuracy and find that weak points are
often located towards the corresponding class boundaries and their transformed versions are likely
to be predicted to be more diverse classes. Leveraging these observations, we propose a white-
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box method and a black-box method to identify weak/strong points to warn a user about potential
weakness in the given trained model in real-time. We design, implement and evaluate our proposed
framework, DEEPROBUST-W and DEEPROBUST-B, on three image recognition datasets and one
self-driving car dataset (for DEEPROBUST-W only) with three models for each. The results show
that they can effectively identify weak/strong points with high precision and recall.
For future work, other consistency analysis methods [238] e.g. variation ratio, entropy can be
tried. We can also leverage ideas from [230, 231] to easily prioritize test cases or generate more
hard test cases based on identified weak points. Further, we can potentially modify existing fixing
methods such as [55] targeting the weak points to fix them.
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Chapter 5: DeepInspect: Testing DNN Image Classifiers for Group-Level
Errors
In Chapter 3, we introduced our work DeepTest, where we designed, implemented and evalu-
ated our proposed techniques for systematic testing DNN based software. We show that our tool
identified thousands of erroneous behaviours in three top performing DNN based self-driving car
models in Udacity self-driving challenge. In Chapter 4, we introduced our work DeepRobust,
where we studied the per-point robustness of DNNs under natural variation, proposed and imple-
mented a white-box approach and black-box approach in identifying weak points for DNN based
image classifiers and DNN based self-driving cars. These two works as well as most of existing
works in SE for AI area focus on instance-wise errors, which are single inputs that result in a DNN
model’s erroneous outputs. In this chapter, we introduce our third project DeepInspect, where
we first show another type of errors, group-level errors, which DNN based software also suffer
from but most of existing works ignored. Then we categorized group-level errors into confusion
errors and bias errors based on real-world reports. Lastly, we proposed neuron coverage based
distance metric to automatically test DNN based software for group-level errors without requiring
data labels.
We publicly release the source code1. All images, figures, tables, equations, and text included
in this chapter is based on a published collaborative work[78].
5.1 Motivation
Image classification has a plethora of applications in software for safety-critical domains such
as self-driving cars, medical diagnosis, etc. Even day-to-day consumer software includes image
1https://github.com/ARiSE-Lab/DeepInspect
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classifiers, such as Google Photo search and Facebook image tagging. Image classification is
a well-studied problem in computer vision, where a model is trained to classify an image into
single or multiple predefined categories [242]. Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have enabled major
breakthroughs in image classification tasks over the past few years, sometimes even matching
human-level accuracy under some conditions [209], which has led to their ubiquity in modern
software.
However, in spite of such spectacular success, DNN-based image classification models, like
traditional software, are known to have serious bugs. For example, Google faced backlash in 2015
due to a notorious error in its photo-tagging app, which tagged pictures of dark-skinned people as
“gorillas” [79]. Analogous to traditional software bugs, the Software Engineering (SE) literature
denotes these classification errors as model bugs [65], which can arise due to either imperfect
model structure or inadequate training data.
At a high-level, these bugs can affect either an individual image, where a particular image is
mis-classified (e.g., a particular skier is mistaken as a part of a mountain), or an image class, where
a class of images is more likely to be mis-classified (e.g., dark-skinned people are more likely to
be mis-classified), as shown in Table 5.1. The latter bugs are specific to a whole class of images
rather than individual images, implying systematic bugs rather than the DNN equivalent of off-
by-one errors. While much effort from the SE literature on Neural Network testing has focused
on identifying individual-level violations—using white-box [44, 50, 196, 221], grey-box [45, 65],
or concolic testing [57], detection of class-level violations remains relatively less explored. This
paper focuses on automatically detecting such class-level bugs, so they can be fixed.
After manual investigation of some public reports describing the class-level violations listed
in Table 5.1, we determined two root causes: (i) Confusion: The model cannot differentiate one
class from another. For example, Google Photos confuses skier and mountain [81]. (ii) Bias: The
model shows disparate outcomes between two related groups. For example, Zhao et al. in their
paper “Men also like shopping” [83], find classification bias in favor of women on activities like
shopping, cooking, washing, etc. We further notice that some class-level properties are violated
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Table 5.1: Examples of real-world bugs reported in neural image classifiers
Bug Type Name Report Date Outcome
Gorilla Tag [79] Jul 1, 2015 Black people were tagged as gorillas by Google photo app.
Confusion Elephant is detected Aug 9, 2018 Image Transplantation (replacing a sub-region of an image by
in a room [80] another image containing a trained object) leads to mis-classification.
Google Photo [81] Dec 10, 2018 Google Photo confuses skier and mountain.
Nikon Camera [82] Jan 22, 2010 Camera shows bias toward Caucasian faces when detecting people’s blinks.
Men Like Shopping [83] July 29, 2017 Multi-label object classification models show bias towards women on
Bias activities like shopping, cooking, washing, etc.
Gender Shades[84] 2018 Open-source face recognition services provided by IBM, Microsoft, and Face++
have higher error rates on darker-skin females for gender classification.
in both kinds of cases. For example, in the case of confusion errors, the classification error-rate
between the objects of two classes, say, skier and mountain, is significantly higher than the overall
classification error rate of the model. Similarly, in the bias scenario reported by Zhao et al., a DNN
model should not have different error rates while classifying the gender of a person in the shopping
category. Unlike individual image properties, this is a class property affecting all the shopping
images with men or women. Any violation of such a property by definition affects the whole class
although not necessarily every image in that class, e.g., a man is more prone to be predicted as a
woman when he is shopping, even though some individual images of a man shopping may still be
predicted correctly. Thus, we need a class-level approach to testing image classifier software for
confusion and bias errors.
The bugs in a DNN model occur due to sub-optimal interactions between the model structure
and the training data [65]. To capture such interactions, the literature has proposed various metrics
primarily based on either neuron activations [44, 50, 196] or feature vectors [65, 243]. However,
these techniques are primarily targeted at the individual image level. To detect class-level viola-
tions, we abstract away such model-data interactions at the class level and analyze the inter-class
interactions using that new abstraction. To this end, we propose a metric using neuron activations
and a baseline metric using weight vectors of the feature embedding to capture the class abstrac-
tion.
For a set of test input images, we compute the probability of activation of a neuron per predicted
class. Thus, for each class, we create a vector of neuron activations where each vector element
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corresponds to a neuron activation probability. If the distance between the two vectors for two
different classes is too close, compared to other class-vector pairs, that means the DNN under test
may not effectively distinguish between those two classes. Motivated by MODE’s technique [65],
we further create a baseline where each class is represented by the corresponding weight vector of
the last linear layer of the model under test.
We evaluate our methodology for both single- and multi-label classification models in eight
different settings. Our experiments demonstrate that DeepInspect can efficiently detect both Bias
and Confusion errors in popular neural image classifiers. We further check whether DeepInspect
can detect such classification errors in state-of-the-art models designed to be robust against norm-
bounded adversarial attacks [244]; DeepInspect finds hundreds of errors proving the need for or-
thogonal testing strategies to detect such class-level mispredictions. Unlike some other DNN test-
ing techniques [45, 44, 243, 57], DeepInspect does not need to generate additional transformed
(synthetic) images to find these errors. The primary contributions of this paper are:
• We propose a novel neuron-coverage metric to automatically detect class-level violations (con-
fusion and bias errors) in DNN-based visual recognition models for image classification.
• We implemented our metric and underlying techniques in DeepInspect.
• We evaluated DeepInspect and found many errors in widely-used DNN models with precision
up to 100% (avg. 72.6%) for confusion errors and up to 84.3% (avg. 66.8%) for bias errors.
Our code is available at https://github.com/ARiSE-Lab/DeepInspect. The
errors reported by DeepInspect are available at: https://www.ariselab.info/deepin
spect.
5.2 Methodology
We give a detailed technical description of DeepInspect. We describe a typical scenario where
we envision our tool might be used in the following and design the methodology accordingly.
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Usage Scenario. Similar to customer testing of post-release software, DeepInspect works in a
real-world setting where a customer gets a pre-trained model and tests its performance in a sample
production scenario before deployment. The customer has white-box access to the model to profile,
although all the data in the production system can be unlabeled. In the absence of ground truth
labels, the classes are defined by the predicted labels. These predicted labels are used as class
references as DeepInspect tries to detect confusion and bias errors among the classes. DeepInspect
tracks the activated neurons per class and reports a potential class-level violation if the class-level
activation-patterns are too similar between two classes. Such reported errors will help customers
evaluate how much they can trust the model’s results related to the affected classes. As elaborated
in Section 5.6, once these errors are reported back to the developers, they can focus their debugging
and fixing effort on these classes. Figure 5.1 shows the DeepInspect workflow.
5.2.1 Definitions
Before we describe DeepInspect’s methodology in detail, we introduce definitions that we use
in the rest of the paper. The following table shows our notation.
All neurons set # = {#1, #2, ...}
Activation function >DC (#, 2) returns output
for neuron # , input 2.
Activation threshold )ℎ
Neural-Path (#%). For an input image 2, we define neural-path as a sequence of neurons that are
activated by 2.
Neural-Path per Class (#%). For a class 8, this metric represents a set consisting of the union
of neural-paths activated by all the inputs in 8.
For example, consider a class cow containing two images: a brown cow and a black cow. Let’s
assume they activate two neural-paths: [#1, #2, #3] and [#4, #5, #3]. Thus, the neural-paths for
class cow would be #%2>F = {[#1, #2, #3], [#4, #5, #3]}. #%2>F is further represented by a
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Figure 5.1: DeepInspect Workflow








5 ), where the superscripts represent the number of times each neuron
is activated by 2>F . Thus, each class 8 in a dataset can be expressed with a neuron activation
frequency vector, which captures how the model interacts with 8.
Neuron Activation Probability: Leveraging how frequently a neuron # 9 is activated by all the
members from a class 8, this metric estimates the probability of a neuron # 9 to be activated by
8. Thus, we define: %(# 9 | 8) =
|{28: | ∀28: ∈ 8, >DC (# 9 , 28: ) > )ℎ}|
|8 |
We then construct a = × < dimensional neuron activation probability matrix, d, (= is the number
of neurons and < is the number of classes) with its ij-th entry being %(# 9 | 8).
d=








This matrix captures how a model interacts with a set of input data. The column vectors (dU<)
represent the interaction of a class < with the model. Note that, in our setting, s are predicted
labels.
Since Neuron Activation Probability Matrix (d) is designed to represent each class, it should
be able to distinguish between different s. Next, we use this metric to find two different classes
of errors often found in DNN systems: confusion and bias (see Table 5.1).
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5.2.2 Finding Confusion Errors
In an object classification task, when the model cannot distinguish one object class from an-
other, confusion occurs. For example, as shown in Table 5.1, a Google photo app model confuses
a skier with the mountain. Thus, finding confusion errors means checking how well the model
can distinguish between objects of different classes. An error happens when the model under test
classifies an object with a wrong class, or for multi-label classification task, predicts two classes
but only one of them is present in the test image.
We argue that the model makes these errors because during the training process the model
has not learned to distinguish well between the two classes, say 0 and 1. Therefore, the neurons
activated by these objects are similar and the column vectors corresponding to these classes: dU0
and dU1 will be very close to each other. Thus, we compute the confusion score between two
classes as the euclidean distance between their two probability vectors:




(%(#8 |0) − %(#8 |1))2 (5.2)
If the Δ value is less than some pre-defined threshold (conf_th) for two pairs of classes, the
model will potentially make mistakes in distinguishing one from another, which results in confu-
sion errors. This Δ is called NAPVD (Neuron Activation Probabiliy Vector Distance).
5.2.3 Finding Bias Errors
In an object classification task, bias occurs if the model under test shows disparate outcomes
between two related classes. For example, we find that ResNet-34 pretrained by imSitu dataset,
often mis-classifies a man with a baby as woman. We observe that in the embedded matrix d,
Δ(101H, F><0=) is much smaller than Δ(101H, <0=). Therefore, during testing, whenever the
model finds an image with a baby, it is biased towards associating the baby image with a woman.
Based on this observation, we propose an inter-class distance based metric to calculate the bias
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learned by the model. We define the bias between two classes 0 and 1 over a third class 2 as
follows:
180B(0, 1, 2) := |Δ(2, 0) − Δ(2, 1) |
Δ(2, 0) + Δ(2, 1) (5.3)
If a model treats objects of classes 0 and 1 similarly under the presence of a third object class
2, 0 and 1 should have similar distance w.r.t. 2 in the embedded space d; thus, the numerator of the
above equation will be small. Intuitively, the model’s output can be more influenced by the nearer
object classes, i.e. if 0 and 1 are closer to 2. Thus, we normalize the disparity between the two
distances to increase the influence of closer classes.
This bias score is used to measure how differently the given model treats two classes in the
presence of a third object class. An average bias (abbreviated as avg_bias) between two objects 0
and 1 for all class objects $ is defined as:
0E6_180B(0, 1) := 1|$ | − 2
∑
2∈$,2≠0,1
180B(0, 1, 2) (5.4)
The above score captures the overall bias of the model between two classes. If the bias score is
larger than some pre-defined threshold, we report potential bias errors.
Note that, even when the two classes 0 and 1 are not confused by the model, i.e. Δ(0, 1) >
2>= 5 _Cℎ, they can still show bias w.r.t. another class, say 2, if Δ(0, 2) is very different from Δ(1, 2).
Thus, bias and confusion are two separate types of class-level errors that we intend to study in this
work.
Using these above equations we develop a novel testing tool, DeepInspect, to inspect a DNN
implementing image classification tasks and look for potential confusion and bias errors. We
implemented DeepInspect in the Pytorch deep learning framework and Python 2.7. All our exper-
iments were run on Ubuntu 18.04.2 with two TITAN Xp GPUs. For all of our experiments, we set
the activation threshold )ℎ to be 0.5 for all datasets and models. We discuss why we choose 0.5 as
neuron activation threshold and how different thresholds affect our performance in the section 5.6.
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Table 5.2: Study Subjects
Dataset Model
Classification CNN Reported
Task Name #classes Models #Neurons #Layers Accuracy
COCO [105] 80 ResNet-50[83] 26,560 53 Conv 0.73*
Multi-label COCO gender[83] 81 ResNet-50[209] 26,560 53 Conv 0.71*
classification imSitu[106] 205,095 ResNet-34[106] 8,448 36 Conv 0.37†
CIFAR-100[103] 100 CNN[245] 2,916 26 0.74
Robust 10 Small CNN[244] 158 8 0.69
Single-label CIFAR-10[103] Large CNN[244] 1,226 14 0.73
classification ResNet[244] 1,410 34 0.70
ImageNet[104] 1000 ResNet-50[211] 26,560 53 Conv 0.75
* reported in mean average precision, †reported in mean accuracy
5.3 Experimental Design
5.3.1 Study Subjects
We apply DeepInspect for both multi-label and single-label DNN-based classifications. Under
different settings, DeepInspect automatically inspects 8 DNN models for 6 datasets. Table 5.2
summarizes our study subjects. All the models we used are standard, widely-used models for each
dataset. We used pre-trained models as shown in the Table for all settings except for COCO with
gender. For COCO with gender model, we used the gender labels from [83] and trained the model
in the same way as [83]. imSitu model is a pre-trained ResNet-34 model [106]. There are in
total 11,538 entities and 1,788 roles in the imSitu dataset. When inspecting a model trained using
imSitu, we only considered the top 100 frequent entities or roles in the test dataset.
Among the 8 DNN models, three are pre-trained relatively more robust models that are trained
using adversarial images along with regular images. These models are pre-trained by provably
robust training approach proposed by [244]. Three models with different network structures are
trained using the CIFAR10 dataset [244].
5.3.2 Constructing Ground Truth (GT) Errors
To collect the ground truth for evaluating DeepInspect, we refer to the test images misclassified
by a given model. We then aggregate these misclassified image instances by their real and predicted
84
class-labels and estimate pair-wise confusion/bias.
GT of Confusion Errors
Confusion occurs when a DNN often makes mistakes in disambiguating members of two dif-
ferent classes. In particular, if a DNN is confused between two classes, the classification error
rate is higher between those two classes than between the rest of the class-pairs. Based on this,
we define two types of confusion errors for single-label classification and multi-label classification
separately:
Type1 confusions: In single-label classification, Type1 confusion occurs when an object of
class G (e.g.,violin) is misclassified to another class H (e.g.,cello). For all the objects of class
G and H, it can be quantified as: type1conf (G, H) = mean(P(G |H), P(H |G)) —DNN’s probability to
misclassify class H as G and vice-versa, and takes the average value between the two. For example,
given two classes cello and violin, type1conf estimates the mean probability of violin
misclassified to cello and vice versa. Note that, this is a bi-directional score, i.e. misclassification
of H as G is the same as misclassification of G as H.
Type2 confusions: In multi-label classification, Type2 confusion occurs when an input im-
age contains an object of class G (e.g.,mouse) and no object of class H (e.g.,keyboard), but
the model predicts both classes (see Figure 5.7. For a pair of classes, this can be quantified as:
type2conf (G, H) = mean(P((G, H) |G), P((G, H) |H)) to compute the probability to detect two objects
in the presence of only one. For example, given two classes keyboard and mouse, type2conf
estimates the mean probability of mouse being predicted while predicting keyboard and vice
versa. This is also a bi-directional score.
We measure type1conf and type2conf by using a DNN’s true classification error measured on
a set of test images. They create the DNN’s true confusion characteristics between all possible
class-pairs. We then draw the distributions of type1conf and type2conf. For example, Figure 5.2a
shows type2conf distribution for COCO . The class-pairs with confusion scores greater than 1
standard deviation from the mean-value are marked as pairs truly confused by the model and form
85
(a) Confusions distribution (b) NAPVD distribution
Figure 5.2: Identifying Type2 confusions for multi-classification applications. LHS shows how we
marked the ground truth errors based on Type2 confusion score. RHS shows DeepInspect’s predicted
errors based on NAPVD score.
our ground truth for confusion errors. For example, in the COCO dataset, there are 80 classes and
thus 3160 class pairs (80*79/2); 178 class-pairs are ground-truth confusion errors.
Note that, unlike how a bug/error is defined in traditional software engineering, our suspicious
confusion pairs have an inherent probabilistic nature. For example, even if 0 and 1 represent a
confusion pair, it does not mean that all the images containing 0 or 1 will be misclassified by the
model. Rather, it means that compared with other pairs, images containing 0 or 1 tend to have a
higher chance to be misclassified by the model.
GT of Bias Errors
A DNN model is biased if it treats two classes differently. For example, consider three classes:
man, woman, and surfboard. An unbiased model should not have different error rates while
classifying man or woman in the presence of surfboard. To measure such bias formally, we
define confusion disparity (cd) to measure differences in error rate between classes G and I and
between H and I: cd(G, H, I) = |4AA>A (G, I) − 4AA>A (H, I) |, where the error measure can be either
type1conf or type2conf as defined earlier. cd essentially estimates the disparity of the model’s
error between classes G, H (e.g., man, woman) w.r.t. a third class I (e.g., surfboard).
We also define an aggregated measure average confusion disparity (avg_cd) between two
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classes G and H by summing up the bias between them over all third classes and taking the average:




Depending on the error types we used to estimate avg_cd, we refer to)H?41_avg_cd and)H?42_avg_cd.
We measure avg_cd using the true classification error rate reported for the test images. Similar to
confusion errors, we draw the distribution of avg_cd for all possible class pairs and then consider
the pairs as truly biased if their avg_cd score is higher than one standard deviation from the mean
value. Such truly biased pairs form our ground truth for bias errors.
5.3.3 Evaluating DeepInspect
We evaluate DeepInspect using a set of test images.
Error Reporting. DeepInspect reports confusion errors based on NAPVD (see Equation (5.2))
scores—lower NAPVD indicates errors. We draw the distributions of NAPVDs for all possible
class pairs, as shown in Figure 5.2b. Class pairs having NAPVD scores lower than 1 standard
deviation from the mean score are marked as potential confusion errors.
As discussed in Section 5.2.3, DeepInspect reports bias errors based on avg_bias score (see Equa-
tion (5.4)), where higher avg_bias means class pairs are more prone to bias errors. Similar to above,
from the distribution of avg_bias scores, DeepInspect predicts pairs with avg_bias greater than 1
standard deviation from the mean score to be erroneous. Note that, while calculating error dis-
parity between classes 0, 1 w.r.t. 2 (see Equation (5.3)), if both 0 and 1 are far from 2 in the
embedded space d, disparity of their distances (Δ) should not reflect true bias. Thus, while calcu-
lating avg_bias(0, 1) we further filter out the triplets where Δ(2, 0) > Cℎ ∧ Δ(2, 1) > Cℎ, where
Cℎ is some pre-defined threshold. In our experiment, we remove all the class-pairs having Δ larger
than 1 standard deviation (i.e. Cℎ) from the mean value of all 4;C0s across all the class-pairs.
Evaluation Metric. We evaluate DeepInspect in two ways:
Precision & Recall. We use precision and recall to measure DeepInspect’s accuracy. For each
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error type t, suppose that E is the number of errors detected by DeepInspect and A is the the





Area Under Cost Effective Curve (AUCEC). Similarly to how static analysis warnings are
ranked based on their priority levels [246], we also rank the erroneous class-pairs identified by
DeepInspect based on the decreasing order of error proneness, i.e. most error-prone pairs will be at
the top. To evaluate the ranking we use a cost-effectiveness measure [247], AUCEC (Area Under
the Cost-Effectiveness Curve), which has become standard to evaluate rank-based bug-prediction
systems [248, 249, 250, 246, 251].
Cost-effectiveness evaluates when we inspect/test top n% class-pairs in the ranked list (i.e.
inspection cost), how many true errors are found (i.e. effectiveness). Both cost and effectiveness
are normalized to 100%. Figure 5.6 shows cost on the x-axis, and effectiveness on the y-axis,
indicating the portion of the ground truth errors found. AUCEC is the area under this curve.
Baseline. We compare DeepInspect w.r.t. two baselines:
(i) MODE-inspired: A popular way to inspect each image is to inspect a feature vector, which
is an output of an intermediate layer [65, 46]. However, abstracting a feature vector per image
to the class level is non-trivial. Instead, for a given layer, one could inspect the weight vector





]) of a class, say ;, where the superscripts represent a feature. Similar weight-
vectors are used in MODE [65] to compare the difference in feature importance between two
image groups. In particular, from the last linear layer before the output layer we extract such per-
class weight vectors and compute the pairwise distances between the weight vectors. Using these
pairwise distances we calculate confusion and bias metrics as described in Section 5.2.
(ii) Random: We also build a random model that picks random class-pairs for inspection [252] as
a baseline.
For AUCEC evaluation, we further show the performance of an optimal model that ranks the
class-pairs perfectly—if =% of all the class-pairs are truly erroneous, the optimal model would
rank them at the top such that with lower inspection budget most of the errors will be detected.
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The optimal curve gives the lower upper bound of the ranking scheme.
Research Questions. With this experimental setting, we investigate the following three research
questions to evaluate DeepInspect for DNN image classifiers:
• RQ1. Can DeepInspect distinguish between different classes?
• RQ2. Can DeepInspect identify the confusion errors?
• RQ3. Can DeepInspect identify the bias errors?
5.4 Results
We begin our investigation by checking whether de-facto neuron coverage-based metrics can
capture class separation.
RQ1. Can DeepInspect distinguish between different classes?
Motivation. The heart of DeepInspect’s error detection technique lies in the fact that the underly-
ing Neuron Activation Probability metric (d) captures each class abstraction reasonably well and
thus distinguishes between classes that do not suffer from class-level violations. In this RQ we
check whether this is indeed true. We also check whether a new metric d is necessary, i.e., whether
existing neuron-coverage metrics could capture such class separations.
Approach. We evaluate this RQ w.r.t. the training data since the DNN behaviors are not tainted
with inaccuracies associated with the test images. Thus, all the class-pairs are benign. We eval-
uate this RQ in three settings: (i) using DeepInspect’s metrics, (ii) neuron-coverage proposed by
Pei et al. [44], and (iii) other neuron-activation related metrics proposed by DeepGauge [50].
Setting-1. DeepInspect. Our metric, Neuron Activation Probability Matrix (d), by construction
is designed per class. Hence it would be unfair to directly measure its capability to distinguish
between different classes. Thus, we pose this question in slightly a different way, as described
below. For multi-label classification, each image contains multiple class-labels. For example, an
image might have labels for both mouse and keyboard. Such coincidence of labels may create
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confusion—if two labels always appear together in the ground truth set, no classifier can distin-
guish between them. To check how many times two labels coincide, we define a coincidence score
between two labels !0 and !1 as: 2>8=2834=24 (!0, !1) = <40=(% (!0, !1 |!0) , % (!0, !1 |!1)).
The above formula computes the minimum probability of labels !0 and !1 occurring together
in an image given that one of them is present. Note that this is a bi-directional score, i.e. we treat
the two labels similarly. The <40= operation ensures we detect the least coincidence in either
direction. A low value of coincidence score indicates two class-labels are easy to separate and vice
versa.
Now, to check DeepInspect’s capability to capture class separation, we simply check the corre-
lation between coincidence score and confusion score (NAPVD) from Equation 5.2 for all possible
class-label pairs. Since only multi-label objects can have label coincidences, we perform this ex-
periment for a pre-trained ResNet-50 model on the COCO multi-label classification task.
A Spearman correlation coefficient between the confusion and coincidence scores reaches a
value as high as 0.96, showing strong statistical significance. The result indicates that DeepInspect
can disambiguate most of the classes that have a low confusion scores.
Interestingly, we found some pairs where coincidence score is high, but DeepInspect was able
to isolate them. For example, (cup,chair), (toilet,sink), etc.. Manually investigating such
cases reveals that although these pairs often appear together in the input images, there are also
enough instances when they appear by themselves. Thus, DeepInspect disambiguates between
these classes and puts them apart in the embedded space d. These results indicate DeepInspect
can also learn some hidden patterns from the context and, thus, can go beyond inspecting the
training data coincidence for evaluating model bias/confusion, which is the de facto technique
among machine learning researchers [83].
Next, we investigate whether popular white-box metrics can distinguish between different
classes.
Setting-2. Neuron Coverage (#) [44] computes the ratio of the union of neurons activated by
































































































































































































Figure 5.3: Distribution of neuron coverage per class label, for 10 randomly picked class labels, from
the COCO dataset.
for a given class-label, we measure the number of neurons activated by the images tagged with that
label w.r.t. to the total neurons. The activation threshold we use is 0.5. We perform this experiment
on COCO and CIFAR-100 to study multi- and single-label classifications. Figure 5.3 shows results
for COCO . We observe similar results for CIFAR-100 .
Each boxplot in the figure shows the distribution of neuron coverage per class-label across all
the relevant images. These boxplots visually show that different labels have very similar # distri-
bution. We further compare these distributions using Kruskal Test [253], which is a non-parametric
way of comparing more than two groups. Note that we choose a non-parametric measure as #s
may not follow normal distributions. (Kruskal Test is a parametric equivalent of the one-way
analysis of variance (ANOVA).) The result reports a ? − E0;D4 << 0.05, i.e. some differences
exist across these distributions. However, a pairwise Cohend’s effect size for each class-label pair,
as shown in the following table, shows more than 56% and 78% class-pairs for CIFAR-100 and
COCO have small to negligible effect size. This means neuron coverage cannot reliably distinguish
a majority of the class-labels.
Effect Size of neuron coverage across different classes
Exp Setting negligible small medium large
COCO 40.51% 38.19% 16.96% 4.34%
CIFAR-100 31.94% 25.69% 23.87% 18.48%
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Setting-3. DeepGauge [50]. Ma et al. [50] argue that each neuron has a primary region of op-
eration; they identify this region by using a boundary condition [;>F, ℎ86ℎ] on its output during
training time; outputs outside this region ((−∞, ;>F) ∪ (ℎ86ℎ, +∞)) are marked as corner cases.
They therefore introduce multi-granular neuron and layer-level coverage criteria. For neuron cov-
erage they propose: (i) k-multisection coverage to evaluate how thoroughly the primary region of
a neuron is covered, (ii) boundary coverage to compute how many corner cases are covered, and
(iii) strong neuron activation coverage to measure how many corner case regions are covered in
(ℎ86ℎ, +∞) region. For layer-level coverage, they define (iv) top-k neuron coverage to identify
the most active k-neurons for each layer, and (v) top-k neuron pattern for each test-case to find a
sequence of neurons from the top-k most active neurons across each layer.
We investigate whether each of these metrics can distinguish between different classes by mea-
suring the above metrics for individual input classes following Ma et al.’s methodology. We first
profiled every neuron upper- and lower-bound for each class using the training images containing
that class-label. Next, we computed per-class neuron coverage using test images containing that
class; for k-multisection coverage we chose : = 100 to scale up the analysis. It should be noted
that we also tried : = 1000 (which is used in the original DeepGauge paper) and observed similar
results (not shown here).
For layer-level coverage, we directly used the input images containing each class, where we
select : = 1.
Figure 5.4 shows the results as a histogram of the above five coverage criteria for the COCO dataset.
For all five coverage criteria, there are many class-labels that share similar coverage. For example,
in COCO , there are 52 labels with k-multisection neuron coverage with values between 0.31 and
0.32. Similarly, there are 40 labels with 0 neuron boundary coverage. Therefore, none of the five
coverage criteria are an effective way to distinguish between different equivalence classes. The
same conclusion was drawn for the CIFAR-100 dataset.
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Figure 5.4: Histogram of DeepGauge [50] multi-granular coverage per class label for COCO dataset
Result 1: DeepInspect can disambiguate classes better than previous coverage-based met-
rics for the image classification task.
We now investigate DeepInspect’s capability in detecting confusion and bias errors in DNN
models.
RQ2. Can DeepInspect identify the confusion errors?
Motivation. To evaluate how well DeepInspect can detect class-level violations, in this RQ, we
report DeepInspect’s ability to detect the first type of violation, i.e., Type1/Type2 confusions w.r.t.
to ground truth confusion errors, as described in Section 5.3.2.
We first explore the correlation between NAPVD and ground truth Type1/Type2 confusion
score. Strong correlation has been found for all 8 experimental settings. Figure 5.5 gives exam-
ples on COCO and CIFAR-10. These results indicate that NAPVD can be used to detect confusion
errors—lower NAPVD means more confusion.
Approach. By default, DeepInspect reports all the class-pairs with NAPVD scores one standard
deviation less than the mean NAPVD score as error-prone (See Figure 5.2b). In this setting, as the
result shown on Table 5.3, DeepInspect reports errors at high recall under most settings. Specif-
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(a) COCO dataset + ResNet-50











(b) Robust CIFAR-10 Small
Figure 5.5: Strong negative Spearman correlation (-0.55 and -0.86) between NAPVD and ground truth
confusion scores.
ically, on CIFAR-100 and robust CIFAR-10 ResNet, DeepInspect can report errors as high as
71.8%, and 100%, respectively. DeepInspect has identified thousands of confusion errors.
If higher precision is wanted, a user can choose to inspect only a small set of confused pairs
based on NAPVD. As also shown in Table 5.3, when only the top1% confusion errors are reported,
a much higher precision is achieved for all the datasets. In particular, DeepInspect identifies 31 and
39 confusion errors for the COCO model and the CIFAR-100 model with 100% and 79.6% pre-
cision, respectively. The trade-off between precision and recall can be found on the cost-effective
curves shown on Figure 5.6, which show overall performance of DeepInspect at different inspec-
tion cutoffs. Overall, w.r.t. a random baseline mode, DeepInspect is gaining AUCEC performance
from 61.6% to 85.7%; w.r.t. a MODE baseline mode, DeepInspect is gaining AUCEC performance
from 10.2% to 28.2%.
Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8 give some specific confusion errors found by DeepInspect in the
COCO and the ImageNet settings. In particular, as shown in Figure 5.7a, when there is only a
keyboard but no mouse in the image, the COCO model reports both. Similarly, Figure 5.8a shows
confusion errors on (cello, violin). There are several cellos in this image, but the model predicts it
to show a violin.
Across all three relatively more robust CIFAR-10 models DeepInspect identifies (cat, dog),
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Table 5.3: DeepInspect performance on detecting confusion errors
NAPVD < mean-1std Top 1%
TP FP Precision Recall TP FP Precision Recall
COCO DeepInspect 138 256 0.350 0.775 31 0 1 0.174
MODE 126 382 0.248 0.708 26 5 0.839 0.146
random 22 372 0.056 0.124 1 30 0.032 0.006
COCO gender DeepInspect 139 286 0.327 0.827 32 0 1 0.190
MODE 125 379 0.248 0.744 30 2 0.938 0.179
random 22 403 0.052 0.131 1 31 0.031 0.006
CIFAR-100 DeepInspect 206 584 0.261 0.718 39 10 0.796 0.136
MODE 111 605 0.155 0.387 22 27 0.449 0.077
random 45 745 0.057 0.157 2 47 0.041 0.007
R CIFAR-10 S DeepInspect 4 6 0.400 0.800 - - - -
MODE 3 4 0.429 0.600 - - - -
random 1 9 0.100 0.200 - - - -
R CIFAR-10 L DeepInspect 3 4 0.430 0.600 - - - -
MODE 3 5 0.375 0.600 - - - -
random 0 7 0 0 - - - -
R CIFAR-10 R DeepInspect 5 3 0.625 1 - - - -
MODE 1 3 0.250 0.200 - - - -
random 0 8 0 0 - - - -
ImageNet DeepInspect 4014 69957 0.054 0.617 1073 3922 0.215 0.165
MODE 3428 66987 0.049 0.527 1591 3404 0.319 0.245
random 962 73009 0.013 0.148 65 4930 0.013 0.010
imSitu DeepInspect 48 58 0.453 0.165 31 19 0.620 0.107
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Figure 5.6: AUCEC plot of Type1/Type2 Confusion errors in three different settings. The red vertical
line marks 1-standard deviation less from mean NAPVD score. DeepInspect marks all class-pairs with
NAPVD scores less than the red mark as potential errors.
95
(a) (keyboard,mouse) (b) (oven,microwave)
Figure 5.7: Confusion errors identified in COCO model. In each pair the second object is mistakenly
identified by the model.
(a) (cello, violin) (b) (library, bookshop)
Figure 5.8: Confusion errors identified in the ImageNet model. For each pair, the second object is
mistakenly identified by the model.
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(bird, deer) and (automobile, truck) as buggy pairs, where one class is very likely to be mistakenly
classified as the other class of the pair. This indicates that these confusion errors are to be tied to
the training data, so all the models trained on this dataset including the robust models may have
these errors. These results further show that the confusion errors are orthogonal to the norm-based
adversarial perturbations and we need a different technique to address them.
We also note that the performance of all methods degrades quite a bit on ImageNet. ImageNet
is known to have a complex structure, and all the tasks, including image classification and robust
image classification [254] usually have inferior performance compared with simpler datasets like
CIFAR-10 or CIFAR-100. Due to such inherent complexity, the class representation in the em-
bedded space is less accurate, and thus the relative distance between two classes may not correctly
reflect a model’s confusion level between two classes.
Result 2: DeepInspect can successfully find confusion errors with precision 21% to 100%
at top1% for both single- and multi-object classification tasks. DeepInspect also finds confu-
sion errors in robust models.
RQ3. Can DeepInspect identify the bias errors?


























Figure 5.9: Strong positive Spearman’s correlation (0.76 and 0.62) exist between avg_cd and avg_bias
while detecting classification bias.
Motivation. To assess DeepInspect’s ability to detect class-level violations, in this RQ, we report
DeepInspect’s performance in detecting the second type of violation, i.e., Bias errors as described
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in Section 5.3.2.
Approach. We evaluate this RQ by estimating a model’s bias (avg_bias) using Equation (5.4) w.r.t.
the ground truth (avg_cd), computed as in Section 5.3.2. We first explore the correlation between
pairwise avg_cd and our proposed pairwise avg_bias; Figure 5.9 shows the results for COCO and
CIFAR-10. Similar trends were found in the other datasets we studied. The results show that a
strong correlation exists between avg_cd and avg_bias. In other words, our proposed avg_bias is a
good proxy for detecting confusion errors.
Table 5.4: DeepInspect performance on detecting bias errors
avg_bias > mean+1std Top 1%
TP FP Precision Recall TP FP Precision Recall
COCO DeepInspect 249 278 0.472 0.759 24 8 0.75 0.073
MODE 145 324 0.309 0.442 12 20 0.375 0.037
random 54 472 0.103 0.167 3 28 0.103 0.010
COCO gender DeepInspect 218 325 0.401 0.568 17 16 0.515 0.044
MODE 151 328 0.315 0.393 13 20 0.394 0.034
random 64 478 0.118 0.168 3 28 0.118 0.010
CIFAR-100 DeepInspect 310 543 0.363 0.380 29 21 0.580 0.036
MODE 69 315 0.180 0.085 5 45 0.100 0.001
random 140 711 0.165 0.172 8 41 0.165 0.010
R CIFAR-10 S DeepInspect 7 4 0.636 0.778 - - - -
MODE 3 10 0.231 0.333 - - - -
random 2 8 0.200 0.222 - - - -
R CIFAR-10 L DeepInspect 6 7 0.462 0.667 - - - -
MODE 8 14 0.364 0.889 - - - -
random 2 9 0.200 0.267 - - - -
R CIFAR-10 R DeepInspect 6 3 0.667 0.667 - - - -
MODE 8 14 0.364 0.889 - - - -
random 1 7 0.200 0.200 - - - -
ImageNet DeepInspect 26704 48913 0.353 0.330 3253 1742 0.651 0.040
MODE 23881 47503 0.335 0.295 2355 2640 0.471 0.029
random 12234 63381 0.162 0.151 808 4186 0.162 0.010
imSitu DeepInspect 408 311 0.567 0.718 43 8 0.843 0.076
random 80 638 0.112 0.142 5 44 0.112 0.010
As in RQ2, we also do a precision-recall analysis w.r.t. finding the bias errors across all
the datasets. We analyze the precision and recall of DeepInspect when reporting bias errors
at the cutoff Top1%(avg_bias) and mean(avg_bias)+standard deviation(avg_bias), respectively.
The results are shown in Table 5.4. At cutoff Top1%(avg_bias), DeepInspect detects suspicious
pairs with precision as high as 75% and 84% for COCO and imSitu, respectively. At cutoff
mean(avg_bias)+standard deviation(avg_bias), DeepInspect has high recall but lower precision:
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DeepInspect detects ground truth suspicious pairs with recall at 75.9% and 71.8% for COCO and
imSitu. DeepInspect can report 657(=249+408) total true bias bugs across the two models. DeepIn-
spect outperforms the random baseline by a large margin at both cutoffs. As in the case of detect-
ing confusion errors, there is a significant trade-off between precision and recall. This can be
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Figure 5.10: Bias errors detected w.r.t. the ground truth of avg_cd beyond one standard deviation
from mean.
As shown in Figure 5.10, DeepInspect outperforms the baseline by a large margin. The AUCEC
gains of DeepInspect are from 37.1% to 76.1% w.r.t. the random baseline and from 6.0% to 41.9%
w.r.t. the MODE baseline across the 8 settings. DeepInspect’s performance is close to the optimal
curve under some settings, specifically the AUCEC gains of the optimal over DeepInspect are only
7.11% and 7.95% under the COCO and ImSitu settings, respectively.
Inspired by [83], which shows bias exists between men and women in COCO for the gender
image captioning task, we analyze the most biased third class 2 for 0 and 1 being men and women.
As shown in Figure 5.11, we found that sports like skiing, snowboarding, and surfboarding are
more closely associated with men and thus misleads the model to predict the women in the images
as men. Figure 5.12 shows results on imSitu, where we found that the model tends to associate the
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class “inside” with women while associating the class “outside” with men.
Figure 5.11: The model classifies the women in these pictures as men in the COCO dataset.
We generalize the idea by choosing classes 0 and 1 to be any class-pair. We found that similar
bias also exists in the single-label classification settings. For example, in ImageNet, one of the
highest biases is between Eskimo_dog and rapeseed w.r.t. Siberian_husky. The model tends to
confuse the two dogs but not Eskimo_dog and rapeseed. This makes sense since Eskimo_dog and
Siberian_husk are both dogs so more easily misclassified by the model.
Figure 5.12: The model classifies the man in the first figure to be a woman and the woman in the
second figure to be a man.
One of the fairness violations of a DNN system can be drastic differences in accuracy across
groups divided according to some sensitive feature(s). In black-box testing, the tester can get a
number indicating the degree of fairness has been violated by feeding into the model a validation
set. In contrast, DeepInspect provides a new angle to the fairness violations. The neuron distance
difference between two classes 0 and 1 w.r.t. a third class 2 sheds light on why the model tends to be
more likely to confuse between one of them and 2 than the other. We leave a more comprehensive
examination on interpreting bias/fairness violations for future work.
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Result 3: DeepInspect can successfully find bias errors for both single- and multi-label
classification tasks, and even for the robust models, from 52% to 84% precision at top1%.
5.5 Related Work
Software Testing & Verification of DNNs. Prior research proposed different white-box testing
criteria based on neuron coverage [44, 50, 45] and neuron-pair coverage [108]. Sun et al. [57]
presented a concolic testing approach for DNNs called DeepConcolic. They showed that their
concolic testing approach can effectively increase coverage and find adversarial examples. Odena
and Goodfellow proposed TensorFuzz[243], which is a general tool that combines coverage-guided
fuzzing with property-based testing to generate cases that violate a user-specified objective. It
has applications like finding numerical errors in trained neural networks, exposing disagreements
between neural networks and their quantized versions, surfacing broken loss functions in popular
GitHub repositories, and making performance improvements to TensorFlow. There are also efforts
to verify DNNs [239, 67, 156, 70] against adversarial attacks. However, most of the verification
efforts are limited to small DNNs and pixel-level properties. It is not obvious how to directly apply
these techniques to detect class-level violations.
Adversarial Deep Learning. DNNs are known to be vulnerable to well-crafted inputs called
adversarial examples, where the discrepancies are imperceptible to a human but can easily make
DNNs fail [109, 110, 111, 112, 77, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121]. Much work
has been done to defend against adversarial attacks [122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129,
130, 131, 132, 133, 75]. Our methods have potential to identify adversarial inputs. Moreover,
adversarial examples are usually out of distribution data and not realistic, while we can find both
out-distribution and in-distribution corner cases. Further, we can identify a general weakness or
bug rather than focusing on crafted attacks that often require a strong attacker model (e.g., the
attacker adds noise to a stop sign image).
Interpreting DNNs. There has been much research on model interpretability and visualiza-
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tion [255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260]. A comprehensive study is presented by Lipton [255]. Dong
et al. [260] observed that instead of learning the semantic features of whole objects, neurons tend
to react to different parts of the objects in a recurrent manner. Our probabilistic way of looking
at neuron activation per class aims to capture holistic behavior of an entire class instead of an
individual object so diverse features of class members can be captured. Closest to ours is by Pa-
pernot et al. [261], who used nearest training points to explain adversarial attacks. In comparison,
we analyze the DNN’s dependencies on the entire training/testing data and represent it in Neuron
Activation Probability Matrix. We can explain the DNN’s bias and weaknesses by inspecting this
matrix.
Evaluating Models’ Bias/Fairness. Evaluating the bias and fairness of a system is important both
from a theoretical and a practical perspective [134, 135, 136, 137]. Related studies first define a
fairness criteria and then try to optimize the original objective while satisfying the fairness criteria
[138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143]. These properties are defined either at individual [138, 144, 145]
or group levels [146, 139, 147]. In this work, we propose a definition of a bias error for image
classification closely related to fairness notions at group-level. Class membership can be regarded
as the sensitive feature and the equality that we want to achieve is for the confusion levels of two
groups w.r.t. any third group. We showed the potential of DeepInspect to detect such violations.
Galhotra et al. [148] first applied the notion of software testing to evaluating software fairness.
They mutate the sensitive features of the inputs and check whether the output changes. One major
problem with their proposed method, Themis, is that it assumes the model takes into account
sensitive attribute(s) during training and inference. This assumption is not realistic since most
existing fairness-aware models drop input-sensitive feature(s). Besides, Themis will not work on
image classification, where the sensitive attribute (e.g.,, gender, race) is a visual concept that cannot
be flipped easily. In our work, we use a white-box approach to measure the bias learned by the
model during training. Our testing method does not require the model to take into account any
sensitive feature(s). We propose a new fairness notion for the setting of multi-object classification,
average confusion disparity, and a proxy, average bias, to measure for any deep learning model
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even when only unlabeled testing data is provided. In addition, our method tries to provide an
explanation behind the discrimination. A complementary approach by Papernot et al. [261] shows
such explainability behind model bias in a single classification setting.
5.6 Discussion & Threats to Validity
Discussion. In the literature, bug detection, debugging, and repair are usually three distinct
tasks, and there is a large body of work investigating each separately. In this work, we focus on
bug detection for image classifier software. A natural follow-up of our work will be debugging and
repair leveraging DeepInspect’s bug detection. We present some preliminary results and thoughts.
A commonly used approach to improving (i.e. fixing) image classifiers is active learning, which
consists of adding more labeled data by smartly choosing what to label next. In our case, we can
use NAPVD to identify the most confusing class pairs, and then target those pairs by collecting
additional examples that contain individual objects from the confusing pairs. We download 105
sample images from Google Images that contain isolated examples of these categories so that the
model learns to disambiguate them. We retrain the model from scratch using the original train-
ing data and these additional examples. Using this approach, we have some preliminary results
on the COCO dataset. After retraining, we find that the type2conf of the top confused pairs re-
duces. For example, the type2conf(baseball bat, baseball glove) is reduced from 0.23 to 0.16, and
type2conf(refrigerator, oven) is reduced from 0.14 to 0.10. Unlike traditional active learning ap-
proaches that encourage labeling additional examples near the current decision boundary of the
classifier, our approach encourages the labeling of problematic examples based on confusion bugs.
Another potential direction to explore is to use DeepInspect in tandem with debugging & repair
tools for DNN models like MODE [65]. DeepInspect enables the user to focus debugging effort
on the vulnerable classes even in the absence of labeled data. For instance, once DeepInspect
identifies the vulnerable class-pairs, one can use the GAN-based approach proposed in MODE to
generate more training data from these class-pairs, apply MODE to identify the most vulnerable
features in these pairs to select for retraining.
103
We have also explored how the neuron coverage threshold(Cℎ) used in computing #%+
affects our performance in detecting confusion and bias errors. We studied one multi-label classi-
fication task COCO and one single-label classification task CIFAR-100. Table 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8
show how our precision and recall change when using different neuron coverage thresholds (Cℎ).
We observed that for CIFAR-100 and COCO that DeepInspect’s accuracies are overall stable at
0.4 ≤ Cℎ ≤ 0.75. With smaller th(< 0.25), too many neurons are activated pulling the per-class
activation-probability-vectors closer to each other. In contrast, with higher th(> 0.75), important
activation information gets lost. Thus, we select Cℎ = 0.5 for all the other experiments to avoid
either issue.
Table 5.5: DeepInspect impact of neuron coverage threshold on detecting confusion errors for COCO
NC threshold NAPVD < mean-1std Top 1%
TP FP Precision Recall TP FP Precision Recall
0.25 36 18 0.67 0.20 23 8 0.74 0.13
0.40 150 215 0.41 0.84 31 0 1 0.17
0.50 138 256 0.35 0.78 31 0 1 0.17
0.60 137 264 0.34 0.77 30 1 0.97 0.17
0.75 135 271 0.33 0.76 29 2 0.94 0.16
Table 5.6: DeepInspect impact of neuron coverage threshold on detecting confusion errors for
CIFAR-100
NC threshold NAPVD < mean-1std Top 1%
TP FP Precision Recall TP FP Precision Recall
0.25 188 629 0.23 0.66 34 15 0.69 0.12
0.40 197 550 0.26 0.69 39 10 0.80 0.14
0.50 206 584 0.26 0.72 39 10 0.80 0.14
0.60 211 596 0.26 0.74 37 12 0.76 0.13
0.75 195 604 0.24 0.68 37 12 0.76 0.13
Threats to Validity. We only test DeepInspect on 6 datasets under 8 settings. We include both
single-class and multi-class as well as regular and robust models to address these threats as much
as possible.
Another limitation is that DeepInspect needs to decide thresholds for both confusion errors and
bias errors, and a threshold for discarding low-confusion triplets in the estimation of avg_bias.
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Table 5.7: DeepInspect impact of neuron coverage threshold on detecting bias errors for COCO
NC threshold avg_bias > mean+1std Top 1%
TP FP Precision Recall TP FP Precision Recall
0.25 218 280 0.438 0.665 26 6 0.812 0.079
0.40 260 275 0.486 0.793 20 12 0.625 0.061
0.50 249 278 0.472 0.759 24 8 0.75 0.073
0.60 190 273 0.410 0.579 24 8 0.75 0.073
0.75 197 54 0.785 0.601 32 0 1 0.098
0.90 201 102 0.663 0.592 32 0 1 0.094
Table 5.8: DeepInspect impact of neuron coverage threshold on detecting bias errors for CIFAR-100
NC threshold avg_bias > mean+1std Top 1%
TP FP Precision Recall TP FP Precision Recall
0.25 289 569 0.337 0.355 18 32 0.36 0.022
0.40 272 545 0.333 0.334 27 23 0.54 0.033
0.50 310 543 0.363 0.380 29 21 0.58 0.036
0.60 279 473 0.371 0.342 26 24 0.54 0.032
0.75 276 455 0.378 0.339 29 21 0.58 0.036
0.90 179 587 0.234 0.220 12 38 0.24 0.015
Instead of choosing fixed threshold, we mitigate this threat by choosing thresholds that are one
standard deviation from the corresponding mean values and, also, reporting performance at top1%.
The task of accurately classifying any image is notoriously difficult. We simplify the problem
by testing the DNN model only for the classes that it has seen during training. For example, while
training, if a DNN does not learn to differentiate between black vs. brown cows (i.e., all the cow
images only have label cow and they are treated as belonging to the same class by the DNN),
DeepInspect will not be able to test these sub-groups.
5.7 Summary
Our testing tool for DNN image classifiers, DeepInspect, automatically detects confusion and
bias errors in classification models. We applied DeepInspect to six different popular image classifi-
cation datasets and eight pretrained DNN models, including three so-called relatively more robust
models. We show that DeepInspect can successfully detect class-level violations for both single-
105
and multi-label classification models with high precision.
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Chapter 6: Repairing Group-Level Errors Using Weighted Regularization
In Chapter 5, we introduced our work DeepInspect, which is designed to identify group-level
errors(confusion errors and bias errors) for DNN based software. In this chapter, we work on ad-
dressing a follow-up and more challenging problem - automatically repair DNN based software for
confusion errors and bias errors. As proposed by Goodfellow et al., regularization are all different
approaches expressing preference for different solutions[262]. To solve this problem, we propose
WR consists of five different weighted regularization techniques to make a DNN model takes more
effort in learning from distinguishing target classes to reduce confusion between target pairs and
bias among target triples. These five different weighted regularization techniques function at dif-
ferent stages of retraining or inference of DNNs including input phase, layer phase, loss phase
and output phase. These different techniques make it possible for effective repairing in different
scenarios. Our experimental results show that WR can effectively fix confusion and bias errors and
these methods all have their pros, cons and applicable scenarios.
We publicly release the source code1. All images, figures, tables, equations, and text included
in this chapter is based on a recently collaborative work.
6.1 Motivation
Deep Neural Networks are widely used nowadays as components in many critical applica-
tions like self-driving cars, face-recognition, medical diagnosis, etc. Unlike traditional software,
although a DNN model has no code logics, it may still suffer from a different type of "serious
bugs"[263, 78]. For example, it has been found that Google photo-tagging app tagged pictures of
two dark-skinned people as “gorillas” [79]. Analogous to traditional software bugs, previous work
in Software Engineering (SE) has denoted classification errors like this as model bugs [65] that
1https://github.com/deepfixdeepfix/dnnfix
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arise from either biased training data, problematic model architecture, training procedure error or
the combination of them.
DNN classification errors fall into two main categories, instance-wise and group-wise. The
former has been well-studied in the previous literature. In essence, an instance-wise error happens
when a DNN model outputs inconsistent prediction across different semantic-preserving transfor-
mations of a given input [44, 45, 76, 72]. Over the past few years, researchers have found numer-
ous such transformations such as norm-bounded perturbation[72], natural transformation[47], or
physical attack[77] to fool a well-trained DNN classifier. The fixing strategies such as adversary
training, data augmentation are also widely studied [72, 47]. In contrast, group-wise error is about
the DNN model’s weak performance on differentiating among certain classes or has inconsistent
performance across classes[78]. There are very few work on repairing group-wise errors and it
only receives attentions recently [78]. This type of bugs is very concerning since it has been found
to relate to many real-world notorious errors without malicious attackers[78]. Some works pro-
posed techniques to detect this kind of errors, however until now, no fixing methods have been
proposed for repairing them. To bridge this gap, in this work, we propose a generic fixing method
for repairing such errors of any given DNN models.
The group-level errors definition proposed in [78] consists of two main types with different
root causes: (i) Confusion: The model cannot differentiate one class from another. For example,
Google Photos confuses skier and mountain [81]. (ii) Bias: The model shows disparate outcomes
between two related groups. For example, Zhao et al. [83] find classification bias in favor of women
on activities like shopping, cooking, washing, etc.. Figure 6.1 presents two concrete examples of
both types of errors from COCO and Image-Net reported in [78]. Note that unlike an instance-level
error, such group-level error affects all the images falling into the groups.
The causes of such errors can be certain classes are harder to be differentiated from each other.
For example, in CIFAR-10 , dog and cat tend to confuse even a state-of-the-art DNN model since
they share many common semantic features. As a result, the two classes tend to be very close
to each other in the representation space and the decision boundary between them might not be
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(a) given laptop, a mouse is predicted (b) a surfing woman is misclassied as man
Figure 6.1: Examples of confusion and bias errors found in [78]
"fine-grained" enough for correct classification on some dog can cat images. We denote the error-
inducing classes as target classes. To fix the errors of the target classes, the model needs to take
more effort to learn from them. For large and complex DNN models, complete training from
scratch may not be possible. Sometimes no extra data can be collected, either. In these cases, fine-
tuning can be applied to let the model to take more effort in learning from target classes. When
fine-tuning is not possible or training data cannot be accessed, (for example, the user does not have
the right to access the data) the output can be modified to fix the errors while sacrificing the overall
performance to some extent.

















Figure 6.2: Overview of Weighted Regularization for Target Fixing
109
With this insight, we propose a generic method called weighted regularization (WR). WR con-
sists of multiple methods including weighted augmentation (w-aug), weighted batch normalization
(w-bn), weighted output smoothing (w-os), weighted loss (w-loss), and weighted distance-based
regularization (w-dbr). These methods function at different stages of a given DNN’s training or
inference time Figure 6.2. In particular, if retraining is allowed and training data are provided,
w-aug assigns more weights to the target classes during the retraining, w-bn shifts the distribution
of the activation values induced by the input at every batchnorm layer(assuming the model has
batchnorm layers), and w-loss and w-dbr modify the loss function by assigning more weights to
the erroneous instances and regularizing the class centroids in the representation space, respec-
tively. Such fine-tuning strategies enable the model to emphasize more on the instances of the
target classes and thus more likely to avoid the errors involving the target classes. If fine-tuning
and training data are not provided, w-os multiplies the model’s prediction on target classes by a
smaller user-specified constant. In other words, making the model predict less the target class. In
this way, the group-level errors on those unsure data points can be avoided.
Figure 6.3 further illustrates the different impact of these methods using an example consists
of three classes (square, circle and diamond). The colors represent the model’s prediction while
the dark dashed lines denote the model’s decision boundary. Figure 6.3(a) shows that the original
model tends to confuse between blue and red since these two classes are very close with each other.
Ideally, a fixing method wants to finetune the model such that the decision boundary becomes that
in Figure 6.3(d). w-os tends to solve the confusion issue by contracting the decision boundary of
the target classes as illustrated in Figure 6.3(c). w-aug, w-loss, and w-dbr try to reuce confusion by
shifting the decision boundary. They may be able to achieve Figure 6.3(d) but may also sacrifice
the decision boundary for other classes sometimes and get the decision boundary in Figure 6.3(b)
instead. w-bn comes in between: on the one hand, it tends to contract the decision boundary as
w-os; on the other hand, it tends to shift the decision boundary through finetuning.
We evaluate the proposed methods on fixing confusion error and bias error for both single-
label and multi-label image classification in five different settings involving four datasets and DNN
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(a)Original (b)Shifted (c)Contracted (d)Ideal
Figure 6.3: Illustration of different potential decision boundary before and after applying WR.
architectures. Our experiments show that WR can effectively fixing the errors with minimal cost
of the overall performance. In every setting, a subset of our proposed methods can reduce the error
significantly and most of time at least one method can achieve better accuracy (or mean average
precision for multi-label image classification) and lower confusion/bias error than the original
model at the same time. We also provide some analysis of the proposed methods’ performance and
applicability. In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We propose a generic method for target class-level bug fixing of DNN models, WR.
• We compare the proposed, specific fixing methods under the generic method and show their
effectiveness on fixing two types of class-level errors.
Our code is available at https://github.com/deepfixdeepfix/dnnfix.
6.2 Methodology
Figure 6.2 provides an overview of our proposed framework, Weighted Regularization (WR)
for DNN target fixing. It consists of different methods applied to different stages of a DNN’s
retraining or inference. In particular, Weighted Augmentation (w-aug) re-weights the input data
according to their class membership, Weighted Batch Normalization (w-bn) modifies the batch
norm layer’s statistics of the given DNN model, Weighted Output Smoothing (w-os) smooths a
model’s prediction probability of each class, and finally, Weighted Loss (w-loss) and Weighted
Distance-Based Regularization (w-dbr) assign more weights to a model’s mistake on target classes
and regularize the representation of the target classes in the loss function when finetuning the DNN
model, respectively.
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When training data is accessible and finetuning of the given model is allowed, w-aug, w-bn, w-
loss, w-dbr can be applied to repairing the model through finetuning. w-os, on the other hand, does
not require the access to the training data or the extra finetuning step. It only required the DNN’s
prediction confidence values for every class (mostly last layer’s output). An extra limitation for
w-bn is that it requires the given model to have batch norm layers.
In the following subsections, we will introduce the details of each method in terms of how they
are developed to fix the confusion error and the bias error for both single-label classification as
well as multi-label classification. For simplicity, we only explain our methods in fixing confusion
error between one pair of classes and bias error among one triplet. However, our method can be
very easily extended to fixing multiple pairs and multiple triplets by simply treating every pair /
triplet the same way as the one demonstrated in the methodology. In the result section, we further
show the effectiveness of applying our methods to fixing multiple confused pairs.
6.2.1 Original model (orig)
Before explaining our proposed methods, we first briefly introduce how the original model is
trained. The original model is trained using the standard objective function as follows:
!>BB>A86 = E(G,H)∼DL( 5 (G), H)
where D is the underlying data distribution of input G and label H and L is the user specified loss
function. Some widely used classification loss functions include cross-entropy loss and l2 loss.
6.2.2 Weighted augmentation (w-aug)
The weighted augmentation method oversamples images from the target classes such that the
DNN model will be able to better identify these target classes. For fixing the confusion error, the
target classes consist of the chosen pairs of classes. For fixing the bias error, the target classes
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consists of the chosen triplets of classes. The loss function is defined as:
!>BB>B = E(G,H)∼D′L( 5 (G), H)
where the probability density function for the weighted distribution D′ is
?35 ′(-,. ) =

d × ?35 (-,. ), if H ∈ .C0A64C
?35 (-,. ), otherwise
where ?35 is the probability density function of the original data distribution . In essence, the
images that have labels belonging to the target classes are oversampled by a user specified constant
d ≥ 1 times during finetuning. The larger d is, more effort the DNN model will spend on the target
classes compared with other non-target classes.
(a)Fixing confusion error: target classes  and  are oversampled.
(b)Fixing bias error: target classes ,  and  are oversampled.
6.2.3 Weighted batch normalization (w-bn)
The weighted batch normalization method redistributes the batch normalization layer based on
the distribution of data from target classes. Such method has not been proposed before in previous
literature. We have found that this method can shift the decision boundaries of the non-target
classes towards the target classes. To demonstrate this phenomenon, Figure 6.4(a) shows a toy 2D
dataset composed of three classes. Figure 6.4(b) shows the decision boundary of a well-trained
simple ResNet model and Figure 6.4(c) shows the decision boundary of the model retrained via
w-bn. It is noticeable that the decision boundary of class 2 expand over class 0 and class 1.
Figure 6.5 illustrates our approach. We first denote G to be a regular batch of images and GC0A64C
to be a batch consists of images sampled only from the target classes. (a) shows a traditional BN
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(a) toy 2D dataset
































Figure 6.4: Shift of decision boundary using weighted BN
layer. Given the input from previous convolutional layer G(1) , the output
G(2) =
G(1) −  [G(1)]√
+0A [G(1)] + n
× W + V.
where W and V are standard batchnorm scaling and shifting trainable parameters.





G(1) − ̂ [G(1) , GC0A64C(1) ]√
+̂0A [G(1) , GC0A64C(1) ] + n
× W + V
where
̂ [G(1) , GC0A64C(1) ] := (1 − d) [G(1)] + d [G
C0A64C
(1) ],
+̂0A [G(1) , GC0A64C(1) ] := (1 − d)+0A [G(1)] + d+0A [G
C0A64C
(1) ] .
The main differences are that the weighted BN layer passes extra batch of the target classes and
assigns more weights to those data when estimating the BN statistics (i.e. batch mean  and batch
variance+0A) in neural network forward pass. It should be noted that during the back-propagation,
only the loss coming from the regular batch (highlighted in dashed red box) is considered. This is
because we aim to preserve the overall accuracy at the same time of reducing the confusion/bias
error.
(a)Fixing confusion error: More instances of the uncertain target classes  and  (those lay around









(b) proposed reweighted BN
Figure 6.5: Illustration of the traditional BN layer and the proposed weighted BN layer.
class  and  drops while sacrificing the confusion between class A, B and other classes.
(b)Fixing bias error: all the three classes , , and  will be included in the target class. The
reason is that this will contract the decision boundaries of all the three classes and the misclassified
ones among them will be more likely to be predicted to other classes. As a result, both confusions
between A and C, and B and C tend to drop. It follows that the bias will be mitigated.
6.2.4 Weighted output smoothing (w-os)
First we denote the last layer’s output of a given input x to be ?(G), which is a< (i.e. the number
of classes) dimensional vector. Each field of ?(G) is positively correlated with the prediction
probability of the class corresponding to that field.
(a)Fixing confusion error: for single-label classification, w-os multiplies the target class predic-
tion probability ?(G)C by a specified parameter [ ∈ [0, 1] for images classified into any of the
target classes  and ; for multi-label classification, w-os multiplies the target class prediction
probability ?(G)C by [ for images predicted to have both target classes  and .
(b)Fixing bias error: for single-label classification, w-os multiplies the target classes prediction
probability ?(G)C by [ for images predicted to be any of the target classes , , and ; for multi-
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label classification, w-os multiplies the target classes prediction probability ?(G)C by [ for images
predicted to have the positive target class  and the anchor target class  or have the negative
target class  and the anchor target class .
In essence, this method tends to make those unsure prediction on the target classes to be pre-
dicted to the most confident non-target classes. Thus, images laying around the decision boundary
of the target classes tend to change prediction early and thus reduce the confusion between target
classes. In order to repair bias error, it reduces the confusion between the two pairs at the same
time. Since most of the influence will be on the higher confused pair(for example A-B), it does not
hurt the overall accuracy much.
Note that this method is analogous to the post-processing method in fairness ML literature[264],
where different thresholds are assigned to each sensitive group for a binary classifier’s to mitigate
equalized odds/opportunity. The thresholds are set to make trade-off between prediction accuracy
and fairness criteria. In contrast, we apply different levels of smoothing for target classes to make
trade-off between accuracy and confusion/bias errors.
6.2.5 Weighted loss (w-loss)
The weighted loss method allows a user to assign more weights to images leading to a confu-
sion error or a bias error.
(a)Fixing confusion error: Denote .C0A64C = {, }. The loss function is defined as:
!>BBA; = (1 − d)E(G,H)∼DL( 5 (G), H)
+ dE(G,H)∼D(.C0A64C )L( 5 (G), H)
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where the probability density function for the distribution D(.C0A64C) is
?35 ′(-,. ) =

?35 (-,. ), if (G, H) ∼ D s.t. H ∈ .C0A64C
and 5 (G) ≠ H and 5 (G) ∈ .C0A64C .
0, otherwise
Intuitively, the DNN model is encouraged to better differentiate between  and  compared with
differentiating among other classes in general.
(b)Fixing bias error: The loss function is defined as:
!>BBA; = (1 − d)E(G,H)∼DL( 5 (G), H)
+ d
(
E(G,H)∼D′(.C0A64C+ )L( 5 (G), H)
+ E(G,H)∼D(.C0A64C− )L( 5 (G), H)
)
where .C0A64C+ = {,} and .C0A64C− = {,}. This loss function encourages the DNN model to
better differentiate between  and as well as  and compared with differentiating among other
classes in general.
6.2.6 Weighted distance-based regularization (w-dbr)
The distance-based regularization method leverages the class-level representation and adds an
extra regularization term in the loss function to balance the distance among the target classes in
the representation space under a defined metric. The insight here is that the closer the two classes
representations are, the more confused the model is between the two classes[78].
Given a class A, we define its class-level representation
%=4F () =
[((=1), ((=2), ..., ((=C)]
#
,
where ((=8) is the sum of each output of neuron =8, given # input images. Then, we define the
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distance metric between two classes A and B as:
=4F (, ) = | | (%=4F (), %=4F ()) | |2
(a)Fixing confusion error: The loss for reducing confusion is defined as:
!>BB31A−2>= 5 = !>BB>A86 − d=4F (, )
where d trades off the original loss and the new distance-based regularization. In essence, the
regularization term encourages a larger separation of the centroids of the two classes  and  in
the representation space.
(b)Fixing bias error: Similarly, we define a new loss for reducing bias:
!>BB31A−180B = !>BB>A86 + d 01B(=4F (,) − =4F (,)).
The regularization term balances the difference between the centroid distance between class  and
, and centroid distance between class  and  in the representation space such that the relative
distances from  to  and  are similar.
6.3 Experimental Design
6.3.1 Study Subjects
We evaluate the proposed method for two applications involving both single-label and multi-
label DNN-based classifications including five combinations of four DNN architectures for four
datasets.
Datasets: We conduct our experiments on two single-label image classification datasets, CIFAR-
10, CIFAR-100 and two multi-label image classification datasets, MS-COCO[105] and MS-COCO
gender[83].
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• CIFAR-10: consists of 50,000 training and 10,000 testing 32x32 color images. It has 10
classes and 6,000 images per class.
• CIFAR-100: consists of 50,000 training and 10,000 testing 32x32 color images. It has 100
classes and 600 images per class.
• MS-COCO: MS-COCO dataset has 80 objects. It contains 80783 training images and 40504
validation images.
• MS-COCO gender: MS-COCO gender dataset is a subset of MS-COCO dataset. The gen-
der information is annotated by Zhao et al. [83]. We remove person class and add man and
woman classes based on the gender annotation.
Architectures: We evaluate our repairing performance on four different convolutional neural net-
works[209, 211].
• ResNet-18: ResNet-18 is trained on CIFAR-10 dataset. the model is trained using the state-
of-the-art training scripts from CutMix[265]. The training takes 300 epochs and the repairing
takes 60 epochs for methods requiring retraining. The initial learning rate is 0.1 and is
multiplied by 0.1 after 50% training epochs and 75% training epochs.
• VGG11_BN: VGG11_BN is a variant of VGG11 model with batch normalization layers
[211]. We train a VGG11_BN model on CIFAR-10 dataset in a same way as above.
• ResNet-34: ResNet-34 is trained on CIFAR-100 dataset. the model is trained in the same
way as above.
• ResNet-50: Following Zhao et al[83], we train ResNet-50 models for both MS-COCO and
MS-COCO gender datasets. Both models are trained for 12 epochs and are repaired by
retraining of another 6 epochs for methods requiring retraining.
Table 6.1 summarizes our study subjects including the details of all the datasets and models
used.
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Table 6.1: Study Subjects
Dataset Model
Classification Models Reported
Task Name #classes #Params #Layers Accuracy
Multi-label COCO [105] 80 ResNet-50[209] 23,671,952 174 0.6603*
classification COCO gender[83] 81 ResNet-50[209] 23,674,001 174 0.6691*
Single-label CIFAR-100[103] 100 ResNet-34 [265] 336,244 101 0.6961†
classification CIFAR-10[103] 10 ResNet-18[265] 127,642 41 0.8747†
VGG11-BN[211] 9,756,426 36 0.9175†
* reported in mean average precision, †reported in mean accuracy
6.3.2 Evaluations Metrics
For either fixing the confusion error or bias error, the goal is to fix the error while maintaining
or even improving the model’s overall accuracy. Since there are two goals i.e. high accuracy
and low confusion/bias a model tries to achieve, for comparison purpose, we rank each fixed
model (including the original model) by accuracy and confusion respectively. Next, we sum up the
two ranks for each model and compare the rank sums. The model with the smallest rank sum is
considered the one that achieves the best trade-off between accuracy and confusion/bias.
Research Questions. With the experimental setting mentioned above, we investigate the following
two research questions to evaluate WR for target bug fixing of DNNs:
• RQ1. Can WR fixes confusion errors of DNN models for both single-label classification and
multi-label classification effectively?
• RQ2. Can WR fixes bias errors of DNN models for both single-label classification and multi-
label classification effectively?
6.4 Results
RQ1. Fixing Confusion Error
In this RQ, we explore if the proposed methods can fix confusion errors effectively. We evaluate
the proposed methods on two settings in the multi-label classification task and three settings in the
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single-label classification task. We choose two hyper-parameters for each method and thus result
in eleven models (including the original model) for each setting.
Table 6.2 shows the results under different settings. We highlight the top3 (or top4 if tied)
methods in terms of rank sum. In summary, under every setting, many of the proposed methods
can achieve lower confusion while preserving decent overall accuracy (or mean average precision
for multi-label classification). For example, w-os can almost always decrease the confusion to
close to 0 under every setting while maintaining accuracy at a reasonable level.
For the multi-label classification task, w-loss strikes the best trade-off between mean aver-
age precision and confusion in terms of the rank sum. On both the COCO and COCO gender
datasets, w-loss improves the mean average precision while also decreasing confusion compared
with the original model. For example, on the COCO dataset, w-loss(0.4) improves the mean aver-
age precision from 0.6603 to 0.6611 and reduces confusion between person and bus from 0.2381
to 0.03457; on the COCO gender dataset, w-loss(0.4) improves the mean average precision from
0.6691 to 0.6697 and reduces confusion between handbag and woman from 0.0394 to 0.02063.
For the single-label classification task, on CIFAR-10 , w-dbr(0.1) is ranked the top while on
CIFAR-100 , w-aug(5) is ranked the top. They also achieve higher accuracy and lower confusion
compared with the original models in the same setting, respectively. In particular, on the CIFAR-
10 dataset and ResNet-18 model, w-dbr(0.1) improves the overall accuracy from 0.8747 to 0.8764
and reduces confusion between cat and dog from 0.096 to 0.09; on the CIFAR-10 dataset and VGG-
11 with BN model, w-bn(0.4) improves the overall accuracy from 0.9175 to 0.919 and reduces
confusion between cat and dog from 0.083 to 0.076; on the CIFAR-100 dataset, w-aug(5) improves
the accuracy from 0.6961 to 0.6697 and reduces confusion between girl and woman from 0.15 to
0.12.
Under all the settings, w-os works very well and gives decent trade-off between accuracy and
confusion. In particular, w-os with different hyper-parameters is ranked at the top3 for every
setting. On the flip side, it has to trade confusion for accuracy. w-bn also works reasonably
well across all the settings but slightly worse than w-os in most settings. Although w-loss works
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Table 6.2: Results on Confusion
Dataset Model Target Method Accuracy Confusion Acc Conf Rank
Classes Rank Rank Sum
COCO * ResNet-50 person, orig 0.6603 0.2381 4 9 13
bus w-aug(3) 0.6563 0.2763 10 10 20
w-aug(5) 0.6531 0.3009 11 11 22
w-bn(0.4) 0.6606 0.101 2 7 9
w-bn(0.6) 0.6585 0.0641 8 6 14
w-os(0.5) 0.6599 0 6 1 7
w-os(0.7) 0.6602 0.1159 5 8 13
w-loss(0.4) 0.6606 0.03457 2 4 6
w-loss(0.6) 0.6611 0.04276 1 5 6
w-dbr(0.5) 0.6589 0.01309 7 2 9
w-dbr(1) 0.6566 0.02491 9 3 12
COCO ResNet-50 handbag, orig 0.6691 0.0394 3 7 10
gender* woman w-aug(3) 0.6679 0.0643 7 8 15
w-aug(5) 0.6646 0.0897 11 11 22
w-bn(0.4) 0.6689 0.00603 4 3 7
w-bn(0.6) 0.6679 0 7 1 8
w-os(0.5) 0.6686 0 6 1 7
w-os(0.7) 0.6688 0.0061 5 4 9
w-loss(0.4) 0.6697 0.02063 1 6 7
w-loss(0.6) 0.6695 0.01754 2 5 7
w-dbr(0.5) 0.6672 0.06763 9 9 18
w-dbr(1) 0.6659 0.06867 10 10 20
CIFAR-100 ResNet-34 girl, orig 0.6961 0.15 3 8 11
woman w-aug(3) 0.7042 0.145 2 7 9
w-aug(5) 0.7043 0.12 1 5 6
w-bn(0.4) 0.6593 0.02 7 3 10
w-bn(0.6) 0.6174 0.005 8 1 9
w-os(0.01) 0.6911 0.055 4 4 8
w-os(0.001) 0.6901 0.01 5 2 7
w-loss(0.4) 0.534 0.17 10 9 19
w-loss(0.6) 0.5342 0.165 9 8 17
w-dbr(0.1) 0.6628 0.125 6 6 12
w-dbr(0.5) 0.6593 0.145 7 7 14
CIFAR-10 ResNet-18 cat, orig 0.8747 0.0960 3 9 12
dog w-aug(3) 0.875 0.093 2 8 10
w-aug(5) 0.8636 0.0915 6 7 13
w-bn(0.4) 0.8313 0.051 8 3 11
w-bn(0.6) 0.781 0.028 10 2 12
w-os(0.1) 0.8654 0.0710 5 4 9
w-os(0.001) 0.8056 0.0195 9 1 10
w-loss(0.4) 0.8566 0.1105 7 10 17
w-loss(0.6) 0.7556 0.172 11 11 22
w-dbr(0.1) 0.8764 0.09 1 6 7
w-dbr(0.5) 0.8699 0.087 4 5 9
VGG-11 cat, orig 0.9175 0.083 2 9 11
with BN dog w-aug(3) 0.9143 0.0655 6 2 8
w-aug(5) 0.9138 0.07 8 3 11
w-bn(0.4) 0.919 0.076 1 6 7
w-bn(0.6) 0.9167 0.0725 4 4 8
w-os(0.1) 0.9173 0.081 3 8 11
w-os(0.001) 0.9086 0.053 9 1 10
w-loss(0.4) 0.7912 0.3135 10 10 20
w-loss(0.6) 0.2017 0.4125 11 11 22
w-dbr(0.1) 0.9151 0.076 5 6 11
w-dbr(0.5) 0.9141 0.0725 7 4 11
* reported in mean average precision
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very well on COCO and COCO gender, it works poorly on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 . A deeper
exploration of the retraining process reveals that its retraining processes on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-
100 tend to be very unstable. For example, on CIFAR-100 , it tends to misclassify dog to cat
much more frequently on one epoch and the reverse on another. w-aug is ranked among the top
on CIFAR-100 and CIFAR-10 but performs quite poorly on COCO and COCO gender. This is
because the causes of confusions between single-label classification and multi-label classification
are different. For CIFAR-100 and CIFAR-10 , the high confusions result from similar features
between two classes when the target classes are oversampled during training, the difference of
features are better learned by models. However, for COCO and COCO gender the confusions
mostly result from two objects appearing together frequently in the same image or having similar
backgrounds. When target classes are oversampled, the confusions may be increased. w-dbr can
reduce confusion for COCO , CIFAR-100 and CIFAR-10 but fail to do so on COCO gender. One
possibility is that the confusion between handbag and woman is already very low and the class
centroids between woman and handbag are far away from each other so the extra loss regularization
term does not help reduce the confusion further.
Figure 6.6 shows some examples of the fixed confusion instances. On the CIFAR-10 dataset,
Figure 6.6(a)-(b) show two cat images that were originally classified to dog by the original model.
After the fixing using w-dbr, they are correctly predicted to cat and Figure 6.6(c)-(d) show two
dog images that were originally classified to cat by the original model. After the fixing using w-
dbr, they are correctly predicted to dog after applying w-dbr. Similarly, on the CIFAR-100 dataset
Figure 6.6(e)-(f) show two girl images that were originally classified to woman by the original
model. After the fixing using w-dbr, they are correctly predicted to girl. Figure 6.6(g)-(h) show
two woman images that were originally classified to girl by the original model. After the fixing
with w-dbr, they are correctly predicted to woman. On the COCO dataset, Figure 6.6(i)-(j) show
two images that contain only person but the original model mispredicts the presence of bus in
them. After fixing using w-loss, the model correctly predicts the presence of person without false
positively predicting the presence of bus. Similarly, Figure 6.6(k)-(l) show two images with only
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bus in them but the original model false positively predicts the presence of person in them as well.
After fixing using w-loss, the model can correctly predict the presence of bus while not falsely
predicting the presence of person in the images.
(a) cat (b) cat (c) dog (d) dog
(e) girl (f) girl (g) woman (h) woman
(i) person (j) person (k) bus (l) bus
Figure 6.6: Fixed confusion errors on CIFAR-10 ((a)-(d)), CIFAR-100 ((e)-(h)), and COCO ((i)-(l))
respectively.
Next, we explore if the proposed methods can be applied to fixing confusion errors among
multiple pairs at the same time. To answer this question, we apply the proposed methods to fixing
confusions between two pairs (one top confused pair and one randomly picked confused pair) on
CIFAR-10 and COCO . Table 6.3 shows the results. On COCO , w-loss(0.6) achieves the best
trade-off between accuracy and confusion. It reduces the summed confusions of two pairs (person-
bus and mouse-keyboard) from 0.4025 to 0.0723 while only sacrificing mean average precision
by 0.0001 (from 0.6604 to 0.6603). On CIFAR-10 , w-dbr(0.1) achieves the best trade-off by
increasing the overall accuracy from 0.8747 to 0.8778 and reducing the confusion from 0.134 to
0.128. We also want to highlight that w-os is ranked in top3 for both settings and significantly
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reduces the confusion in both settings while only slightly sacrificing the mean average precision
and accuracy, respectively.
Table 6.3: Results on Confusion (Two Pairs)
Dataset Model Target Method Accuracy Confusion Acc Conf Rank
Classes Rank Rank Sum
COCO * ResNet-50 (person orig 0.6604 0.4025 1 6 7
, bus), w-aug(3) 0.6564 0.5335 7 7 14
(mouse, w-bn(0.6) 0.6574 0.2032 5 4 9
keyboard) w-os(0.7) 0.6595 0.1937 3 3 6
w-os(0.5) 0.6575 0 4 1 5
w-loss(0.6) 0.6603 0.0723 2 2 4
w-dbr(0.5) 0.6566 0.2954 6 5 11
CIFAR-10 ResNet-18 (cat orig 0.8747 0.134 2 5 7
, dog), w-aug(3) 0.8697 0.149 3 6 9
(automobile, w-bn(0.6) 0.8328 0.082 6 2 8
truck) w-os(0.1) 0.8628 0.1055 4 3 7
w-os(0.001) 0.7788 0.0327 7 1 8
w-loss(0.4) 0.8493 0.1655 5 7 12
w-dbr(0.1) 0.8778 0.128 1 4 5
* reported in mean average precision
We further check the confusion between the target classes and all other classes on CIFAR-10 to
explore how the confusion from the target classes to other classes change when using different
methods. Figure 6.7 shows the result. In the original model, dog(label 5) is highly confused with
cat(label 3) than any other classes. After the fixing, the confusion between dog and cat drops
slightly for w-aug and w-dbr and drops significantly for w-os and w-bn. However, the confusion
between dog and other classes (also cat and other classes) increase at the same time as a trade-off
for all the methods except w-aug. It is also worth noting that w-bn(the purple bars) provides a
uniform distribution of the confusion after fixing. This might be a desirable property if a user does
not want to overburden one particular non-target class in terms of the confusion distribution. The
result also suggests a future exploration direction of our method: by adjusting hyper-parameter,
one can optimize the model such that the maximum pair-wise confusion is the lowest. In other
words, no pair should be confused much larger than other pairs.
Since w-os can be applied when no training data is available or retraining is allowed and can
reduce confusion by a significant amount while only slightly sacrificing the overall performance
under every setting, we conduct an ablation study on its hyper-parameter [ to explore its trade-
off between confusion and accuracy. Figure 6.8 shows the results. Note that by decreasing [,
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(a) confusion between dog and other classes






















(b) confusion between cat and other classes
Figure 6.7: Confusion between target classes and non-target classes for each model on CIFAR-10 .
the confusion decreases and accuracy decrease at the same time. Thus, a user can decide what
parameter to use depending on the significance of accuracy and confusion.















































Figure 6.8: Accuracy and Confusion trade-off of different parameters for w-os.
Result 1: The proposed method WR can effectively fix confusion errors for both single-
label image classification and multi-label image classification. Under every setting, one fixing
method can achieve both higher accuracy and lower confusion than the original model. The
proposed methods also generalize to fixing errors for multiple pairs.
RQ2. Fixing Bias Error
In this RQ, we explore if the proposed methods can fix bias errors. The settings are similar to
those for evaluating confusion error fixing. Table 6.4 shows the results under different settings. In
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summary, the general trend is similar to fixing the confusion error. Under every setting, many of
the proposed methods can achieve lower bias while preserving decent overall accuracy (or mean
average precision for multi-label classification). For example, w-os can significantly decrease the
bias under every setting.
For the multi-label classification task, w-loss strikes the best trade-off between mean average
precision and bias in terms of the rank sum. On both the COCO and COCO gender datasets, w-
loss improves the mean average precision while also decreasing the bias compared with the original
model. For example, on the COCO dataset, w-loss(0.6) improves the mean average precision from
0.6603 to 0.6611 and reduces bias between person and clock with respect to bus from 0.2366
to 0.0425; on the COCO gender dataset, w-loss(0.4) improves the mean average precision from
0.6691 to 0.6706 and reduces bias between woman and man with respect to skis from 0.2630 to
0.02472.
For the single-label classification task, on CIFAR-10 and ResNet-18 model, w-dbr(0.5) is
ranked among the top3 while on CIFAR-100 , w-aug(5) is ranked among the top3. Both meth-
ods achieve higher accuracy and lower bias compared with the original models in the same setting,
respectively. In particular, on CIFAR-10 and ResNet-18 model, w-dbr(0.1) improves the overall
accuracy from 0.8747 to 0.8763 and reduces the bias between dog and cat with respect to bird from
0.092 to 0.062; on CIFAR-100 , w-aug(5) improves the accuracy from 0.6961 to 0.7059 and re-
duces the bias between girl and boy with respect to woman from 0.09 to 0.075. On CIFAR-10 and
VGG-11 with BN model, w-aug(3) has the top1 performance. It significantly decreases the bias
from 0.065 to 0.04 with only slightly decreasing of accuracy from 0.9175 to 0.914.
Similar to fixing confusion errors, under all the settings, w-os works reasonably well and gives
decent trade-off between accuracy and bias. The observations for w-bn, w-loss, w-aug, and w-dbr
are also similar as in performance in fixing confusion errors. In particular, w-bn also can reduce
bias significantly in most settings but tends to be slightly worse than w-os overall. w-loss works
very well for the multi-label classification task but not for the single-label classification task. w-
aug performs much better on CIFAR-100 and CIFAR-10 than on COCO and COCO gender. w-dbr
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Table 6.4: Results on Bias
Dataset Model Target Method Accuracy Bias Acc Conf Rank
Classes Rank Rank Sum
COCO * ResNet-50 bus, orig 0.6603 0.2366 3 6 9
person, w-aug(3) 0.6563 0.2760 10 8 18
clock w-aug(5) 0.6532 0.2951 11 9 20
w-bn(0.4) 0.6581 0.2445 8 7 15
w-bn(0.6) 0.6576 0.1983 9 5 14
w-os(0.5) 0.6599 0 5 1 6
w-os(0.7) 0.6602 0.1160 4 4 8
w-loss(0.4) 0.6607 0.04131 2 2 4
w-loss(0.6) 0.6611 0.0425 1 3 4
w-dbr(0.5) 0.6595 0.3589 7 11 18
w-dbr(1) 0.6599 0.3557 5 10 15
COCO gender* ResNet-50 skis, orig 0.6691 0.2630 3 8 11
woman, w-aug(3) 0.6648 0.2972 9 10 19
man w-aug(5) 0.6623 0.3190 11 11 22
w-bn(0.4) 0.6656 0.1277 8 5 13
w-bn(0.6) 0.6645 0.0861 10 4 14
w-os(0.5) 0.6685 0 6 1 7
w-os(0.7) 0.6689 0.2119 4 6 10
w-loss(0.4) 0.6706 0.02472 1 3 4
w-loss(0.6) 0.6703 0.02232 2 2 4
w-dbr(0.5) 0.6687 0.2606 5 7 12
w-dbr(1) 0.6684 0.2877 7 9 16
CIFAR-100 ResNet-34 woman, orig 0.6961 0.09 3 11 14
girl, w-aug(3) 0.7002 0.075 2 9 11
boy w-aug(5) 0.7059 0.075 1 9 10
w-bn(0.2) 0.6892 0.040 5 4 9
w-bn(0.4) 0.6584 0.0050 10 1 11
w-os(0.001) 0.688 0.01 6 2 8
w-os(0.1) 0.6944 0.06 4 6 10
w-loss(0.1) 0.6748 0.06 7 6 13
w-loss(0.4) 0.5804 0.07 11 8 19
w-dbr(0.1) 0.6668 0.04 8 4 12
w-dbr(0.5) 0.6639 0.015 9 3 12
CIFAR-10 ResNet-18 dog, orig 0.8747 0.092 2 10 12
cat, w-aug(3) 0.8696 0.073 4 8 12
bird w-aug(5) 0.8605 0.0705 5 7 12
w-bn(0.4) 0.8498 0.053 6 4 10
w-bn(0.6) 0.8103 0.047 7 3 10
w-os(0.01) 0.7675 0.016 10 1 11
w-os(0.5) 0.8731 0.04 3 2 5
w-loss(0.4) 0.7964 0.0915 8 9 17
w-loss(0.6) 0.7348 0.1005 11 11 22
w-dbr(0.5) 0.8763 0.062 1 6 7
w-dbr(1) 0.7845 0.060 9 5 14
VGG-11 dog, orig 0.9175 0.065 1 9 10
with BN cat, w-aug(3) 0.914 0.04 6 1 7
bird w-aug(5) 0.9123 0.048 7 3 10
w-bn(0.4) 0.915 0.057 5 7 12
w-bn(0.6) 0.9161 0.0525 3 4 7
w-os(0.1) 0.9166 0.063 2 8 10
w-os(0.001) 0.9012 0.054 9 6 15
w-loss(0.4) 0.8031 0.1780 10 11 21
w-loss(0.6) 0.6395 0.1715 11 10 21
w-dbr(0.5) 0.916 0.0445 4 2 6
w-dbr(1) 0.9099 0.050 8 5 13
* reported in mean average precision
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can reduce bias for COCO , CIFAR-100 and CIFAR-10 but fail to do so on COCO gender.
Figure 6.6 shows two examples of the fixed bias instances. In particular, Figure 6.9(a) shows
an image containing a woman and a skis but the original model classifies the woman to man. After
fixing using w-loss, the model correctly predicts the presence of woman and skis. Figure 6.9(b)
shows an image containing several woman, man and skis while the original model only predicts
the presence of only man and skis but misses woman. After fixing the model using w-loss, the
model successfully recovers the presence woman, man and skis.
(a) woman, skis (b) woman, man, skis
Figure 6.9: Fixed bias errors on COCO gender.
Result 2: The proposed method WR can effectively fix bias errors for both single-label im-
age classification and multi-label image classification. Under every setting, one fixing method
can achieve both higher accuracy and lower bias than the original model.
6.5 Related Work
6.5.1 Program Repair
Automatic software repair is very challenging and most of existing automatic program repair-
ing works focus on traditional software.[23]. Traditional automatic repairing techniques include
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random or guided mutation of AST(Abstract Syntax Tree)[24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31], static
program analysis or symbolic execution/concrete execution[32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37]. The most
recent techniques involve language models training and program synthesis[38, 39]. All these tech-
niques proposed to repair traditional programs such as C, C++, Java or Python, cannot work on
DNN based software because there is no program logic or AST in DNN models. In this paper, we
propose, compare and discuss Weighted Regularization for automatic target repairing techniques
on DNN based software repair for group-level errors.
6.5.2 DNN Testing and Repairing
An increasing number of works in SE for AI area focus on DNN testing and repairing. The
testing techniques usually leverage metamorphic relation as oracle and coverage guided image
transformation or perturbation for generating test cases[44, 53, 50, 54, 196, 266, 56]. Data aug-
mentation and retraining techniques are usually proposed for repairing DNN models in improving
overall accuracy[63, 64, 65]. There are also works in improving robustness of models against ad-
versarial instances[55, 60, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75]. All of these papers focus on
repairing instance-wise bugs i.e. a model’s failure on the variations of a given image. In contrast,
our paper focuses on fixing group-level errors.
6.5.3 Fairness
Fairness is an important problem from both a theoretical and a practical perspective [134, 135,
136, 137]. Related works in fairness usually define a fairness criteria and then optimize the original
objective while satisfying the fairness criteria [138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143]. These properties are
defined either at individual [138, 144, 145] or group levels [146, 139, 147]. Our paper focuses on
the fixing techniques of a group level fairness definition called bias error proposed in [78], and to
the best of our knowledge, our proposed repairing methods for which have not been studied in the
previous literature.
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6.6 Discussion & Threats to Validity
There are many potential ways to fix group-level errors of DNNs. To mitigate this threat,
we propose and compare the performance of five different methods. For each method, we set a
parameter to make trade-off between accuracy and confusion. We only rank the results using two
parameters for each method to compare different methods’ performance.
There are many datasets and models, which can be used for the evaluation purpose. We choose
five combinations of four widely used datasets and models in the computer vision field. Besides,
DNN training is stochastic so the results may have some fluctuations. The general patterns of the
results we observe hold across different runs of the same methods. Lastly, our method can be
applied to DNN models used in applications beyond image classifications such as object detection
and recommendation systems. We leave that for future work.
6.7 Summary
In this work, we propose a generic method called Weighted Regularization(WR) that can fix
group-level errors for deep neural networks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
proposing, exploring and comparing target fixing methods, which can be applied in different stages
of DNN retraining or inference, on repairing group-level DNN model errors. Our experimental
results show that WR can effectively fix confusion and bias errors and these methods all have their
pros, cons and applicable scenarios.
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Conclusion
In this thesis, we show the limitation of traditional software engineering techniques on
DNN based software and discussed the necessity of developing new software engineering
techniques for DNN based software to ensure the functionality, safety as well as fairness. To this
end, new challenges such as test generation, software testing, software repairing, software fairness
should be addressed for DNN based software. We firstly introduced the development of the new
area SE for AI, an intersection area between software engineering and artificial intelligence and
then presented four major projects addressing these new challenges in SE for AI area. Our first
project (Chapter 3) designed and implemented systematic testing tool for DNN based software.
We applied our tool on three top performing DNN based self-driving car models in Udacity
self-driving car challenge and it identified thousands of erroneous behaviours. Our second project
studied per-point robustness of DNNs under natural variation. We proposed both white-box and
black-box approaches to identify non-robust data points for DNN based image classifiers and
DNN based self-driving car models. We implemented and evaluated our approaches on 9 DNN
based image classifiers and 3 DNN based self-driving car models. Our approaches can identify
weak points with reasonably good precision and recall for both DNN based image classifiers and
self-driving cars. Our third project(Chapter 5) proposed a neuron coverage based distance metric
to identify group-level errors(confusion and bias errors) for DNN based software and it identified
group-level errors in widely used models trained on popular single-label and multi-label image
classification datasets. Our last project(Chapter 6) proposed five different weighted regularization
techniques to repair group-level errors(confusion and bias errors) for DNN based software. Our
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results show that all these five different weighted regularization techniques can effectively fix
group-level errors with minimal cost for different scenarios. Finally, we summarized our
contribution and discussed some open problems and potential future exploration.
Collectively, these projects promote the emerge and advancement of SE for AI area and
contribute to the assuring of functionality, safety as well as fairness for DNN based software. We
summarize the contributions of main published papers in the following:
• Presented a neuron coverage guided test generation techniques for DNN based software.
Leveraged realistic image transformations to synthesize realistic corner cases for
self-driving car models. Applied domain-specific metamorphic relations to generating
oracle for these new generated test cases. Implemented these techniques in DeepTest and
applied it on three top performing self-driving car models in Udacity self-driving car
challenge. DeepTest identified thousands of erroneous behaviours that may lead to potential
fatal crash.[53]
• Conducted an empirical study on per-point robustness of DNNs under natural variation.
Found that specific weak points near decision boundary will result in erroneous behaviours
under natural variations. Designed and implemented a white-box
approach(DEEPROBUST-W) and a black-box approach(DEEPROBUST-B) to identify these
weak data points for DNN based software. Evaluated our approaches to testing 9 DNN
based image classifiers and 3 DNN based self-driving car models. Our results show that
DEEPROBUST-W and DEEPROBUST-B are able to achieve an F1 score of up to 91.4% and
99.1%, respectively in testing DNN based image classifiers. DEEPROBUST-W is effective
in identifying weak data points with F1 score up to 78.9% in testing DNN based
self-driving car models.[76]
• Introduced group-level errors, which is another type of errors DNN based software suffers,
different from instance-wise errors. Categorized group-level errors into confusion errors
and bias errors based on real-world reports. Proposed neuron coverage based distance
133
metric to test DNN based software for confusion errors and bias errors. Implemented these
techniques in DeepInspect and applied it to six different popular image classification
datasets and eight pretrained DNN models, including three robust trained models. It
identified confusion errors with precision up to 100% (avg. 72.6%) bias errors up to 84.3%
(avg. 66.8%). It found hundreds of classification mistakes in widely used models, many
exposing errors indicating confusion or bias.[78]
• Proposed five weighted regularization techniques to automatically repair confusion errors
and bias errors for DNN based software. These five weighted regularization techniques
function at different phases of retraining or inference of DNNs to make the model take more
effort in learning from target classes. These techniques can be applied in different scenarios
including even retraining is not possible. Implemented these techniques in WR and applied
it to four widely-used datasets and architectures. The results show that WR can effectively
fix confusion errors and bias errors with minimal cost of the overall performance.
We summarize the limitation and future work of main published papers in the following:
• Our techniques proposed in DeepTest leverage neuron coverage to measure the quality of
generated test cases and how well DNN based software are tested. Future works may
include the exploration and comparison of other coverage techniques such as neuron set and
neuron path coverage, etc. for DNN based software. We proposed neuron coverage guided
test generation techniques. In future, other search based fuzzing techniques can be explored
and compared. In DeepTest, we specifically applies our implementation on DNN based
self-driving cars models. These models only have camera input and output steering angles.
Future testing of DNN based self-driving car may handle more sensors’ inputs and other
outputs such as brake, acceleration control, etc. besides steering angles.
• We studied per-point robustness of DNNs under natural variation in DeepRobust. We
observed that specific weak points are more likely to fail a DNN based software under
natural transformations. Then, we proposed a white-box approach(DEEPROBUST-W) and a
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black-box approach(DEEPROBUST-B) to identify these weak points for DNN based image
classifiers and self-driving cars. The results show that they can effectively identify
weak/strong points with high precision and recall. Future work may include the exploration
of other consistency analysis methods [238] such as variation ratio, entropy etc. We can
also prioritize test cases based on identified weak points[230, 231] or retrain DNNs with
weak points to improve DNNs’ robustness [55].
• We introduce group-level errors in DeepInspect, orthogonal to instance-wise errors for
DNN based software. There are very few existing works studying group-level errors. In
future, we expect more exploration such as white-box based interpretation and debugging
techniques for group-level errors for DNN based software. In future other types of errors
could be explored and discovered, besides group-level errors and instance-wise errors. As
more and more DNN based software are developed and deployed in real world, we expect
that the fairness issue becomes more serious and our proposed bias errors will be
investigated and studied in more depth.
• In our last project, we proposed five different weighted regularization techniques to repair
group-level errors. We evaluated these techniques on popular single-label and multi-label
DNN based image classification. Future works may include repairing other applications
such as object recognition and recommending systems, etc. We proposed weighted
regularization in different stages of retraining or inference of DNNs to repair group-level
errors. In future other DNN repairing techniques such as weights updates and layers
adding/removing, etc. can be studied and compared. We also expect that increasing number
of works published in SE for AI area will focus on repairing DNN based software.
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